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Abstract 
 
This study aims to discuss the changing hegemonic struggles among the state, business and 
NGOs in the development of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry. Although 
rare earths are indispensable to myriad clean technologies, mining and processing rare earth ores 
cause heavy pollution. As the world‟s largest supplier, China‟s rare earth industry has developed 
at huge environmental cost. Environmental pollution in the upstream supply chains of the high-
tech and new-energy industries becomes one of the most thorny issues in China‟s environmental 
governance. With the critical reviews on the varieties of capitalism approach and the neo-
Gramscian governance studies, the study proposes a neo-Gramscian perspective on varieties of 
environmental governance, through merging a macro-level analysis of institutional diversity with 
a micro-level understanding of Gramscian hegemonic struggles. In line with an interpretivist 
stance, the study employs a qualitative case study approach to investigate the institutional 
variations of the state in China‟s varieties of governance from a planned economy to a market 
economy and the changing hegemonic struggles involved, with consideration of the complex 
historical trajectories and distinctive political economies in China. Based on the empirical 
evidence collected via semi-structured interviews and documentary reviews, the study carries out 
a critical discourse analysis to discuss a series of contested environmental issues in China‟s rare 
earth industry. Empirical findings conclude that the genres of China‟s varieties of governance 
have been transformed from highly prescriptive planning to government supervision, and the 
state still plays a leading role in regulating and coordinating contemporary alliance building. The 
study enriches the abstract VoC typologies with China‟s institutional diversity; extends the 
Gramsci framework to China‟s regime with particular emphasis of state power; provides a more 
plural and dynamic understanding of the hegemonic struggles within China‟s varieties of 
governance. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
1.1.1 An Introduction to China’s Environmental Governance  
 
We must be fully aware of the severity and complexity of our country‟s 
environmental situation and the importance and urgency of strengthening 
environmental protection. Protecting the environment is to protect the homes we 
live in and the foundations for the development of the nation … China should be 
on high alert to fight against worsening environmental pollution and ecological 
deterioration in some regions, and environmental protection should be given a 
higher priority for the development of national modernisation.1 
 
At the Sixth National Environmental Protection Conference in 2006, the former Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao made a significant speech, addressing the importance of environmental governance 
for further modernisation of the nation, and highlighting environmental protection as an 
important ingredient of the assessment system of economic and social development in China. In 
fact, over the past three decades, China has experienced phenomenal economic growth. Similarly 
to all hyper-developing countries in the world, China has also suffered from serious 
environmental and resource sustainability challenges as well as deterioration of its environmental 
self-repair capacity since the 1970s. Facing more threats from environmental degradation and a 
serious imbalance between economic growth and sustainable development, since the 1980s, the 
Chinese government has gradually shifted their focus from purely pursuing economic growth 
and output maximisation, to pollution control and sustainable development, so as to realise 
sustainable resource development and environmental protection in the pursuit of economic 
growth. 
 
As a single-party regime – „a rule of persons‟ tradition, more specifically – the historical 
trajectories of one-party dominance over 5,000 years has heavily shaped the development of 
environmental governance in China, although the top-down decision-making system has been 
                                                 
1
 Extracted from the transcripts of the speech of the former Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, at the Sixth National 
Environmental Protection Conference in 2006 in Beijing, China. The full text is available at: 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200604/24/eng20060424_260577.html. 
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widely criticised concerning the feasibility and effectiveness of green growth planning and 
implementation. The state plays a dominate role in environmental governance, and the 
environmental administrative authorities in the central government and at different levels of local 
governments are particularly important. For example, at the current stage, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) of the People‟s Republic of China (PRC) is endowed with the 
decision-making power in environmental governance by the central state, in alliance with the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MA), the Ministry of Public Health (MPH), the Ministry of Water 
Resources (MWR), and the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), as well as working together 
with the Ministry of Commerce (MC) responsible for formulating policies on bilateral and 
multilateral trade, and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) responsible 
for broad administrative and planning control over the Chinese economy. The different levels of 
local governments, including provincial level, prefectural level, county level, township and 
village level, are responsible for implementing national policies and regulations, monitoring 
pollution sources, and distributing pollution discharge permits (Harashima, 2000; Lan et al., 
2006). Thus, lower-level environmental authorities can more easily assess the sources of 
pollution, obtain detailed information about the local environment and develop the practical 
strategies to fight local environmental deterioration. The variations of state power in the 
development of China‟s environmental governance during the past six decades will be clearly 
explained in this thesis. 
 
With increased industrialisation and urbanisation in China, the environmental influences of 
corporate activities make societal responses to environmental issues significant in firms. Since 
the 1990s, confronting the devastating effects of environmental degradation across the country, 
the central state has begun to require the large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to establish 
internal environmental monitoring departments and designate professional staff to conduct 
internal environmental audits. However, at the beginning, with strong government administrative 
interventions in environmental governance of state-owned industries, including extractive 
industries, the increasing transparency of monitors on business only enriched the experience of 
the government regarding the control of information for environmental governance; at the 
corporate level, with the heritage of the primary consideration of economic imperative in China‟s 
planned economy, the internal environmental audits in large SOEs were not very transparent, and 
were also vulnerable to the public, which generated an „ongoing paradox‟ to involve the business 
sector actively in governance in the environmental arena (Wang, 2005, p. 278). In recent years, 
reacting to the government‟s increased commitments and efforts to fight against industrial 
12 
 
pollution activities, as well as responding to civil society‟s increasing concerns over the adverse 
environmental consequences, firms have begun to focus on improvement of their environmental 
competitiveness (Chang and Wang, 2010; Lo and Tang, 2014), which will be expanded further 
and discussed in more detail. 
 
Before the 1990s, the communication channels among the state, business, and civil society had 
always been ignored, and the low level of environmental awareness of the populace had made 
such communication useless (Harashima, 2000; Lan et al., 2006). Since the 1990s, with the 
gradual relaxation of state control over public discourse, and the improvements in national 
education, as well as the ever more open-minded approach to societal influences on 
environmental governance from Western ideas, the environmental awareness and receptiveness 
of Chinese civil society to government environmental programmes have been gradually 
improved (Ho and Vermeer, 2006; Lan et al., 2006), and civic environmental non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) have been emerging and flourishing in China. Since the mid-1990s, civil 
society studies in China have emerged. However, the idea of civil society, derived from Western 
historical experience, seems to be problematic as a way of understanding social changes in 
Chinese society, which is integrated with different institutional foundations, historical 
trajectories and social characteristics (Saich, 2001). Civil society in China usually designates an 
„informally structured network of NGOs that have a loose relation with the Party-state‟ (Liu, 
2006, p. 54; Saich, 2006; Yu and Guo, 2012). Under the Chinese soft authoritarian political 
economy, as the only legitimate means to effect transformative movement of the democratisation 
process, NGOs have become an exclusive channel for the public to struggle for hegemonic 
power in China. The state, on the one hand, integrates NGOs into bargaining processes; on the 
other hand, it controls them strictly and bans them from acting autonomously from the 
government (Heberer, 2012). Grassroots green NGOs have been tightly restricted to ensure they 
do not challenge the established political authorities, and the „non-oppositional stance‟ secures 
for them survival and growth, but limits their role in creating an inclusive political process in 
China (Tang and Zhan, 2014, p. 197). Under the strict government control, most environmental 
NGOs function as „promoting China‟s green image, facilitating foreign assistance, conducting 
environmental research, mobilising popular support in the implementation of the government‟s 
green policies, and socialising green values‟ (Lo et al., 2001, p. 306; Lan et al., 2006; Lo and 
Leung, 2014). In the context of the Chinese strong state-dominated society (Frolic, 1997; Tang, 
1996), the thesis provides an in-depth analysis of how Chinese civil society is gradually 
13 
 
becoming a „visible player‟ in China‟s environmental politics (Huang, 2013; Lan et al., 2006; 
Tang and Zhan, 2014; Yang, 2005). 
 
1.1.2 Environmental Issues in China’s Rare Earth Industry 
 
We are addicted to rare earths as much as we are addicted to oil. Without these 
elements, much of the modern economy will just plain shut down (King, 2009, p. 
3). 
 
As pointed out by Byron King, editor of Energy & Scarcity Investors, rare earths are 
indispensable to myriad intermediate and end users in „clean‟ technology. Moving into a new era 
of low-carbon economy, the global demand of rare earths has been greatly driven up by the rapid 
development of vibrant high-tech and new-energy industries. Rare earths, including a group of 
15 metallic elements plus scandium and yttrium, have a range of special electronic, magnetic, 
optical and catalytic properties, which can be added to a range of compounds and alloys to boost 
the performance of complex engineered systems that have been widely used in global high-tech 
industries (Mason, 2009; Pool, 2012; Saefong, 2009). Nowadays, most people are quite familiar 
with wind turbines, hybrid and electric vehicles, permanent magnetic motors, renewable energy 
mobile phones, flat screen display panels, computer monitors and hard drives, catalytic 
converters, compact fluorescent light bulbs and so on, but it is not widely known that all these 
products are dependent on the unique properties of rare earth materials. 
 
For example, with increasingly stricter requirements on operational efficiency in high-tech 
industries, rare earths in permanent magnet motors can function efficiently at higher 
temperatures without permanent magnetisation loss, and secure the reliability, efficiency and 
economic viability of motors (Melfi et al., 2008). Rare earth materials not only reduce the weight 
of motors, but also boost the power density, which provides an effective solution to the conflict 
between two important input indicators: light weight and high power (Bernstein Group, 2011; 
Murray, 1990). More specifically, Ford Motor Co. used rare earth oxides to conserve precious 
metal consumption in vehicles‟ catalytic converters, reducing the precious-metal cost by 40% 
from 2002 to 2004 (Stoll, 2004). Taking Toyota‟s Prius as another example, each motor of the 
Prius eats up one kilogram of neodymium and each battery requires 10 to 15 kg of lanthanum. 
The total global sales of hybrid cars have reached 500,000 annually, which consumed rare earth 
materials at a prodigious rate (Conner, 2009; Gorman, 2009). 
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The increasing consumption of rare earths in new-energy and high-tech industries has driven up 
rare earth shortage in the global market (ibid; Bourzac, 2011). Statistics from the Bernstein Black 
Book show that, from the early 2000s, global consumption of rare earth oxides has grown at 8-12% 
per annum and global demand has further outweighed supply, resulting in an ongoing surge in 
rare earth value (Bernstein Group, 2011). The uneven geological distribution of rare earths 
aggravates the global shortage, concentrating their processing in a few countries, including 
Australia, the United States (US, California), Brazil, South Africa, Greenland and Vietnam. The 
mother lode of rare earths is located in Baotou in China‟s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region2. 
China has 36% of the global deposits of rare earth oxides, and supplies more than 90% of global 
rare earth mineral consumption (Cooney, 2010; Nesbit, 2013; Saefong, 2009; Tabuchi, 2010).  
 
Although rare earth materials have been widely applied in many clean-energy and high-tech 
industries, in the upstream supply chains, the processes of mining, smelting and separating rare 
earth ores are heavily polluting (Bernstein Group, 2011; The State Council Information Office of 
the PRC, 2012). The Chinese rare earth industry, as the world's largest rare earth producer and 
supplier, had been operating at a lower level of rough processing for a long period, so that the 
huge economic profits of the rare earth industry came at the very tragic expense of the ecological 
environment. The recycling rates of rare earths are much lower than other metals; for example, 
neodymium, holmium, terbium, samarium, and dysprosium can only be recycled at rates less 
than 1% of the total primary metal input (Burton, 2011; Graedel et al., 2011). Moreover, they are 
very difficult to detect in the environment after emission (ibid; Rusu et al., 2006). According to 
the White Book – China’s Rare Earth Conditions and Policies (short for White Book), the 
processes of smelting and separating rare earth resources generate huge quantities of „toxic and 
hazardous gases and waste water with a high concentration of ammonium nitrogen and 
radioactive residues‟, which heavily pollute and poison ecological environment systems  (The 
State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2012, p. 11). 
 
Bayan Obo Mining District is located in the city of Baotou, China. The light rare earth deposits 
in Bayan Obo account for 87.1% of the total deposits in China, which has made Baotou the 
world‟s largest supplier of rare earth materials and greatly promoted local economic growth. 
                                                 
2
 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, located in northern China adjacent to Mongolia, is one of the 34 provincial-
level administrative areas, including: 4 municipalities; 23 provinces (including Taiwan); 5 autonomous regions; and 
2 special administrative regions. 
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However, after the traditionally protected rare earth industry gradually opening to the domestic 
private enterprises since the 1980s, with higher profit temptation and lower entry barriers, 
Baotou‟s rare earth industry once attracted more than 150 small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs), 
engaging immoderately in rare earth mining and processing. Without enough centralised 
administration and government control at the beginning of the nationwide „corporate reform‟ 
during the mid-1990s, serious mining chaos emerged in Baotou, and caused a huge waste of rare 
earth resources and a sharp deterioration of the local environment. Until the late 1990s, more 
than one hundred rare earth ore tailings dams, saturated with toxic substances, had emerged on 
the outskirts of Baotou. Locating one of the largest rare earth ore tailings dams on Google Maps, 
a big „lake‟ can be found about 10 km west of the city of Baotou, known as „Weikuang Dam‟, 
shown in Figure 1. From the air, the huge tailings dam looks like a big lake, but on the ground, 
the lake becomes a murky expanse of toxic water with no biological survival, which is heavily 
poisoning the local environment. 
 
 
Figure 1 One of the Rare Earth Tailings Dams in Baotou, China, positioned on Google Maps  
(Source: 
https://www.google.co.uk/maps/place/Weikuang+Dam,+Kundulun,+Baotou,+China/@40.6370636,109.6991988,14
z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x360fe45a81d762bb:0x2f17c9cc30c9af55 ). 
16 
 
 
In recent years, under the newly established national policy of „Scientific Outlook on 
Development3, proposed by Hu Jintao‟s government in 2003, realising sustainable development 
has become one of the most important principles for all businesses. A new era of low-carbon 
economy not only requires more environmentally friendly end products, but also appeals to 
green supply chain management at the most upstream stage. For the heavily-polluting extractive 
industries in China, especially the rare earth industry, responding to ever more stringent 
environmental requirements from the central state, and facing increasing international 
environmental standards after China‟s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001, as well as reacting to the growing pressure from investors, markets, environmental NGOs 
and the public, environmental pollution in the upstream supply chain of many „clean energy‟ 
industries becomes a rather „ironic‟ and „thorny‟ problem in the development of China‟s 
environmental governance.  
 
1.1.3 A Case for Studying Environmental Governance of China’s Rare Earth Industry 
 
It is a worldwide phenomenon that many key industries including extractive industries are either 
directly or indirectly controlled and monitored by the state. China‟s rare earth industry has 
always been regarded as the key national strategic asset, and the state plays more of a key role 
than in other industries in its environmental governing practices. In order to investigate the exact 
themes of different roles of the state, business and civil society in the development of China‟s 
environmental governance, a case study is conducted on the largest SOE in the Chinese rare 
earth industry: Baotou Steel Rare Earth Group (BSRE for short). Due to the special historical, 
political, and social roots, SOEs in China include not only corporations invested in and owned b y 
the central state, but also those invested in and owned by local governments. BSRE is a typical 
local SOE, which was established in 1961 with the mission to explore the world‟s largest rare 
earth treasure in Baotou, Bayan Obo Mining District.  
 
The 1990s‟ mining chaos in Baotou caused a series of serious environmental problems to the 
local ecological environment. From the early 2000s, reacting to the huge waste of rare earth 
                                                 
3
 The „Scientific Outlook on Development‟ was proposed in 2003 by Hu Jintao‟s government, as one of the leading 
socio-economic development principles, incorporating the concepts of sustainable development, scientific socialism, 
increased democracy, humanistic society, and ultimately, the establishment of a socialist harmonious society. The 
full text of Hu Jintao‟s report at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is available at: 
http://en.people.cn/102774/8024779.html. 
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resources and the serious deterioration of the local environment, as well as responding to the 
dramatic growth of global rare earth demands, the central state has gradually realised the 
importance of rare earths as a strategic resource for China‟s economic development and 
environmental governance, and has carried out a series of consolidation plans to integrate 
China‟s rare earth industry, targeting the establishment of a strong pricing system and an integral 
marketing system as well as an effective environmental governance system (The State Council 
Information Office of the PRC, 2012). In 2001, in order to implement the geologically 
environmental control and restoration of the rare earth industry, and promote its green update 
and energy conservation, the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) proposed a two-
year plan to consolidate the national rare earth industry, and establish the „Northern and Southern 
Rare Earth Groups‟ to secure stronger economic and technical strengths as well as resource and 
energy advantages. However, this plan was finally suspended in 2003, due to unexpected  
governmental reorganisation and unforeseen cross-ownership problems. After 2003, under the 
new government‟s leadership, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has 
begun to take over the consolidation process of China‟s rare earth indus try, targeting 
improvement in its pricing and competitiveness in the global market, as well as establishing an 
effective environmental governance system. After that, with the central state‟s instructions as 
well as the local governments‟ support, BSRE fully engaged in an industrial consolidation 
process, and finally, BSRE monopolised the whole rare earth industry in northern China. 
Nowadays, BSRE, with four major advantages, namely strong government support, huge 
resource deposit, outstanding research and development capability, and integrated industrial 
chain in the Chinese market, has become the largest supplier of rare earth materials in the world. 
 
Thus, BSRE‟s development and integration represent the full image of the Chinese rare earth 
industry during the past six decades, and the changes of BSRE‟s involvement in environmental 
governance are typical to the transitions of the environmental governance of China‟s rare earth 
industry. With the strong specificities of extractive industries as national strategic assets, the 
changing discourses of environmental governance of the rare earth industry display the 
variations of the state and the distinct hegemonic struggles involved, as well as the different 
themes of the roles of the state, business and civil society in the development of China‟s 
environmental governance, all of which are set within a distinctive regime with „Chinese 
characteristics‟.  
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1.2 Aim of the Study 
 
This research aims to investigate the changing themes of the roles of the state, business and civil 
society, as well as their changing power relations in the development of China‟s environmental 
governance, which evolved from a centralised planned economy (between the 1950s and the 
1980s) to a market-oriented economy (from the 1990s to now) in China. Since the 1950s, the 
rare earth industry, as the pillar industry in Baotou, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, has 
brought a large amount of economic profits to spur local economic growth, but at the huge costs 
of environmental degradation and resource depletion, especially in the 1990s‟ mining chaos. 
With ever more focus from government agencies, corporations and NGOs placed on the green 
performance of the rare earth industry, the environmental governance practices of China‟s rare 
earth industry have become the most significant and representative cases in discussing the 
changing discourses of China‟s environmental governance. Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
is the researcher‟s home region, which provides the researcher with more opportunities to access 
the local rare earth industry. With an in-depth case study on BSRE, the thesis discusses the 
changing roles of three main actors in the development of environmental governance of China‟s 
rare earth industry, including different levels of government, BSRE and green NGOs, as well as 
their complex hegemonic struggles over the environmental issues in different periods in New 
China. 
 
The development of environmental governance in China is divided into two timeline stages. The 
first stage is from the foundation of New China in 1949 to the early 1990s, when China had 
followed a Soviet-style model and experienced a long period of „planned economy‟. After the 
nationwide „Socialist Transformation‟ in the 1950s, almost all private enterprises in China had 
been forced to convert to collective ownership and state ownership. For BSRE, the Inner 
Mongolia and Baotou local governments were the only two shareholders. In national governance, 
the state implemented extremely tight ideological and social control in the form of „command‟, 
and the highly prescriptive plans from the central state determined everything in China. 
Commencing in 1978, the Communist Party of China (CPC) led by Deng Xiaoping began to 
transform the economic system towards a „market economy‟, in which non-state enterprises were 
allowed to produce and compete with SOEs in the market. However, the legacy left by the 
former command economy deeply hindered the reform, which retained the supreme position of 
the central administrative plans in business before the early 1990s. Thus, a  typical „big-
government‟ era had lasted more than forty years in China; and in order to achieve phenomenal 
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economic growth and large-scale industrialisation rapidly, an extensive growth model with fewer 
environmental concerns was adopted by the central state. Under such a government-led 
development model, first of all, the researcher tries to identify the unique politico-economic 
features by considering the particular historical-geographical heritages related to the unique 
institutional foundations. With a deep understanding of China‟s institutional diversity during the 
planned economy, the researcher tries to clarify the different roles of the main actors in the 
environmental governance of the rare earth industry and illustrate the distinctive power relations 
within such state-dominated politics.  
 
The second stage is from Deng Xiaoping‟s southern visit in 1992. Deng made a profound 
decision to „establish the socialist market economy‟, which marked the new wave of market-
oriented reforms in China. Since then, in order to improve business competitiveness and 
information transparency, the central state has required all SOEs to accept a series of „major 
surgeries‟ in terms of their industrial structures and specificities, administrative structures, and 
ownership; while private and foreign-funded enterprises have been widely allowed to compete 
with SOEs in the market. At the same time, a gradual relaxation of the Party‟s control over 
public discourse provides opportunities for environmental NGOs‟ survival and development. 
Although the unique Chinese historical and political trajectories of one-party dominance over 
5,000 years still retain the „big-government‟ overtone in contemporary environmental 
governance in China, the potentials of non-state actors in securing sustainable development have 
gradually been unlocked. Within such a unique and complex politico-economic context, this 
research aims to investigate the changing discourses of China‟s environmental governance, 
through evaluating how government agencies secure the hegemonic power but decentralise 
partial power to business and civil society; how corporations become engaged in improving 
environmental competitiveness; and how environmental NGOs carry out their green activities; as 
well as in which ways the three main actors have been involved in contemporary alliance 
building in the modern environmental governance system in China. 
 
1.3 Developing an Approach 
 
1.3.1 Varieties of Capitalism in China 
 
First of all, in order to investigate the environmental struggles within the particular empirical 
setting of the Chinese governance regime, it is necessary to understand the uniqueness of China‟s 
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politico-economic system, which is significantly dissimilar to both the Anglo-Saxon model in the 
US and the UK (United Kingdom), and the coordinated market economies in France, Germany 
and Japan. Post-World War II capitalism has been manifested meaningfully in different systems 
of economic organisation in the industrialised market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001), 
which direct to different types of „logics of economic activities and rules of the game‟ (Morgan, 
2011, p. 14; Scott, 1987), and government agencies, business and NGOs also have different ways 
of gaining an understanding of and exerting impacts on the environmental regime (Levy and 
Newell, 2005; Wittneben et al., 2012). 
 
The varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach in the „comparative capitalisms‟ literature provides a 
deep insight into different logics of politics and economic activities, which can help to identify 
countries‟ typologies, and matters for fruitful interchange among scholars who are interes ted in 
industrial relations, social policy-making, business and economics (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Thus, the researcher employs the VoC approach to model the diversity of China‟s institutional 
formations and foundations. Based on varying politico-economic structures, many scholars 
propose their classifications of different regimes. For example: two models of economies (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001); five different regimes (Freeman, 2007; Rawls, 2001); four types of state 
(Whitley, 2005; 2007); and institutional diversity in four typologies (Morgan, 2009). Although 
many models of VoC have been proposed in the politico-economic diversity research, the 
Chinese VoC is rather complex, involving multiple models of VoC within the same national 
boundaries (McCann, 2014). On the basis of China‟s unique historical and cultural trajectories 
and political and economic structures, the literature review and analytical chapters will carry out 
a more detailed analysis of China‟s VoC. 
 
Moreover, although the VoC approach can help to model China‟s changing regime typologies, 
the approach itself has been widely criticised as less considerate of politico-economic and 
societal themes, historical trajectories and dynamic power relations among multiple actors 
(Bieling, 2014; Coates, 2014; Jessop, 2014; Weiss, 2014; Bruff and Hartmann, 2014). All of 
these critiques appeal for a more dynamic and sophisticated understanding of the diversity of 
power relations among the state, business and civil society in different regimes. With the shift 
from government to governance, a multiple actor-centred perspective with particular emphasis 
on the hegemonic struggles is needed to contextualise variations of institutional setups of post-
World War II capitalisms along different lines. 
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1.3.2 From Government to Governance 
 
The period before 1990 was a „big-government‟ era, when people regarded state government as 
the leader in offering services concerning the „high-politics‟ of waging war, making peace, 
diplomacy, and managing constitutional change (Evans, 2012). With the development of 
globalisation and internalisation across nations as well as the rapid industrialisation and 
urbanisation in the 1990s, a transition from the „high politics‟ of the states to „low politics‟ has 
been executed: the states have begun to administer the needs and daily affairs of their population 
by means of education, economic policy, public health, sanitation and so on; and the modern 
people have begun to internalise the governing process (Foucault, 1991). As a result, power, in 
the modern world, is not confined to laws and the states, but is exercised through social 
organisations and civil society; moreover, forms of power beyond the state often „sustain the 
state more effectively than its own institutions‟ (Foucault, 1980, p. 73, 1977). Within the  order of 
the modern world, there has been a shift of power gradually from „government to governance‟ 
(Evans, 2012, p. 32). 
 
Governance, as a „catch-all concept‟ based on new institutionalism, emerged in the 1990s 
(Steurer, 2013, p. 387), refers to „activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive 
from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police 
powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance‟ (Rosenau, 1992, p. 4). Kooiman defines 
governance as the totality of governing interactions, in which „public as well as private actors 
participate, aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities; attending to the 
institutions as contexts for these governing interactions; and establishing a normative foundation 
for all those activities‟ (Kooiman, 2003, p. 4). In contemporary governance, not only can the 
government function, but also informal and non-governmental mechanisms can work effectively 
(Bogason and Zolner, 2007). From a collective perspective, governance cannot be simply looked 
upon as a public task of the state, or a responsibility of the private sector in the market, or a duty 
of civil society, but as a shared set of responsibilities (Kooiman, 2003). Emerging from different 
historical and intellectual lineages, governance offers „a third way between the two poles of 
market and state‟ (Evans, 2012, p. 4). Thus, a multiple actor-centred governance approach is 
needed to illustrate shifts across a number of areas, and extends the governing practices to a 
broader scale, in which non-state actors and stakeholders such as businesses, NGOs and the 
public are involved in a broader process of steering to achieve common goals. 
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1.3.3 A Neo-Gramscian Perspective on Varieties of Capitalism 
 
With the shift from government to governance, Gramsci‟s hegemony, with a broader conception 
of power and politics, is meaningful in illustrating the particular assembly of economic, political 
and discursive relations that bind multiple actors in political contestations and negotiations (Levy 
and Newell, 2005). Thus, the neo-Gramscian framework, with the persistence of social and 
economic structures in building hegemonic coalitions (Levy et al., 2015), can extend the VoC 
approach from firm-centred to multiple actor-centred with an alignment of economic, 
organisational and ideological forces, and help the VoC approach to identify the diversity of 
political contestations and accommodations in the varieties of institutional formations through 
engaging the state, business and civil society in building policies and norms in alternative ways.  
 
However, although the neo-Gramscian approach provides a valuable theoretical framework with 
which to analyse the changing hegemonic struggles among the state, business and civil  society in 
China‟s changing regimes, most Gramscian studies are Anglo-Saxon centred with overemphasis 
of non-state power in the context of neo-liberalism, and the variations of state power have not 
received much attention. In other words, it is too simplistic for the neo-Gramscian studies to 
neglect or de-empower the role of the state. Even in the most neo-liberal countries, the state still 
matters in securing the functioning of markets, maintaining the cohesion of social organisations, 
and resolving the crisis of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2008; 2010; 2013). Especially in 
non-market areas, such as in the process of environmental governance and climate control, state 
action is significant in constructing and securing the functioning of organisational structures. In 
the „comparative capitalisms‟ literature, a number of scholars try to clarify the re-configuration 
of state power in variations of institutional formations along different lines (Jessop, 2014; 
Morgan, 2009; Whitley, 2005; 2007), so as to develop and enrich the debates on contemporary 
capitalist diversity.  
 
Therefore, the researcher merges a neo-Gramscian approach with the VoC approach to provide a 
more plural and dynamic view on the institutional variations of the state, the power relations 
involved, and the struggles within the state and within the governance regime, so as to 
investigate and clarify the institutional diversity of China‟s changing governance regimes. The 
contemporary political economy in China is not a mirror image of that of Western countries 
(King and Szelényi, 2005; Morgan, 2011), which contains multiple models and tactics (McNally, 
2012); and the literature thereon is also contradictory (McCann, 2014). A neo-Gramscian 
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perspective on China‟s VoC can provide a collective perspective on the dynamics of 
contemporary political contests in China‟s varieties of governance, on the basis of the particular 
historical and cultural trajectories of China as well as complex political and economic structures.  
 
1.3.4 Varieties of Environmental Governance 
 
Since the 1980s, the emergence of global environmental problems has called for new methods of 
environmental governance across different countries. Climate change has been „a crisis of 
governance … rather than a crisis of the environment or a failure of the market‟ (Hulme, 2009, p. 
300). With the shift from government to governance in the environmental domain, 
environmental issues emerged as an object of governance primarily at the global level, „reflected 
by the profusion of institutions like NGOs and international bodies‟ (Evans, 2012, p. 211). With 
the acceleration of globalisation and internationalisation, the state governance system is no 
longer competent at regulating global business, governing scattered sources of pollution, and 
serving the public interest. At the same time, transnational governmental institutions are also 
incapable of filling the governance gaps facing NGOs‟ increasing criticism of multinationals‟ 
activities along their global production networks (GPNs). Thus, corporations are required to take 
responsibility for public issues, reacting to growing social and environmental demands (Scherer 
et al., 2014). As ever more serious environmental problems emerge as new threats to hegemony 
on a global scale, environmental activists have sought to contest the power of business in new 
ways and balance the power between the state and the market in the global environmental 
governance system (Cox, 1987, 1996; Newell, 2005). 
 
Before the 1990s, within the traditional command-and-control model, governments had always 
dealt with environmental issues as isolated, small-scale technical problems that were easily 
fixable through specific laws and procedures (Evans, 2012). Landy and Rubin (2001) criticised 
the traditional centralised command-and-control model which, although it can work well when 
only a few point source polluters need to be regulated, easily breaks down when multiple non-
point source polluters emerge. Against the nineteenth-century backdrop of rapid urbanisation and 
industrialisation, global environmental threats such as climate change, acid rain, desertification 
and biodiversity loss require new forms of state control (Evans, 2012). Confronting global 
environmental issues, the command-and-control model of the state was gradually replaced by a 
series of new environmental policy instruments, such as environmental taxes, voluntary 
agreements, tradable permits, eco-labels and so on. These instruments, growing enormously 
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since the 1970s, appeal for the participation of many non-state actors beyond governments 
(Jordan et al., 2003). As illustrated by Lipschutz (1996), environmental change should be 
thought of as a social phenomenon rather than a solely biogeophysical phenomenon, in which the 
roles of state and non-state actors become increasingly concerned. Compared with the 
government taking responsibility for governing the environment alone, governance provides a 
better way to bring NGOs, the public and business into the process of governing (Evans, 2012; 
Jordan et al., 2003; Levy and Newell, 2005; Levy et al., 2015). 
 
In 2003, Levy and Egan conducted a research on climate change negotiation with a neo-
Gramscian perspective, based on a case study of the automobile and oil industries in the US and 
European regions. They point out that greenhouse gases in the global climate system present „a 
threat to hegemony‟ (Levy and Egan, 2003, p. 814). The climate change resulting from human 
emission of greenhouse gases challenges all three pillars of hegemonic stability: the state, 
business and civil society. The automobile industry fears that emission issues touch emotional 
chords which could be exploited by active environmental groups, and promote environmental 
organisations, regulatory agencies, and nascent companies pursuing low-emission technologies. 
As transnational problems, the climate change issues spur the development of international 
institutions to monitor business operations, and expand the organisational capacity and 
legitimacy of NGOs and communities of scientific experts to make international environmental 
assessments and negotiations. Tackling climate change, firms, governmental agencies, NGOs, 
and intellectuals seek to establish coalitions in new ways to build policies and norms, which push 
government agencies to tighten regulations for the green performance of automobiles and 
efficiency of power plants at the organisational level (Levy and Newell. 2005). Levy and Egan‟s 
research provides a valuable empirical study to investigate the influence of firm-level and 
institutional variables on corporate political strategy within a neo-Gramscian theoretical 
framework, particularly contributing to institutional theory by illustrating the tensions of agency-
structure relationship in the political strategy formation process, as well as the hegemonic 
position of business and the challenging role of civil society in climate change negotiations. 
 
David Levy and his colleagues use a neo-Gramscian approach to extend Gramsci‟s political 
thought of hegemony, historical bloc, war of position and civil society (Levy, 2008; Levy and 
Egan, 2003; Levy and Newell, 2002; Levy and Scully, 2007), and apply the neo-Gramscian 
approach to environmental governance, investigating how business, NGOs and state agencies 
„engage in contests over the structures and processes that constrain and order industrial activities 
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giving rise to environmental impacts‟ (Levy and Newell, 2005, pp. 48-49; Levy, 2011; Levy and 
Jones, 2006; Levy and Spicer, 2013; Levy et al., 2015). In order to clarify the variations of 
changing hegemonic struggles among the state, business and civil society over the environmental 
issues in China‟s rare earth industry, the researcher proposes a neo-Gramscian perspective on 
varieties of environmental governance to investigate the particular historical and politico-
economic heritages of the institutional variations of the state in constructing hegemony, the 
institutional diversity of business and civil society in alliance building, and the unique 
institutional formations and foundations of their power relations in the development of China‟s 
environmental governance. 
 
1.4 Importance of the Study 
 
The aim of this study is to argue for a neo-Gramscian perspective on the changing hegemonic 
struggles in the varieties of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry in two 
periods, from a centralised planned economy between the 1950s and the early 1990s to a market-
oriented economy. According to Scott (1987), the diversity of societal spheres directs to different 
belief systems and different types of social relations. Owing to the unique historical, social, 
political and economic trajectories, the hegemonic coalitions and bargaining processes among 
the state, the capital, and civil society over the environmental domain in China have distinctive 
features, associated with the existence of multiple models of VoC within the same national 
boundaries, which are completely different from the discourses of environmental governance in 
Western countries (Lu, 2014; McCann 2014; McNally, 2012; Morgan, 2011; Witt, 2010; Witt 
and Redding, 2014). Thus, to investigate the environmental contestations in China, it is 
necessary to understand the uniqueness of China‟s changing politico-economic regimes, which 
are significantly dissimilar to both the Anglo-Saxon model in the US and the UK, and the 
coordinated market economies of France, Germany and Japan (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
 
Therefore, first of all, based on the mainstream divisions of VoC in the „comparative capitalisms‟ 
literature, this study employs the varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach to model the changing 
typologies of China‟s complex political economies, and identifies the institutional formations of 
the changing regimes of New China with its distinctive politico-economic and historical 
trajectories. However, although the VoC approach helps to model the unique changing 
typologies of China from a planned economy to a market economy, the approach itself has been 
widely criticised. This study summarises the major critiques of the VoC approach. In terms of 
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the critiques, the study proposes a neo-Gramscian perspective on varieties of governance by 
merging a neo-Gramscian approach with the VoC approach: on the one hand, the VoC approach, 
with a deep insight on varying politico-economic structures at the macro-level, extends the new-
Gramscian framework to a wider range of regimes; on the other hand, the neo-Gramscian 
approach, with consideration of micro-level struggles among multiple actors, provides a more 
dynamic and coherent understanding of the ideological, political and social dimensions of 
institutional foundations and formations in China. 
 
As the environmental issues are a new crisis for hegemony, with regard to David Levy and his 
colleagues‟ research, the research proposes a neo-Gramscian perspective on China‟s varieties of 
environmental governance. However, although the neo-Gramscian approach provides a valuable 
theoretical framework with which to analyse the changing hegemonic struggles among the state, 
business and civil society in China‟s changing environmental governance systems, most of the 
existing neo-Gramscian studies on environmental governance, for example, by David Levy and 
others, set within the neo-liberal countries, and are overly focused on a pluralistic interpretation 
of Gramsci from a neoliberal perspective. In other words, from the perspective of neo-liberalism, 
with overemphasis of the roles of the non-state actors in outmanoeuvring their rivals giving rise 
to environmental impacts, most neo-Gramscian studies are usually Anglo-Saxon centred, and 
make few efforts to clarify the institutional variations of the state in environmental governance 
and to identify the reconfiguration of state power in contemporary alliance building, although 
they essentially imply that all three main actors have similar access to power in environmental 
governance. The reregulation and re-empowerment of the state in contemporary alliance building 
has not received much attention in the current Gramscian environmental governance research. 
 
The thesis is more critical of the western bias of the neo-Gramscian perspective, by introducing 
Bob Jessop and other scholars‟ studies in the comparative capitalism studies, which regard that 
the state still matters in neoliberalism and elsewhere. In the „comparative capitalisms‟ literature, 
there are a number of scholars trying to clarify the re-configuration of state power in variations 
of institutional setups of post-World War II capitalisms along different lines, so as to develop the 
debate on capitalist diversity (Jessop, 2014; Morgan, 2009; Whitley, 2005, 2007). Therefore, to 
extend the neo-Gramscian framework to China‟s „soft authoritarian‟ regime (Johnson, 2002, p. 
155), it is important to understand the institutional variations of the state in the development of 
China‟s political economies. By integrating a neo-Gramscian perspective into China‟s varieties 
of environmental governance, the institutional variations of the state and the power relations 
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involved in China‟s varieties of governance during the two periods can be better understood at 
both micro and macro levels, with particular consideration of the Chinese institutional diversity. 
 
Due to the uniqueness of Chinese institutional diversity, few studies merge the neo-Gramscian 
approach with China‟s varieties of environmental governance to discuss the changing power 
relations among the state, business and civil society in the development of China‟s 
environmental governance. Thus, this research is important in combining macro-level analysis of 
institutional diversity with micro-level understanding of organisational struggles in the neo-
Gramscian framework, and providing a more plural and dynamic view of varieties of 
environmental governance in China‟s rare earth industry evolving from a planned economy to a 
market economy. In accordance with the changing discourses of China‟s complex political 
economies, the researcher dynamically investigates how the state regulates and constructs the 
hegemonic coalitions among government agencies, business and civil society in the different 
periods, and how non-state actors are created, adapted and coordinated over time in the 
development of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry. Based on an in-depth 
case study of BSRE, the researcher conducts a valuable empirical study on China‟s 
environmental governance at an organisational level, and bridges an empirical research gap in 
investigating the different roles of the state, business and NGOs as well as their changing 
hegemonic relations in the development of China‟s environmental governance, which displays a 
completely different image from the governance discourses in neo-liberal countries. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Study 
 
The main body of the thesis is organised into six chapters: literature review, methodology, two 
stages of timeline analysis, discussion, and conclusion. 
 
The literature review chapter starts from the different mainstream typologies of VoC in the 
„comparative capitalisms‟ literature, and points out the research gap for China‟s VoC model. 
Then in terms of the major critiques towards the VoC approach, Gramsci‟s  hegemony, with a 
broader conception of power and politics to bind multiple actors in political contestations and 
negotiations, is regarded as meaningful in providing, in a more concrete way, a multidimensional 
view on variations of capitalist social formations along different lines. Since the emergence of 
environmental problems as a new crisis to hegemony, David Levy and his colleagues‟ studies, by 
introducing a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework to environmental governance, are mainly 
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referred to as providing a more dynamic and collective understanding of varieties of 
environmental governance. However, in most Gramscian governance studies, compared with the 
overemphasis of corporate political power and NGO‟s counter-hegemonic power in 
contemporary alliance building, the institutional variations of the state and the power relations 
involved are implicit. But they are important for analysing the hegemonic coalitions between the 
state, business and civil society under the Chinese state-dominated regime. Thus, the importance 
of a neo-Gramscian perspective on varieties of environmental governance is emphasised so as to 
discuss the reconfiguration of state power and the potential of non-state actors in contestations 
over the environmental issues under the development of China‟s distinctive politico-economic 
regime. 
 
In the following chapter, the research philosophy, methodology and methods of data collection 
and analysis are illustrated. The philosophical stance of environmental governance research 
displays different ontological and epistemological positions to create trans-disciplinary 
knowledge. Based on the research philosophy, the researcher chooses interpretivism as the 
research paradigm and conducts a qualitative research on the chosen topic. To investigate the 
different roles of government agencies, corporations and NGOs as well as their power relations 
in the development of China‟s environmental governance, the researcher positions the field site 
on Baotou‟s rare earth industry, with a case study on BSRE. Primary data based on the semi-
structured interviews with Baotou‟s local government officers, BSRE‟s managers and 
environmental NGOs‟ staff are collected through on-site investigation, and secondary data based 
on documentary collection of government documents, corporate reports, and relevant media 
news, are also gathered to support the empirical research. 
 
For data analysis in the following two analytical chapters, on the basis of the two timeline stages, 
the research follows Fairclough‟s three dimensions of critical discourse analysis (CDA) – a 
textual analysis, a process analysis and a social analysis – to illustrate the changing discourses of 
environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry. Based on the discursive textual 
elements of interview transcripts and documents, a textual analysis is carried out to describe the 
different roles of the state and non-state actors in the changing genres, discourses and styles of 
environmental governance in the Chinese rare earth industry; then there is a process  analysis to 
interpret how different textual elements hang together to constitute  the integrated discourse of 
environmental governance in China‟s rare earth industry; and finally a social analysis, from a 
wider perspective of political discourse, to discuss the hegemonic struggles among government 
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agencies, corporations and NGOs that are embattled within the institutional foundations and 
formations of China‟s varieties of environmental governance. 
 
Based on the theoretical framework of varieties of environmental governance and the timeline 
analysis on the changing discourse of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry, 
the discussion chapter identifies the theoretical contributions and the empirical contributions of 
the study, as well as how the empirical findings link to the theories and are consistent with the 
theoretical framework. With a neo-Gramscian perspective on China‟s varieties of governance, 
the history of China‟s varieties of environmental governance is interpreted at an organisationa l 
level, particularly emphasising the institutional variations of the state and the power relations 
between the state, business and civil society that have evolved within the Chinese governance 
regime. 
 
The final chapter summarises the conclusion of the research, including the empirical findings 
and contributions, and points out certain limitations of the research as well as suggested areas for 
further research. Concluding remarks appeal for multiple actors worldwide including 
multinational corporations, international NGOs and intergovernmental organisations to place 
more attention to the environmental performance of the global rare earth industry, facing the new 
round of the vibrant global demand for rare earth materials in high-tech and new-energy 
industries. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In order to identify China‟s institutional diversity and provide a more plural and dynamic 
understanding of the changing hegemonic struggles in the environmental governance of China‟s 
rare earth industry, this chapter reviews the VoC studies in the „comparative capitalisms‟ 
literature and the neo-Gramscian studies on environmental governance. Section 2.2 starts from a 
series of main typology divisions of VoC, and then points out gaps in the VoC model in terms of 
describing the unique Chinese politico-economic regime, and finally provides a critical view of 
the VoC approach in comparative capitalism studies. Towards the critiques of VoC, with 
environmental issues being a new crisis of governance, Section 2.3 introduces the neo-
Gramscian framework to understand the varieties of dynamics of hegemonic struggles between 
the state and non-state actors in institutional formations of environmental governance along 
different lines. With the critical reviews on the neo-Gramscian studies on environmental 
governance, the researcher proposes a neo-Gramscian perspective on varieties of environmental 
governance in Section 2.4, to clarify China‟s institutional diversity and investigate the dynamics 
of environmental struggles in China‟s rare earth industry at both the macro level of institutional 
variations of the state and the micro level of power relations involved therein. 
 
2.2 Varieties of Capitalism 
 
2.2.1 Different Forms of Capitalism 
 
Countries have different logics of economic activity and rules of the game 
(Morgan, 2011, p. 14). 
 
Post-World War II capitalism has been manifested meaningfully in different systems of 
industrialised market economies. With the deepening of globalisation and internationalisation, 
political differences do not seem to be reduced, and a wide variety of ways of organising market 
economies still exist. To identify these differences, the varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach 
has been widely used to provide a deep insight into different logics of politics and economic 
activities, and matters for fruitful interchange among scholars who are interested in industrial 
relations, social policy-making, and economic organisations in the current studies of political 
31 
 
economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Although the VoC approach defines a politico-economic 
system as a „terrain populated by multiple actors‟ (ibid, p. 6), firms are still regarded as the 
crucial agents of adjustment in the face of international competition and technological innovation 
in capitalist economies. 
 
According to the rational ways through which firms are involved in strategic interaction with 
governments and individuals and influence the overall levels of economic performance, Hall and 
Soskice identify two types of VoC: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market 
economies (CMEs). In LMEs, the demand and supply conditions in competitive markets always 
play the key role in balancing corporate behaviour; while in CMEs, the equilibrium outcomes of 
corporate behaviour are more often achieved via strategic interaction between firms and other 
actors. Economic activities in certain nations such as Germany, France and Japan, are 
coordinated with other non-market actors to construct their core competencies, which are greatly 
different from those in the US and the UK, where companies coordinate their activities mainly 
based on „hierarchies and competitive market arrangement‟ (ibid, p. 8). It is more distinct for 
China, with „whatever forms of market economy‟, differentiating significantly from those 
institutionalised in both CMEs and LMEs (Whitley, 2007, p. 3). 
 
In short, varieties of politico-economic systems, based on respectively historical, cultural and 
social trajectories, contain varying power relations between the state, business and civil society. 
Multiple actors in VoC have different ways of gaining a partial understanding of and exerting 
influences over their respectively political and social systems (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Jessop, 
2014; Levy and Newell, 2005; Morgan, 2009; Scott, 1986). According to various forms of post-
World War II capitalism, many scholars propose their classification of different regimes in the 
„comparative capitalisms‟ literature, and group countries‟ typologies based on their common 
aspects of institutional foundations and formations (ibid; Morgan, 2011; Rawls, 2001; Whitley, 
2007). 
 
2.2.2 Whitley’s Varieties of Capitalism 
 
Based on the institutional variations of the state, Whitley (2005) points out that at least four types 
of state with complementary institutions to constitute particular institutional regimes can be 
identified, which differ greatly in how the state organises economic activities, develops 
economic actors, and standardises economic systems across regions and sectors. The four ideal 
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types of state are identified based on two essential principles: the extent to which the states are 
involved in directing economic development, especially in constructing particular organisational 
capabilities; and the extent to which the states are involved in steering independent intermediary 
associations to represent the interests of varied groups in the processes of policy development 
and implementation. In arm’s length states, the state tries to build more transparent capital 
markets, economic actors are equal and free to engage in business activities, and funds are priced 
and allocated via market processes. In dominant developmental states, the state is suspicious of 
independent firms, unions and other groups competing with government authorities in economic 
policy making, so that the state takes active approaches to control union organisation, and 
independent interest groups usually function as agents of the state. For the other two more 
collaborative promotional states, business corporatist states and inclusive corporatist states, both 
support individual groups with greater autonomy through delegating powers and resources and 
granting monopolies in dealing with state agencies, but differ in their recognition and 
involvement of labour union federations in economic policy formulation and implementation. 
Business corporatist states attempt to cooperate with large firms but rarely encourage labour 
unions‟ intervention in policy development; by contrast, in the context of inclusive corporatist 
states, social partners are encouraged to engage in distribution issues and income policy making 
(Whitley, 2007, pp. 39-44). In Whitley‟s division of VoC, the state is regarded as the most 
important political force to institutionalise political and legal systems and constitute economic 
actors within national boundaries. 
 
To examine the influence of globalisation, particularly for the impact of transnational business on 
VoC, Morgan (2009) develops the details of Whitley‟s national business systems approach, and 
investigates how VoC may evolve with the influence of multinational activities and globalisation. 
First of all, in liberal market economies, regulatory states do not intervene in business activities 
except when developing economic rules to secure efficient market operation; markets, based on 
transparent regulations, are open for multinationals‟ entry and fair for competition, and firms are 
equal and free to carry out business activities; thus, institutional diversity is quite open at the 
corporation, sectorial and regional levels, and reinforced to become more diverse by the MNCs‟ 
entry from different institutional systems. Second, within inclusive corporatist contexts, states 
are engaged in coordinating systems with independent intermediary associations; markets for 
financial and professional services are open to outsiders‟ entry, and  conventional markets for 
manufactured products tend to be dominated by insider incumbents; thus, there is relatively weak 
but increasing institutional diversity with the growth of multinationals in the financial sector. 
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Third, business corporatist forms evolve governments and large firms together in supportive 
networks; large firms develop their own labour management standards, while small firms are 
usually subject to their power; markets are open for outsiders‟ entry, but restricted by insiders so 
that only insiders are able to access markets of the final products; thus, institutional diversity 
exists within a particular pattern of power of large firms, and multinationals‟ potential for 
influence is weak. Finally, developmental states tend to sponsor particular individuals and forms 
to create world-class corporations; a small number of large firms with governmental support can 
intervene in policy-making, and other firms are subject to their power; states welcome 
multinationals‟ entry to upgrade national industry and access global markets, although resistance 
from large firms could undermine their attempts. As a result, institutional diversity is constrained 
by the power of states and large firms, and multinationals have the potential to affect the 
diversity through successful entry (Morgan, 2009, pp. 588 -601). In Morgan‟s division of VoC, 
the influence of corporate political power on different structures of diversity is highly 
emphasised in maintaining relationships between key social factors. 
 
2.2.3 Rawls’ Varieties of Capitalism 
 
Based on diversity of social systems, Rawls (2001, p. 136) categorises five typologies of VoC, in 
accordance with their respective political, economic, and social institutions, including: laissez-
faire capitalism; welfare-state capitalism; state socialism with a command economy; property-
owning democracy; and liberal (democratic) socialism. Their unique regimes determine the 
effectiveness of their political society in achieving the aims of the public.  Laissez-faire 
capitalism, with the separation of state and economy, concerns formal equality but „rejects the 
fair value of political liberties and the fair equality of opportunity‟; welfare-state capitalism 
suggests a welfare state covering the basic social needs and allows a small part of society with a 
near monopoly over the means of production, thus securing equality of opportunity to a certain 
extent but still rejecting the fair value of political liberties; state socialism, under a command 
economic system controlled by one party, rejects „the equal basic rights and liberties, not to 
mention the fair value of liberties‟ as well as the equality of opportunity; property-owning 
democracy, with the aim of realising the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation and 
dispersing the ownership of wealth and capital to prevent a small class from controlling the 
economy and even political life, secures the fair value of liberties and the fair equality of 
opportunity; and finally, liberal socialism also secures the basic liberties, under which the 
economic structure is „owned by society‟, political power is „shared among democratic parties‟, 
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and economic power is „dispersed among corporations‟, allowing them to carry out their 
business activities freely within competitive markets. 
 
Freeman rebuilds Rawls‟ five kinds of regime, and develops a continuum of VoC, based on 
diversity of political constitutions, legal systems, economic systems, property systems, and 
mechanisms of the family. Freeman‟s divisions start from laissez-faire capitalism, in which 
property is privately owned and unregulated market exchange, gambling, bequest or some other 
free choices determine all economic activities; to classical liberalism in which the liberty of 
individuals is secured through limiting the power of the state; then to a variety of mixed 
economies, including liberal equality, welfare-state capitalism, property-owning democracy, and 
market socialism; all the way to Soviet-style command economy communism in which the central 
plans determine all allocations and distributions (Freeman, 2007, p. 205). 
 
Mäkinen and Kourula (2012, pp. 652-654) introduce the Rawlsian conception of division of 
moral labour to illustrate the pluralism of corporate political roles within six varying politico-
economic structures, including libertarian laissez-faire, in which minimal state and coercive 
structures are addressed in business, strong firms take over traditional state roles, and citizenship 
is regarded as a private contractual relationship; classical liberalism, in which the state aims to 
provide public goods efficiently, firms mainly focus on economic tasks, and citizens are treated 
as free economic actors with political responsibilities; liberty equality, in which the state aims to 
secure equal opportunity, firms with excessive economic powers are considered to „spill over to 
other spheres of society and corrupt them‟, and citizens are regarded as free and political 
participants of society; welfare-state capitalism, in which the state aims to secure general welfare 
through a fair social sector and redistributive economic institutions, firms are incapable of 
processing the public task of general welfare but have some space for political tasks due to 
public failures and information asymmetries, and citizens are considered as having civil and 
political rights and moderate economic means as well as political, social and economic 
responsibilities; property-owning democracy, in which the state aims to maintain democratic 
social life and the economic system, firms have freedoms with which to operate their business 
activities, but are prevented from elite control of economy and politics; and market socialism, in 
which the objective of the state is to maintain strict equality and socialise the means of 
production, and firms owned by workers rent public means of production for efficient use and 
take major political roles for equal distribution. Rather than the firm-centred perspective in Hall 
and Soskice‟s division or the state-centred perspective in Whitley‟s division, Mäkinen and 
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Kourula use the VoC approach as a multiple actor -centred perspective to investigate the diversity 
of the roles of the state, firms, and citizens, as well as the relationship between business and the 
state within different structures of society, based on the political, social and economic 
dimensions, which provides an innovative and multidimensional perspective for comparative 
capitalism studies. 
 
In short, on the basis of the different models of VoC in politico-economic diversity research, 
which are mentioned in Section 2.2.1, Section 2.2.2 and Section 2.2.3, the researcher moves the 
focus to the unique Chinese politico-economic regime. Although many models of VoC have 
been proposed in comparative capitalist studies, the Chinese VoC is rather complex, involving 
multiple tactics and models within the same national boundaries, which is distinct and 
significantly dissimilar to both the Anglo-Saxon model and coordinated market economies 
(McCann, 2014). Morgan (2011, p. 21) points out that China provides „an interesting 
counterpoint to the institutional upheavals of Europe‟. Thus, to identify which model or multiple 
models of VoC fit China‟s changing politico-economic regimes, a deep insight into China‟s 
unique institutional formations and foundations is required, with consideration of China‟s 
economic, political and historical trajectories. 
 
2.2.4 Gap for China’s Varieties of Capitalism Model 
 
China is not a „mirror image‟ of the West, and thus an independent analysis of the Chinese 
politico-economic system should be rooted in China‟s unique historical and political experience 
(Hamilton, 2006; McNally, 2012). From a historical perspective, according to McCann (2014), 
China has been engaged in an unfinished project which continues to evolve, so that it is difficult 
for a single classical VoC model to accurately pinpoint the dramatic changes in China‟s politico-
economic structures. 
 
Regarding the four types of VoC delineated by Whitley (2007) and Morgan (2009), liberal 
market economies in which the states have limited roles in free markets, and inclusive 
corporatist contexts in which the states cooperate closely with social partners in constructing 
economic systems, are clearly not suitable for China‟s regime. Due to the suspicions of private 
firms, unions and other independent groups challenging state authority, the state nationalised all 
means of production after the foundation of New China, and then gradually opened to private 
and international enterprises after the Reform and Opening-up policy of 1978, which exhibits 
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certain similarities to the typology of the developmental state, in which strong central 
government directs and sponsors large businesses and discourages intermediary associations for 
both firms and labour.  
 
However, at the current stage, China „is moving in the direction of a capitalist economy, but has 
not yet achieved it‟ (King and Szelényi, 2005, p. 222). Regarding China‟s capitalist transition, 
according to McNally (2012), there exists a „unique duality‟ within the Chinese political 
economy: the state maintains control over the commanding heights of China‟s economic 
structure via large SOEs, while most retail and manufacturing sectors are populated by private- 
or hybrid-owned corporations. In the process of seeking strong social support, the state still acts 
as the „dominant and overarching force leading China‟, and secures a soft authoritarian system, 
so that „any organised political opposition is resolutely crushed‟ ( ibid, p. 184). With the 
emergence of new market-oriented legitimacy, the private sector has been gradually embedded 
politically in the party-state‟s political advisory and legislative bodies, especially in terms of 
their power of negotiating with local governments. Thus, the current Chinese regime contains 
considerable divergences and great uniqueness in its politics, and its unique historical -
geographical heritage leads to a further layer of variation, which does not fully fit in Whitley‟s 
the developmental state.  
 
In the categories of Rawlsian typologies, there is also no single regime appropriate for analysing 
the dynamic politico-economic system in China. The three kinds of liberties with different levels 
of requirements of free markets and business power, including laissez-faire capitalism, classical 
liberalism and liberal equality, are clearly not suitable for China‟s state-dominated system, in 
which a soft totalitarian state exerts control over the national economy, and there is no clear 
dominance of private property (King and Szelényi, 2005; McCann, 2014; McNally, 2012). For 
the period of China‟s planned economy, state socialism with a command economy or Soviet-style 
command economy communism can be used to depict the logics of politics and economic 
activities in China. However, during the past three decades, China has gradually transformed its 
traditional government-led development model, to the market-oriented system of resource 
allocation, encouraging private SMEs and international corporations to compete with large SOEs 
in the Chinese market (McNally, 2012). Nowadays, for the key industries closely related to the 
national economy, there is less institutional diversity to a particular pattern of power in large 
firms; while in other retail and manufacturing industries, the markets are more open to private 
and hybrid ownership enterprises. With the deepening of market-oriented reform, due to the 
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„unique duality‟ of economic structure and the soft authoritarian politics, any other single 
Rawlsian typology such as welfare-state capitalism, property-owning democracy and market 
socialism also do not fit appropriately into China‟s unique discourse. 
 
By introducing a comparative capitalism approach to institutional diversity, Morgan (2011, p. 21) 
suggests that the particularity of gradual institutional changes in China involve „a triangulation‟ 
between aspects of tradition, state socialism and foreign involvement. From a historical 
perspective, China‟s politico-economic reform has been engaged in an unfinished project which 
continues to evolve, from the foundation of New China, to China‟s dramatic attempts to break 
out of backwardness by following a Soviet-style developing model, then to China‟s gradual 
opening-up and economic reforms to detach itself from the Soviet model and establish the 
modern enterprise system, and eventually to the current market-oriented economy with 
„distinctly Chinese characteristics‟ (Fan et al., 2011, p. 1; Harvey, 2005, p. 151), as a 
combination of „market autonomy and techoscientific administrative regulation‟ (Lo and NG, 
2009; Sigley, 2006, p. 495). From the perspective of institutional diversity, China‟s current 
market-oriented economy can be considered as „a combination of many models and systems‟, 
and a mixed economy consisting of state actors such as SOEs, semi -state actors such as 
collectives and township and village enterprises (TVEs), and private actors (McCann, 2014, p. 
295).  
 
With the growth of private capital accumulation and the development of an internationalised 
economy in China, McNally (2012, p. 176) points out that China‟s VoC seems to fit a „state 
coordinated economy‟, but McNally also clearly points out that any conceptualisation of China‟s 
emergent capitalism needs to be combined with its unique duality of institutional arrangement. 
Therefore, to examine which model or multiple models of VoC are more suitable for discussing 
the changing political economies in China, a deep insight into China‟s particular historical -
geographical heritage vis-à-vis its unique institutional formations and foundations is required, 
with a deep understanding of the hegemonic struggles in the Chinese historical, political, 
economic and social trajectories. 
 
2.2.5 A Critique of Varieties of Capitalism 
 
Although the VoC approach provides a deep insight into the diversity of politico-economic 
regimes, the approach itself has been widely criticised as: not sufficiently considering politico-
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economic and societal themes as well as power relations, conflicts and contradictions (Bieling, 
2014); lacking the historical depth and comparative breadth to explain the crisis-prone capital 
relation (Jessop, 2014); separating institutions from their historical context (Weiss, 2014); 
ignoring dynamic contradictions and complex institutional variations (Coates, 2014); failing to 
provide a satisfactory theoretical understanding of capitalist societies (Bruff and Hartmann, 2014; 
Gallas, 2014), and failing to engage various actors in a holistic manner due to its absence of class 
tension and exploitation in contemporary varieties of capitalist relations (Bailey and Shibata, 
2014; Bruff and Ebenau, 2014).  
 
As a deficient politico-economic framework, VoC is only able to explain power relations 
between multiple actors in capitalist accumulation and regulation to a limited extent. With a 
firm-centred perspective, the VoC approach only seeks to explore the development potential of 
economic activities in specific institutional arrangements, and defines politico-economic change 
as a simple product of managerial investment, innovation and other modernisatio n concepts, 
rather than a combination of a series of institutional changes with dynamic political and social 
conflicts in a more sophisticated and dynamic manner (Bieling, 2014). All of these critiques, in 
terms of lacking micro-level consideration of the societal contradictions inherent in given power 
relations among multiple institutional actors in VoC, appeal for a more dynamic and 
sophisticated understanding of the diversity of political contestations and accommodations in 
varieties of institutional formation with historical depth and comparative breadth. 
 
Bieling (2014) employs the neo-Gramscian political economy approach to enrich the „lean‟ 
societal theory and politico-economic theory in VoC, and explores the dynamics and differences 
between different institutional settings. Gramsci‟s politics, with the conceptions of „hegemony‟, 
„historical bloc‟, and „civil society‟, and the persistence of social and economic structures in 
building hegemonic coalitions, emphasise dynamic power and struggle of multiple actors. Thus, 
the neo-Gramscian framework, connoting an alliance among states, business and civil society 
and an alignment of economic, organisational and ideological forces (Levy and Newell, 2002; 
2005), can help to contextualise variations of institutional setups of post-World War II capitalism 
along different lines. 
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2.3 A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Environmental Governance 
 
2.3.1 Gramsci’s Hegemony in Governance  
 
The term of hegemony, with a long prior history, as „one of the most significant political slogans 
during the Russian Social-Democratic movement from the late 1890s to 1917‟ (Anderson, 1976, 
p. 15), refers to „the role of the working class as a leading force in the fight for democracy‟ 
(Hoffman, 1984, p. 52). However, hegemony had not been seen as an explicit concept in Marxist 
social theory before Gramsci (Adamson, 1980; Buci-Glucksmann, 1980; Fontana, 1993; Thomas, 
2010). The illustrations of hegemony in Gramsci‟s Prison Notebooks introduce new ideas to the 
traditional Marxist perspectives of hegemony. „A sense of intellectual and moral direction‟ was 
particularly injected into Gramsci‟s notion of hegemony (Mouffe, 1979, p. 181). In terms of the 
state, compared with traditional Marxism, Gramsci addresses the importance of the ideological 
superstructure overriding the economic structures, as well as civil society with a consent function 
prevailing over political society with a violence function. 
 
For Gramsci, the real power of a ruling system does not lie in the coercive power of the ruling 
class, but in civil society‟s acceptance of the ruling class‟ worldview (Carnoy, 1984). Based on a 
direct assault on the state, a war of position, in Gramsci, aims to achieve hegemony for the 
proletariat in civil society before the state power captured by the Communist Party. Gramsci 
describes how modern capitalist societies are organised in the past and present, and extends the 
concept of hegemony from the proletariat to the bourgeoisie as a feature of class rule in general 
(Anderson, 1976; Buci-Glucksmann, 1980; Carnoy, 1984; Hoffman, 1984; Simon, 1982). As an 
alternative to classical Marxism, Gramsci considers hegemony as the „essential ingredient of 
modern Marxism‟ (Hoffman, 1984, p. 55). As pointed out by Gramsci, hegemony entails:  
 
… not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and 
moral unity. … [T]he development and expansion of the dominant group are 
conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion. … 
[I]n other words, the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general 
interests of the subordinate groups (Gramsci, 1971, p. 181). 
 
According to Hoffman (1984, p. 55), Gramsci regards hegemony as „a fundamental axiom of 
political science and hence relevant to all forms of political rule‟. Adamson (1980, pp. 170-171) 
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points out that hegemony in Gramsci has two related definitions: in the first sense, hegemony 
connotes „the consensual basis of an existing political system within civil society‟, in which only 
the weak states secure their domination via the force or threat, while the strong states secure their 
domination almost exclusively via hegemony; in another sense, hegemony means „an 
overcoming of the economic-corporative‟ to a particular historical stage within a given political 
moment. Ives (2004, p. 71) also illustrates two broad themes in Gramsci‟s hegemony. Firstly, the 
definition of politics expands from government activities to „questions of how people understand 
the world‟. Gramsci‟s hegemony, with philosophical and epistemological elements, illustrates 
how personal aspects of daily life become significant political parts of power operations. 
Secondly, Gramsci‟s hegemony entails „institutional and social analysis of various classes and 
organisations in society‟, from the operations of state power, to the activities of civil society and 
institutions such as schools, newspapers, entertainment enterprises, book publishers, churches, 
and so on. 
 
Between the economic structure and the state, with its legislation and coercion, 
stands civil society (Gramsci, 1971, p. 208). 
 
In this argument, the term „economic structure‟ means the dominant mode of production in a 
given territory at a particular moment, which consists of the „technical means of production‟ and 
the „social relations of production‟; the „state‟ connotes the means of violence in a given territory 
with „state-funded bureaucracies‟; and the term „civil society‟ refers to „the other organisations in 
a social formation that are relatively long-lasting institutions supported and run by people outside 
of the other two major spheres‟ (Bocock, 1986, p. 34). Therefore, Gramsci enlarges the „social 
base of the state‟ and the complex relations between the ruling class and its mass base, and 
characterises the state as „hegemony protected by the armour of coercion‟ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 
263). The state in Gramsci involves: 
 
not only the apparatus of government, but also the private apparatus of hegemony 
or civil society. … [T]he fact is that hegemony over its historical development 
belongs to private forces, to civil society – which is state too, indeed is the state 
itself (Gramsci, 1971, p. 261). 
 
As conceptualised by Gramsci, the integral state not only involves the „means of coercion‟ such 
as police force and army, but also the „means of establishing hegemonic leadership in civil 
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society‟ (ibid). According to Mouffe (1979), Gramsci‟s great originality lies in his conceptually 
unifying two oppositional couples in Marx by buidling a link between „politics – class – state‟ 
and „people – nation – state‟ (ibid, p. 9), and the „integral state‟ in Gramsci signifies the 
„incorporation of the apparatuses of hegemony, of civil society, to the state‟ (ibid, p. 182). In 
other words, the state and civil society are integrated into a larger „suzerain unity‟ (Anderson, 
1976, p. 33); and the state is conceptualised as a combination of political society and civil 
society, rather than as the equivalent of political control (Adamson, 1980). Civil society and 
political society in Gramsci‟s framework are viewed as „two major superstructure levels‟:  
 
What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructual „levels‟: the 
one that can be called „civil society‟, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly 
called „private‟, and that of „political society‟ or the „state‟. These two levels 
correspond on the one hand to the function of „hegemony‟ which the dominant 
group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of „direct 
domination‟ or command exercised through the state and „juridical‟ government 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 13).  
 
Civil society cannot be separated from political society in the theory of superstructures, and the 
state in its integral sense involves „dictatorship plus hegemony‟ (Texier, 1979, p. 49). Gramsci‟s 
notions of the levels of authority and hegemony, force and consent, the individual and the 
universal moment, violence and civilisation, tactic and strategy, agitation and propaganda, and so 
on, all share a broad view of politics and the state with those in Marx and Lenin (Hoffman, 
1984), but seek „a new and fundamental dimension‟ to discuss the two levels – the problem of 
coercion and consent (Mouffe, 1979, p. 181). As concluded by Murphy (1998), Gramsci‟s notion 
of civil society, as a site of the consolidation of power, is meaningful in twentieth-century states. 
 
In the 1980s, based on the thoughts of Gramsci, a crucial break, related to the neo -Gramscian 
perspective emerged, developed in the work of Robert Cox from mainstream international 
relation approaches to hegemony (Bieler and Morton, 2004). By rethinking Gramsci‟s 
conceptions of civil society, hegemony and historic bloc, Cox questions the prevailing order of 
the world in his two papers published respectively in 1981 and 1983. Cox broadens the domain 
of hegemony from a neo-Gramscian perspective and regards hegemony as „a fit between power, 
ideas and institutions [that] makes it possible to deal with some of the problems in the theory of 
state dominance as the necessary condition for a stable international order‟ (Cox, 1981, p. 145). 
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As illustrated by Bieler and Morton (2004), hegemony in Cox operates in two ways: by 
establishing a historical bloc and social cohesion within a state; and by extending a production 
model transnationally and projecting hegemony via world order. Moving beyond „static sense of 
history‟, Cox highlights an international historical bloc, involving governmental agencies, 
professionals from academia and NGOs, as well as managerial elites from international 
corporations (Levy and Newell, 2005; Murphy, 1998). 
 
Gramsci‟s historical blog suggests a specific alignment of economic, ideological, and 
organisational forces as the conditions for field stabilisation, which reveals „the strengths and 
weaknesses of adversaries and potential allies, points of leverage, and the likely impact of each 
move and counter-move‟ (Levy and Egan, 2003, p. 813). Gramsci‟s interpretation of „war of 
position‟, by means of a military metaphor, suggests how actors coordinate power sources and 
build hegemonic coalitions. The war of position, as a long-term struggle (Levy et al., 2015), is 
coordinated across multiple actors, to gain influence over civil society, develop organisational 
capacity, and obtain new allies (Levy and Egan, 2003). Within a neo -Gramscian approach, field-
level politics, as a „war of position‟ to establish hegemony, can be viewed as a process of 
assembling and stabilising a historical bloc. A long-running debate on governments as political 
actors and business firms as economic actors as well as civil society as being ruled in the 
literature was ended by neo-Gramscian theory. 
 
With the transition from government to governance, post-Marxists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe employed discourse analysis to re-conceptualise Gramsci‟s notion of hegemony in their 
book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics , and pushed 
forward the neo-Gramscian discourse theory to a new level. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) direct 
attention to new interpretations of hegemony, intellectual and moral leadership, war of position, 
historical bloc, and collective will and develop a post-Marxist analysis of hegemony. Hegemony, 
being politically constructed and inherently unstable, signifies a form of social relation, in which 
„a particular social force assumes the representation of a totality that is radically 
incommensurable with it‟ (ibid, p. x). Laclau and Mouffe‟s analysis suggests that the 
fundamental hegemonic struggles among different classes are principally on the ideological 
terrain, where „new political subjects are forged‟ (Boucher, 2008, p. 89). 
 
Taking up their ideas, a number of scholars highlight the hegemonic discourse of international 
business and international organisations in global governance, such as the resistance movements 
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to international business (Spicer and Böhm, 2007; Böhm et al., 2008); the contestations in global 
production networks (Levy, 2005, 2008); and the new political role of international business 
(Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et al., 2014). Gramscian hegemony is important in 
illustrating the particular assembly of political, economic and discursive struggles in governance. 
According to Stoker (1998, p. 17), „the outputs of governance are not therefore different from 
those of government; it is rather a matter of difference in process‟. This process incorporates the 
public, NGOs and corporations into governing, and the states have been gradually converted to 
„transmission belts and filtering devices for the imposition of the transnational agenda‟ 
(Robinson, 1996, p. 19). Gramsci‟s political theory „recognises the centrality of organisations 
and strategy, directs attention to the organisational, economic, and ideological pillars of power, 
and illuminates the processes of coalition building, conflict, and accommodation that drive social 
change‟ (Levy and Egan, 2003, p. 803), thus generating a „bottom-up understanding of the world 
economy and state system‟ (Levy and Newell, 2005, p. 52). 
 
2.3.2 Environmental Problems as a New Threat to Hegemony  
 
Since the 1980s, the emergence of global environmental problems including global warming, 
climate change, acid rain, atmospheric pollution, depletion of the ozone layer and so on, has 
called for a new way of environmental governance across different countries. Evans (2012, p. 1) 
points out that environmental issues at the current stage can be viewed as „a crisis of governance, 
or a failure to organise our societies and economies in such a way that they do not harm the 
environment‟. Since climate change is a new threat to hegemony in governance, environmental 
governance has been a profound political process, in which state agencies, business, and NGOs 
„engage in contests over the structures and processes that constrain and order industrial activities 
giving rise to environmental impacts‟ (Levy and Newell, 2005. pp. 48-49). Gramsci‟s hegemony 
is meaningful in discussing long-term and multi-dimensional interactions between state and non-
state actors in constructing hegemonic stability in environmental governance ( ibid; Levy et al., 
2015).  
 
The period prior to 1990 was an era of „big government‟, during which the states were expected 
to lead the public affairs (Evans, 2012). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) view the nation-state as the 
primary shaper of institutional formation to create bureaucratic arrangement and centralise 
discretion at the top of the structure during the second half of the twentieth century. Shifting 
from government to governance in international business and global environmental governance 
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after the 1990s, the requirement of coordinating collective action brings firms and NGOs into the 
process of governing. The increasing focuses on the political economy of environmental 
governance appeal for closer interaction between politics and economics. According to 
Harashima (2000, p. 293), the main emphasis of environmental governance concerns 
„interactions among formal and informal institutions and actors within society that influence how 
environmental problems are identified and framed‟. Levy and Newell define „environmental 
governance‟ as: 
 
[T]he multiple channels through which human impacts on the natural 
environment are ordered and regulated. It not only implies rule creation, 
institution-building and monitoring and enforcement, but also refers to a soft 
infrastructure of norms, expectations, and social understandings of acceptable 
behaviour towards the environment, in processes that engage the participation of a 
broad range of stakeholders (Levy and Newell, 2005, p. 2). 
 
Informed by Gramsci‟s hegemony among the state, the capital, and social forces, David Levy 
and his colleagues introduce a neo-Gramscian framework to extend Gramsci‟s thinking beyond 
the national class conflict to understand the nature of business power in international 
environmental governance, and investigate how different actors can engage in the climate change 
issues and influence complex social and political systems (Levy, 2005, 2008; Levy and Egan, 
2003; Levy and Newell, 2002, 2005; Levy and Spicer, 2013; Levy et al., 2015). Gramsci‟s 
hegemony provides a conceptual linkage among a variety of actors engaged in political struggle 
over complex social and political systems. Actors including government agencies, firms and 
NGOs seek to establish modern legitimacy and coalitions in alternative ways to build policies 
and norms in international environmental assessments and negotiations. The neo-Gramscian 
understanding of hegemony, defined by Klimecki and Willmott (2011, pp. 130-131), connotes „a 
social-political situation‟, which comprises „intricate, contradictory, and contingent alliances of 
forces within the spheres of the state and the economy as well as civil society‟. In the processes 
of alliance building and legitimacy establishing, from a neo -Gramscian perspective, the nature of 
corporate power and the influence of civil society are linked together with the politics of the 
states in environmental governance. 
 
Environmental governance, in the new era of green economy, signifies the „broad range of 
political, economic, and social structures and processes that shape and constrain actors‟ 
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behaviour towards the environment‟ (Levy and Newell, 2005, p. 2). The neo-Gramscian 
approach not only emphasises the political nature of corporate strategies in the face of 
environmental challenges, but also addresses the developments of civil society in the process of 
environmental governing. In a broader sense, corporate technological innovation, partnership 
with NGOs, and private standard development can been seen as political elements to defend their 
hegemonic position among a network of actors in environmental governance (Levy and Egan, 
2003; Levy and Newell, 2002, 2005). The neo-Gramscian theoretical framework, as a 
theoretically grounded frame with a valuable lens to reflect „material, discursive, and 
organisational dimensions of power‟ within complex social systems (Levy and Egan, 2003, p. 
824), therefore connotes a new way to understand the discourse of China‟s environmental 
governance. More specifically, the neo-Gramscian approach, with a strategic conception of 
hegemony among the state, business and civil society, provides a dynamic understanding of the 
changing roles of the state, business, and civil society as well as their delicate relationship 
changes in the development of environmental governance in China. 
 
2.3.3 Non-State Actors in Environmental Governance 
 
2.3.3.1 Business 
 
Gramsci‟s conception of hegemony provides a basis for a more critical approach 
to corporate political strategy that emphasises the interaction of material and 
discursive practices, structures, and strategies in sustaining corporate dominance 
and legitimacy in the face of environmental challenges (Levy and Newell, 2005, 
p. 58). 
 
Nowadays, with a shift from government to governance, states and international governmental 
organisations seem to be incapable of regulating global business and filling the governance gap; 
in the meantime, NGOs criticise the corporate activities along their global production networks 
(GPNs) on more occasions via varied channels; thus, the international businesses, confronting 
increasing social and environmental pressures, are requested to show concern at the public 
issues, and gradually become a political actor in the global governance system (Scherer et al., 
2014). Business activities, as described by Böhm et al. (2008, p. 170), as „part of a wider 
discursive field of power relations involving companies, governments, NGOs and other civil 
society actors‟, involve resistance within the asymmetrical field of power relations. Scherer and 
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Palazzo (2011) point out that the business sector has begun to undertake both social and political 
responsibilities in global governance, going beyond legal requirements and filling the regulatory 
vacuum.  
 
With further deepening of globalisation and internationalisation as well as industrialisation since 
the 1990s, the business sector has been committed to improving market positioning, influencing 
government policy, disciplining labour and sustaining social legitimacy. Levy (2005, p. 4) 
regards GPNs as „geographically dispersed global factories‟, and uses a Gramscian 
understanding of hegemony to illustrate how international business shapes power relations in 
GPNs, where the state, the economic structure and civil society struggle for effects and profits 
and construct a new means of social formation (Levy, 2008). Hegemony in GPNs directs to the 
contingent stability, which can be achieved when technological, economic, discursive and 
organisational elements are appropriately aligned. Modern governance in GPNs requires not only 
„formal international agreements‟ and „national-level regulations‟, but also the „coordination of 
supply chains‟ and the „promulgation of private codes of conduct regarding labour or 
environmental standards‟ (ibid, p. 944).  
 
The emergence of global environmental problems has called for a new way of environmental 
governance along the GPNs across different countries. Regulators should no longer ignore firms‟ 
potential in the design of environmental governance (Newell and Levy, 2006). The growing 
significance of international environmental agreements for a wide range of industry sectors, and 
the increasingly important influences of corporate activities on both environment and governance 
systems, suggest that more emphasis should be placed on business entity and corporate strategy. 
According to the corporate activism engaged in the greening process, Berry and Rondinelli 
(1998) categorise three stages from the 1960s to the 1990s: between the 1960s to the 1970s, it 
was a period of outright denial that any environmental problem existed in business; in the 1980s, 
there was a trend to tighten the centralised regulation of business; from the 1990s, business 
became increasingly compliant towards environmental regulation. Since the early 2000s, 
environmental leaders have begun to seek going beyond the minimum legal requirements, to 
encourage business to voluntarily engage in more environmentally friendly activities (Evans, 
2012). 
 
Corporate activities, dominating each step of the supply chain, can serve as „a powerful engine of 
change toward addressing environmental concerns‟ (Levy and Newell, 2005, p. 1). Firms are 
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directly or indirectly engaged in the process of resource depletion, energy use and hazardous 
emissions, generating great environmental concerns. According to Welford and Starkey (1996), 
business activities and environmental sustainability are always presented in „zero -sum‟ terms, 
since economic growth harms the environment automatically. Thus, the environmental impacts 
of corporate activities cause firms to be central players in societal responses to environmental 
issues and play a key role in negotiating and implementing environmental policies at the national 
and international levels. 
 
Environmental issues provide a valuable lens to „examine the question of global corporate 
power‟ (Newell and Levy, 2006, p. 157). An increasing emphasis on the connections between 
corporate strategies and political spheres in environmental governance suggests an urgent 
demand for a flexible political economy approach. Therefore, the neo -Gramscian approach, 
connoting „a conceptual linkage between corporate strategies and international relations in 
constructing a political economy of international environmental governance‟ (Levy and Newell, 
2005, p. 49), can provide a dynamic and multi -dimensional perspective for evaluating the 
effectiveness of non-state actors in tackling contemporary environmental issues. The neo-
Gramscian framework emphasises the effectiveness of corporate political strategies in 
constructing a political economy of international environmental regimes (Levy and Newell, 
2002). Large corporations with huge amounts of technological and financial resources are 
expected to address environmental issues, and direct these resources towards effective 
environmental governance (Levy, 2006). In fact, with the guise of „corporate citizenship‟, large 
firms are taking over the role of the states as political right providers and protectors towards 
environmental innovation and protection (Levy, 2011).  
 
2.3.3.2 Civil Society 
 
Gramsci‟s concept of civil society has application if emergent international NGOs 
play the same dual role envisaged by Gramsci; as semi-autonomous arenas of 
cultural and ideological struggle, and also as key allies in securing hegemonic 
stability (Levy and Newell, 2005, p. 54). 
 
The neo-Gramscian framework provides a flexible approach not only to understand the nature of 
business power, but also to emphasise the crucial role of civil society in establishing modern 
legitimacy. Facing more high-profile environmental problems and relatively passive corporate 
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strategies, the neo-Gramscian approach suggests civil society to be one of the significant 
political struggles (Levy and Egan, 2003). As illustrated by Landy and Rubin (2001), it is 
necessary to engage society in the environmental governing process due to non-point source 
pollution generated by society at large, such as tailpipe emissions. Citizens have valuable 
knowledge about the places in which they are living, and sufficient capability to influence the 
environment. According to Evans (2012), sustainable development addresses the normative idea 
which civil society has the capability to impact how the places where they live are managed. 
There will be no sustainability without greater potential for civil society to take control (Irwin, 
1995). In other words, people will become involved in civic environmentalism, owing to 
responsibilities stemming from their embeddedness in their own places, rather than some 
environmental ethic or a commitment to the state (Evans, 2012). 
 
During the past half-century, the number and diversity of NGOs has exploded (Evans, 2012), and 
they have been a significant battleground for broader political and social conflicts. As the 
representative of civil society and social power, NGOs are integral to the philosophy of modern 
governance, playing an important role in facilitating collective action. NGOs act as autonomous 
social groups, balancing the power between the state and the capital in the complex processes of 
alliance building and accommodation (Levy and Newell, 2005; Lipschutz, 1992); and as 
significant political pressure groups, contributing to national and international policy-making 
directly (Betsill and Corell, 2008). Arts (1998) points out that NGOs are making some 
differences in global treaty formation and implementation with their growing political influence. 
To be more specific, NGOs have been engaged in governance through various channels, such as 
consultation to government or business, drafting treaties, regulating activities, and even 
influencing national and transnational policy-making (Betsill and Corell, 2008; Cashore, 2002; 
Charnowitz, 1997). 
 
By supplementing, replacing, bypassing, and sometimes even substituting for 
traditional politics, NGOs are increasingly picking up where governmental action 
stops – or has yet to begin (Princen et al., 1994, p. 228). 
 
NGOs, massively influential in the environmental field, „prioritise the inclusion of non-state 
actors in order to enhance the legitimacy of decisions‟ (Evans, 2012, p. 68). Gemmill and 
Bamidele-Izu (2002) summarise five major roles of NGOs in environmental governance: 
collecting and analysing environmental information; offering environmental input to policy-
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making; monitoring and assessing environmental performance; performing operational 
functions; and advocating environmental justice. Green NGOs can become involved in specific 
localities rapidly since they have pre-existing grassroots contacts, providing an acceptable 
substitute for government regulation, such as monitoring private compliance with environmental 
agreements (Evans, 2012). In recent years, industrial development and implementation of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices have transformed some NGOs from challengers 
to partners, widening the hegemonic coalitions between corporations and NGOs (Levy, 2008). 
NGO-run environmental projects can prompt firms to join in, thus greening their brands and 
keeping up with their competitors (Evans, 2012). NGOs can be viewed as valuable partners to a 
certain extent, since sometimes their activities can cover areas in which the roles of governments 
and private companies cannot be played effectively. With the increasingly elevated status of 
NGOs in environmental governance, it has gradually been suggested that NGOs, as a democratic 
force for changes, are an arena of ideological struggle and an increasingly important ingredient 
of the extended state with hegemony secured.  
 
The neo-Gramscian framework emphasises green NGOs‟ potential to outmanoeuvre rivals over 
environment domains (Levy and Newell, 2002; Levy et al., 2015). As a result of the growth of 
global environmental assessments and negotiations, environmental NGOs‟ legitimacy as well as 
their organisational capacity has been expanded to broaden alliance building in the political 
struggling over climate science and economics  (Levy, 2005; Levy and Egan, 2003). Newell 
(2005) points out that there is an increasing amount of literature to focus on the importance of 
partnerships between business and NGOs. According to Levy and Kaplan (2008), NGOs are 
clearly growing in significance as an element of global governance. However, when 
governments and international institutions seek to involve NGOs in governance, the mechanisms 
adopted by NGOs are largely unregulated and informal, which creates a danger that NGOs over -
represent special interest groups. Thus, it would be inappropriate for green NGOs sharing 
common goals and methods in their partnerships with various multinational corporations and 
governments in different places (Evans, 2012). With a gradual transition from government to 
governance, ever more focus has been placed on partnerships and forms of collaboration, and 
seeking to promote skills and expertise of non-state actors including firms and NGOs to manage 
specific environmental problems (Bendell, 2000; Newell, 2001). According to Levy and Newell 
(2005, p. 59), the business-NGO partnership should be regarded as „part of the struggle for 
legitimacy and influence within civil society‟, rather than „a demonstration of harmonious 
interests‟.  
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With addressing non-state actors, environmental governance, as described by Kutting and 
Lipschutz (2009, p. 6), directs to „a complex process that typically seeks to juggle the views and 
approaches presented, for example, by different forms of indigenous local knowledge, official 
bureaucratic knowledge, and professional -technical global knowledge‟. Görg and Rauschmayer 
(2009) point out that a better understanding of the scale issues in multi -level environmental 
governance is important to explain how the power relations are connected with distributional 
conflicts in political institutions. According to Levy and Egan (2003, p. 813), „the most 
distinctive contribution of the neo-Gramscian approach is a strategic conception of power‟. The 
neo-Gramscian governance focuses on the capacity of agents to constitute social structures and 
effect changes in the economic, discursive, and organisational sphere, while being 
simultaneously constructed and constrained by them. Thus, a neo-Gramscian approach to 
hegemony in environmental governance provides particular strategies for state and non-state 
actors to be engaged in a war of position across the three pillars of hegemony; as well as 
intellectual coherence and a more critical understanding of environmental governance in a 
broader and more political context, with consideration of „corporate political strategy, 
environmental management, bargaining theory and institutional theory‟ (Levy and Newell, 2005, 
p. 63).  
 
However, although the neo-Gramscian approach provides a valuable framework for 
understanding the political negotiations and contestations among multiple actors in 
environmental governance, the application of Gramscian thought to other non-Western 
governance regimes is questioned. Taking China‟s unique state-dominated governance regime as 
an example, without a deep understanding of the specific politico-economic heritages and 
particular historical trajectories in China,  it is difficult to conduct an in-depth analysis of 
Gramscian hegemony in the context of China‟s multiple models of VoC.  Thus, in the following 
section, the researcher places specific focus on the application of the neo-Gramscian framework 
to a wide range of comparative governance regimes, especially to the varieties of governance in 
China. 
 
2.3.4 Gap for China’s Environmental Governance Studies 
 
With increasing focus on the politico-economic discourses of global environmental governance, 
there are a growing number of studies emphasising corporate political power and counter-
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hegemonic power of civil society in international arenas of environmental governance from a 
neo-Gramscian perspective. For example, there is the corporate political strategy of European-
based and US-based companies and their responses to the challenges of their hegemonic position 
as well as the political struggle within civil society (Levy and Egan, 2003); the increasing 
influence of non-nation-state actors in global climate governance (Okereke et al., 2009); the 
climate action of green NGOs and community groups in the UK, the US and Australia (Pearse, 
2010); the political roles of firms and NGOs in the international environmental regime (Bled, 
2010); the information tactics employed by ExxonMobil and Greenpeace to win the battle 
against climate change (MacKay and Munro, 2012); the struggle over climate imaginaries in the 
evolution of energy fields in the US (Levy and Spicer, 2013); and the diverse political work in 
Australia‟s emergent landscape of urban carbon governance (McGuirk et al., 2014). Since the 
nature of climate change is a political issue where varieties of organisations engage in 
contestation and collaboration, the neo-Gramscian approach provides a more sophisticated and 
dynamic analysis of how government agencies, business and civil society constitute the political 
economy of climate change within „broader governance structures of neoliberal ideologies, 
institutions and geopolitical relations‟ (Levy and Newell, 2005; Wittneben et al., 2012, p. 1441). 
 
Although the neo-Gramscian framework provides a fruitful way of understanding the political 
contestations in environmental governance, the application of Gramscian thought to a wide range 
of comparative governance regimes is questioned (Germain and Kenny, 1998; Hall, 1986). As 
listed above, most empirical studies on environmental governance with the multiple actor-
centred perspective set within the context of „liberal market economies‟ (Hall and Soskice, 2001), 
such as the US, the UK and Australia. In other words, most Gramscian governance studies, with 
a neo-liberal perspective, are too Anglo-Saxon centred; there is hence a need to have a more 
plural view on what is going on in other politico-economic systems of the world, with macro 
consideration of varieties of governance. Post-World War II capitalisms have displayed great 
variations of social relations and hegemonic struggles among the state, economic structure and  
civil society. The hegemonic coalitions and bargaining processes over the environmental 
domains display distinctive characteristics associated with the particular set of actors and 
institutions and the power structure of organisation fields (Levy and Newell, 2005).  
 
For instance, Southern Africa has experienced a long period of regional cooperation, which has 
been the most distinctive feature in the formation of the post-colonial institutions and modern 
politico-economic systems. With militarisation of the states and regionalisation of the markets in 
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Southern Africa, such a region-building process usually provided scant emphasis on civil society 
in legitimacy, and directed to „a low level of relevance of civil society‟ (Söderbaum, 2007, p. 
319). In recent years, with the „new regionalism‟ emerging in Southern Africa, civil society, as a 
dynamic force at the regional level, has played an increasing role in transnational regional 
integration. However, because of regional donors‟ market-oriented and volatile funding 
preferences, civil society organisations are confronted by a vulnerable financial situation, which 
constrains the development of their agendas (Godsäter, 2013). Taking climate change governance 
for example, nowadays, there is a growing recognition that climate change and environmental 
deterioration present unique challenges for regionalisation and sustainable development on the 
continent, which are especially accentuated by poverty and lack of sources. With a rising 
environmental awareness, civil society organisations are expected to engage more in combating 
the negative impacts of climate change. However, in the context of „widespread poverty and 
deprivation amid population growth‟ (Simon, 2012, p. 236), environmental governance seems far 
more difficult and costly for the public to tackle. Therefore, in Southern Africa, inter-
governmental organisations play a key role in an effective region-building process to combat the 
negative impacts of climate change (Nathan, 2012; Saunders et al., 2012; Söderbaum, 2007). 
 
Compared with Southern Africa, in the new era of neo -liberalism, many East Asian countries, 
such as China and Indonesia, as well as Japan and its emulator states such as South Korea and 
Singapore, still took a soft government-led path-dependency (Brandt and Rawski, 2008; Johnson, 
2002; McCann, 2014). In Japan, the public is better informed, but still mildly restricted by the 
government. In Japanese capitalism, to be more specific, large corporations are encouraged to 
generate inimitable corporate strategies which „take advantage of the capacities for cross-sector 
technology transfer and rapid organisational redeployment provided by the keiretsu system‟ (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001, p. 35; Morgan, 2009). The conglomeration of businesses holds a huge 
amount of political and economic power, and employees have little choice but to strictly follow 
what is required of them. Favourable connections between business networks and different levels 
of government are important in „Japan‟s somewhat conservative, insider business culture‟, which 
makes the Japanese political economy opaque and its ethics questionable (McCann, 2014, pp. 
333-334). In China, freedoms of speech and press are still confronted by a strict constraint, 
directly inhibiting the influence of civil society in politics. Authoritarian rule is regarded as 
indispensable to national development, and thus, „a grand but unspoken bargain‟ exists between 
the state and civil society in China (Brandt and Rawski, 2008, p. 17, McCann, 2014). Under such 
a soft authoritarianism, different levels of government are mainly under the obligation to develop 
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efficient and effective ways toward sustainable development in environmental governance. 
 
Different from the hegemonic relations in the „regionalism‟ in Southern Africa and the „soft 
authoritarianism‟ in East Asia, the power relations in the European economic model manifest in 
two aspects: first of all, the technological innovation in European countries was private initiative, 
in which governments usually play a secondary and passive role; second, whenever governments 
express a hostile attitude towards technological change and innovation, they have to „face the 
consequences in terms of its relative status in the economic (and eventually political) hierarchy‟ 
(McCann, 2014; Mokyr, 1990, p. 223). Thus, stemming from Anglo-Saxon countries, the neo-
Gramscian approach, with a full consideration of neo -liberalism, addresses the crucial role of 
non-state actors to outmanoeuvre the state, which is often Western-biased in its application. The 
researcher concurs with Murphy (1998), Levy and Newell (2005), and Scherer et al. (2014) that 
the government-corporation-NGO interface provides a profound understanding of institutional 
diversity, and a strong theoretical basis with which to discuss the dynamics of contemporary 
political contestations in environmental governance. How to extend the neo -Gramscian 
perspective of hegemony to the unique context of Chinese state-dominated politics is, however, 
the main task for this research.  
 
In short, at the current stage, there are very few empirical studies applying the Western-based 
neo-Gramscian approach to China‟s changing governance regimes and drawing a completely 
different image of hegemony from the neo-liberal countries. As indicated by Lo and Tang (2014), 
without a deep understanding of China‟s complex institutional diversity based on its specifically 
historical and politico-economic trajectories, it is difficult to make a clear and reasonable 
analysis of the changing hegemony in China‟s varieties of governance. Thus, the neo -Gramscian 
approach needs to be integrated with China‟s varieties of capitalism, so as to investigate the 
changes of hegemonic struggles among the state, business and civil society in the development 
of China‟s environmental governance. 
 
2.3.5 A Critique of Gramscian Governance Research 
 
Based on a neo-liberal perspective, most Gramscian governance research focuses more on 
emphasising the increasing influence of corporate political strategy in environmental 
assessments and negotiations and the growing potential of NGO activism in contestations over 
the environmental issues. Compared with the empowerment of non-state actors, the neo-
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Gramscian perspective usually disempowers the state intervention in contemporary hegemonic 
struggles and institutional formations, with overestimation of free market and free society 
(Marquand, 1997) as well as one-sided accentuation of neoliberalism and post-nationalism 
(Jessop, 2002). In fact, it is too simplistic to claim that the state has gone and the power has 
moved from the government to business and civil society. In contemporary alliance building, the 
state still matters in „securing the key conditions for the valorisation of capital and the 
reproduction of labour-power as a fictitious commodity‟, with overall political responsibility for 
„maintaining social cohesion in a socially divided, pluralist society‟ (Jessop, 2013, p. 8).  
 
Bob Jessop has clear ideas on the paradox of state power, which is embedded in the structural 
coupling of the economic and political, and linked to different forms of civil society (Jessop, 
1997, 2008). Facing the emerging crisis of neoliberalism, neoliberal capital and its allies also 
appeal for the decisive „return‟ of the national state to resolve economic, political and social 
problems in a coherent way, although neoliberalism has restricted the state‟s capacity to resolve 
these crises (Jessop, 2010). In fact, even in the most neo-liberal countries, the state is still 
important in creating and preserving the institutional framework for the neo-liberal market, and 
guaranteeing the quality and integrity of money and the proper functioning of markets, through 
setting up military, defence, police and legal structures (Harvey, 2005). Especially in non-market 
areas, such as environmental pollution and climate governance, state action is rather significant 
in constructing and securing the functioning of organisational structures. Therefore, it is 
meaningful for neo-Gramscian governance research to consider Jessop‟s historical-materialist 
analyses of the state and clarify institutional variations of the state and different power relations 
involved along different lines, so as to provide a more comprehensive and coherent view on 
varieties of governance. 
 
The Gramscian studies of Levy and his colleagues, with particular emphasis on the importance 
of private regimes in challenging groups with superior resources, contribute greatly to the neo-
Gramscian studies on environmental governance. They consider business and NGOs as 
increasingly important actors in the process of political bargaining and negotiation over climate 
change (Levy and Newell, 2002, 2005; Levy and Spicer, 2013). Large corporations, with huge 
technological and financial resources, are taking over the role of the states in constructing a 
political economy of the international environmental regime (Levy, 2011; Levy and Jones, 2006). 
The increasing importance of coordinating the deployment of economic, political, and discursive 
strategies suggests a strategic conception of corporate power, which offers opportunities for 
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groups with fewer material resources to challenge the hegemonic position of the state with 
structural advantages (Levy and Newell, 2005). At the same time, with the increasingly elevated 
status of NGOs in environmental governance, their political potential to outmanoeuvre rivals has 
been expanded as a result of the growth of global environmental struggles (Levy and Egan, 2003; 
Levy, 2005). Industry development and implementation of CSR practices have transformed some 
NGOs from challengers to partners, widening the hegemonic coalition (Levy, 2008; Levy et al, 
2015). NGOs, as a democratic force for change, are clearly growing in significance as an 
element of global governance (Levy and Kaplan, 2008), and it is gradually being suggested that 
they are an arena of ideological struggle and an increasingly important ingredient of the extended 
state with hegemony secured with a neo-Gramscian consideration.  
 
However, although Levy and his colleagues use the neo-Gramscian framework to imply that all 
three main actors have similar access to power in governance, the main focuses of their writings 
are usually placed on a pluralistic interpretation of Gramsci. There have been less clear 
interpretations and explanations on the exact themes of government roles and how they function 
in coordinating hegemonic coalitions and constructing contemporary governance regimes in their 
writings. Thus, to a certain extent, a Western-biased perspective limits the neo-Gramscian 
approach‟s application in other different governance regimes, such as the regionalism in 
Southern Africa, and the soft authoritarianism in East Asia, especially for those contexts in 
which the state power still matters significantly in hegemonic struggles, for instance, China‟s 
state-dominated regime. 
 
In „comparative capitalisms‟ literatures, a number of scholars try to give clear explanations of the 
re-regulation and re-configuration of state power along different lines, so as to develop the  
debate on capitalist diversity; for example: different roles of the state in contemporary alliance 
building (Freeman, 2007; Mäkinen and Kourula, 2012; Morgan, 2009; Rawls, 2001); varying 
degrees of government involvement in political systems (Steurer, 2013); different types of state 
and complementary institutions (Whitley, 2005, 2007); and different mechanisms of state power 
to impose specific patterns of valorisation, appropriation and dispossession (Jessop, 2008, 2014). 
Such types of research can help to extend Gramsci‟s framework to a broader range of politico-
economic regimes. Therefore, although the neo-Gramscian approach is widely used as a critical 
theory for a kind of emancipation to the traditional hegemony in environmental governance, 
further studies need a more plural view on the diversity of contemporary institutional formations 
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along different lines, associated with different state powers, belief systems, social relations and 
hegemonic struggles between politics, economics and society. 
 
2.4 A Neo-Gramscian Perspective on Varieties of Environmental Governance  
 
2.4.1 Varieties of Governance 
 
The contemporary institutional diversity comprises various typologies steered by different state 
and non-state actors from local to international geographical levels. Institutional diversity, as a 
set of basic structures of society manifested in the varieties of participation in complex 
governance, is of central concern to VoC analysis (Morgan, 2009). Structured by various national 
institutions, institutional diversity shapes and governs different economic structures (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; McCann, 2014; Whitley, 1999). As early as 2001, Hall and Soskice (2001, p. 
6) regarded political economy in VoC as a terrain constructed by different actors, who are 
„seeking to promote their interests in a rational way through strategic interaction with other 
actors‟, but the institutional diversity as a binary distinction between LMEs and CMEs is 
abstractly defined at a theoretical level. 
 
As illustrated in Section 2.2.5, in the „comparative capitalisms‟ literature, many scholars critique 
the VoC approach as lacking historical, micro and institutional concerns about political 
contestations and accommodations of multiple actors in contemporary alliance building. 
Although corporate activities play a key role in improving national economic performance, 
through raising finance, securing access to inputs and technology, regulating working conditions 
and salaries, maintaining firm-employee relationships, ensuring workers‟ requisite skills, and 
competing for customers, the business sectors also need to cooperate with other actors in 
multiple spheres of political economies in order to prosper in the long run (Hall and Gingerich, 
2009). With increasingly pluralistic themes of roles of the state, business and civil society in the 
varieties of regimes, the VoC approach to political economy should be multiple actor-centred, 
rather than firm-centred or state-centred; and should be rooted in micro-level hegemonic 
struggles and contestations on organisational fields, rather than abstract and macro-level 
divisions of post-World War II economic regimes; so as to clarify complex institutional diversity 
and dynamic hegemonic struggles within varying politico-economic systems. 
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Hegemony, as a crucial conception in the modern pluralism of global political and social orders, 
would be constructed „if the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the 
leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion‟ (Gramsci, 1971, 
p. 418). Then with the establishment of hegemony, an exchange of individual elements between 
the rulers and the ruled can take place with the creation of the historical bloc, which implies the 
existence of hegemony (Sassoon, 1987). More specifically, a historical bloc consists of particular 
ways of various classes construct hegemony within national political frameworks (Bieler and 
Morton, 2004). Therefore, a historical bloc perspective on VoC involves the participation of 
governmental agencies, corporate elites, NGOs and academic professionals in the varieties of 
institutional formations (Cox, 1983, 1987; Levy and Newell, 2005; Murphy, 1998). Towards the 
critiques of VoC, a multiple-actor perspective with a dynamic understanding of the politico-
economic, sociological and ideological aspects of power relations involved in different 
institutional settings is needed. The neo-Gramscian framework, which integrates agency, 
dynamics and power into field-level politics, and provides a collective perspective on the 
dynamics of contemporary political contests engaging a variety of actors (Levy and Egan, 2003), 
can enrich the „lean‟ societal theory and politico-economic theory in VoC (Bieling, 2014). 
 
However, as illustrated in Section 2.3.5, the neo-Gramscian perspective usually focuses overly 
on a pluralistic interpretation of Gramsci and  disempowers the role of the state in contemporary 
institutional arrangement to a certain extent. Extending such a theoretical framework with a 
Western-bias to the East Asian countries under soft authoritarianism, such as China‟s state -
dominated society, may cause some confusion over the re-configuration of state power in 
constructing modern regimes. The prevalent governance regime in China differs significantly 
from those institutionalised in the US or the UK or other European countries (Buhr and 
Frankenberger, 2014; McCann, 2014; McNally, 2012; Morgan, 2011; Whitley, 2007). Towards 
the critiques of Gramscian governance research, the VoC approach, providing a macro insight on 
varieties of institutional architectures and placing great emphasis on institutional variations of 
the state in contemporary political contestations and negotiations, matters for investigating 
particular political regimes different from those in Anglo-Saxon countries.  
 
Post-World War II capitalism displays a great diversity in institutional formations and 
foundations across countries. With increasingly pluralistic themes of roles of government 
agencies, corporations and civil society, merging a neo-Gramscian approach with the VoC 
approach, as shown in Figure 2, is meaningful for contemporary comparative institutional 
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analysis on organisational fields populated by multiple actors to advance their respective 
interests in rational ways with strategic interactions with others. On the one hand, the VoC 
approach provides a deep-seated analysis on macro-level variations of logics of political rules 
and economic activities across different countries, which extends the neo-Gramscian framework 
to a broader range of institutional diversity to identify institutional variations of the state and 
power relations that involved. On the other hand, the neo-Gramscian approach, with a historical 
perspective on micro-level hegemonic contestations and accommodations among multiple actors, 
enriches the lean and abstract divisions in VoC with a broader conception of power and politics, 
and provides a more dynamic and sophisticated understanding of multi-dimensional and multi-
level governance regimes.  
 
 
Figure 2 Merging a Neo-Gramscian Approach with the Varieties of Capitalism 
 
Different politico-economic systems provide different historical-geographical heritages on their 
respective discourses of governance in distinctive ways. Since there have been few historical and 
dynamic concerns in the VoC studies and less comparative breadth for the neo-Gramscian 
studies, merging the neo-Gramscian approach with the VoC approach is beneficial to 
incorporating the particular historical roots, politico-economic trajectories, national conditions, 
and social relations into the consideration of varieties of governance, so as to identify the 
distinctive institutional foundations of a particular regime as „the products of the past social 
conflicts and past institutional developments‟ (Jessop, 2014, pp. 49-50), and clarify the specific 
hegemonic struggles and contestations among multiple actors within a particular territory at a 
given moment. 
 
Therefore, in order to apply the Western-based Gramscian framework to China‟s unique 
governance regime and discuss the complex hegemonic struggles among the state, business and 
civil society in China‟s changing political economies, this research merges a neo-Gramscian 
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approach with the VoC approach to investigate China‟s varieties of governance in a more 
concrete and interpretative way. The complex varieties of governance in China, associated with 
distinctive belief systems and different hegemonic relations between the state, corporations and 
NGOs from the discourses in Western countries, can be better understood dynamically in a more 
descriptive way, at both micro and macro levels, with both historical depth and comparative 
breadth, by integrating the two approaches. 
 
2.4.2 Varieties of Environmental Governance in China 
 
Since the 1980s, with the emergence of global environmental problems being a new crisis of 
hegemony, environmental governance issues have become a profound political process involving 
multiple actors in political contestations and negotiations. The neo-Gramscian approach provides 
a dynamic view on hegemonic relations between the state, economic structure and civil society 
in environmental governance (Levy and Egan, 2003; Levy and Newell, 2002, 2005; Levy et al., 
2015), as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Environmental Governance 
 
Due to rapid industrialisation and phenomenal economic growth especially after the mid -1980s, 
China has been confronted with serious resource challenges and suffered from heavy 
environmental pollution. Introducing a neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance, 
which is illustrated in Section 2.3 and depicted by Figure 3, can also provide a valuable and 
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dynamic understanding of the changing discourses of China‟s unique environmental governance 
regimes. In the new era of green economy, China‟s modern environmental governance also 
directs to a broad range of political, economic, and social structures and processes, involving 
both the state and non-state actors towards a scientific, harmonious, and sustainable 
development, although the state still plays a prominent role in developing rules, norms and 
routines for social behaviour. With a gradual institutional transformation from a government -led 
model in China‟s planned economy, to the current combination of multiple models of VoC in the 
market-oriented economy, the power relations among the three pillar actors have been quietly 
changing in China‟s environmental governance system. Within the context of state -dominated 
political economies, with ever more focus on sustainable issues from the central state, 
corporations and green NGOs have gradually become visible players in the development of 
China‟s environmental governance. 
 
Varieties of regime structures and processes of governance, according to Levy and Newell (2005, 
p. 61), reflect the diversity of „the power, resources, preferences and strategies of various actors‟, 
and direct to different hegemonic coalitions and bargaining processes between the state, business 
and civil society over the environmental regime. Dominant „climate imaginaries‟, which may 
vary across counties, shape different responses to climate change by firms, governments and 
NGOs (Levy and Spicer, 2013). With an institutional consideration, contemporary China, 
engaged in „an unfinished project‟ which continues to evolve, can be viewed as „a combination 
of many models and systems‟ (McCann, 2014, p. 295). Taking Gramsci‟s conception of 
„hegemony‟ and „a historic bloc‟ into China‟s multiple VoC, it may be easier to make a clear 
illustration of the changing power relations in the development of China‟s state -dominated 
environmental governance regimes. Thus, the researcher proposes a neo-Gramscian perspective 
on China‟s varieties of environmental governance, to identify the institutional variations of the 
state and the hegemonic positions of non-state actors in China‟s complex governance regime, 
and discuss the changes of power relations with the development of China‟s environmental 
governance at both micro and macro levels, as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Theoretical Framework: Varieties of Environmental Governance in China  
 
Thus, a neo-Gramscian perspective on China‟s varieties of environmental governance can help to 
identify the unique institutional formation, compliance and changes for China‟s institutional 
diversity, and the complicated hegemonic struggles among the state, economic structure and civil 
society in the development of China‟s environmental governance, which explains the formation 
of the particular historical bloc in a more interpretative way, and clarify the institutional diversity 
of the particular hegemony stemming from the unique political, historical, cultural, and social 
roots of the complex political economies of China. In order to investigate the exercise of state 
power to regulate and coordinate the hegemonic coalitions in China‟s environmental governance, 
this paper investigates the different hegemonic positions of governments, firms and NGOs as 
well as the changing „triangular relationship‟ of the three pillar actors in the development of 
China‟s environmental governance. Based on the theoretical framework in Figure 4, this 
research enriches the abstract VoC typologies with China‟s unique institutional diversity; 
extends the Western-centric neo-Gramscian environmental governance research to China‟s 
distinctive regime; provides a more plural and dynamic understanding of the ideological, 
political and social dimensions of  China‟s varieties of governance; and clarifies the institutional 
variations of the state in China‟s contemporary alliance building as well as the changing 
hegemonic struggles and contestations among state agencies, business and NGOs in the 
development of environmental governance, on the basis of the specific historical, political, 
economic and social trajectories in China. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
With the critical reviews on the VoC approach in „comparative capitalisms‟ literature and the 
neo-Gramscian studies on environmental governance, the literature review chapter combines the 
VoC and neo-Gramscian literatures to provide a critical view of shifts in China‟s varieties of 
environmental governance. Section 2.4 proposed the theoretical framework, and as Figure 4 
shows, merging the neo-Gramscian approach with the VoC approach is meaningful in illustrating 
the particular assembly of economic, political and discursive relations which bind both the state 
and non-state actors within a particular environmental governance regime at a given moment. On 
the one hand, the VoC approach helps the neo-Gramscian framework to extend to other non-
Western governance regimes, with particular emphasis on the institutional variations of the state 
and power relations involved; on the other hand, the neo-Gramscian approach helps the VoC 
approach to identify the post-World War II institutional diversity with consideration of the 
dynamic and micro-level hegemonic contestations and accommodations among multiple actors 
in institutional formations along different lines. 
 
In short, with both historical depth and comparative breadth, a neo-Gramscian perspective on 
varieties of environmental governance, through combining a macro-level analysis of varieties of 
politico-economic regimes with a micro-level understanding of organisational struggles, is 
beneficial for the further VoC studies on the dynamics of institutional diversity and the further 
neo-Gramscian studies under varieties of governance regimes. On the basis such a theoretical 
framework, the following methodology chapter illustrates how the researcher carry out an 
empirical investigation on the exercise of state power in regulating and coordinating hegemonic 
alliance building in China‟s varieties of environmental governance. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY, METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
On the basis of the theoretical framework, as Figure 4 shows, this research aims to discuss the 
changing themes of different roles of the central and local governments, BSRE and green NGOs 
as well as their complex hegemonic struggles at an organisational level in the development of 
environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry. To conduct the empirical research, in 
this chapter, the major philosophical stances on environmental governance research and the main 
methodological position and methods in approaching the analysis are outlined. Section 3.2 starts 
from a brief illustration of ontology and epistemology in management studies, and then 
illustrates the ontological and epistemological positions of environmental governance research. 
Section 3.3 illustrates the reason for choosing the interpretivist approach and carrying out a 
qualitative study on the environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry at an 
organisational level. Section 3.4 emphasises the research design, including the research diagram, 
research questions, research sites and qualitative research methods used for data collection and 
analysis, with a particular focus on Fairclough‟s critical discourse analysis.  
 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
 
3.2.1 Ontology and Epistemology in Business and Management 
 
Starting a research project, a feasible philosophy and research paradigm should first be 
confirmed in order to derive an appropriate methodology and methods for the research (Saunders 
et al., 2007). The research paradigm, as the basic belief system, guides the investigation „not only 
in choices of methods but also in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways‟ (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994, p. 105). A philosophy of science directs a set of ontological and 
epistemological assumptions, providing „a platform that can establish the purpose of scholarly 
activity, help identify problems and point to appropriate methodologies‟ (Huff, 2009, p. 109). 
The philosophical stances also help construct a reference frame, which helps „underpin a way to 
conceive of, and know about, a particular reality being studied in a research frame of reference‟ 
(Hallebone and Priest, 2009, p. 191). 
 
An epistemological stance concerns what constitutes knowledge, while an ontological stance 
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focuses on the nature of reality (Saunders et al., 2007). The key question to an ontological stance 
is „whether there is a real world out there that is independent of our knowledge of it‟ (Stoker and 
Marsh, 2002, p. 18); and the key question to an epistemological position is concerned with 
„whether the approach to the study of the social world can be the same as the approach to 
studying the natural sciences‟ (Saunders et al., 2007, p. 104). Ontological and epistemological 
stances are related to each other, but need to be separated: an ontological stance refers to the 
researcher‟s view about the nature of world; while an epistemological stance directs to what the 
researcher understands about the world and how it is understood. In short, an ontology can be 
seen as a theory of „being‟; while an epistemology can be seen as a theory of „knowledge‟ 
(Stoker and Marsh, 2002). 
 
With consideration of these two positions in business and management research, Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) summarise that both epistemologies and ontologies contain different perspectives 
and ways of influencing the research process. Epistemology is important in understanding how 
the knowledge that is required during the research process is made intelligible: a positivist 
epistemology seeks to create descriptive and predictive principles and rules for a reality; an 
interpretivist epistemology seeks to describe and understand socially constructed realities; and a 
realist epistemology contains both describing and explaining processes (Hallebone and Priest, 
2009). As illustrated by Johnson and Duberley (2000), epistemology considers the criteria 
adopted in the process of knowledge creation, providing a range of different approaches for 
management research. Ontology, concerning the existential reality of the phenomenon studied in 
management research, seeks to illustrate the particular ways through which the world operates, 
involving: objectivism, which means „social entities exist in reality external to social actors 
concerned with their existence‟; and subjectivism, which means „social phenomena are created 
from the perceptions and consequent actions of those social actors concerned with their 
existence‟ (Saunders et al., 2007, p. 108). 
 
3.2.2 Philosophical Stance of Environmental Governance Research 
 
From government to governance, government narrowly concerns the formal structures of state 
authorities; while governance extends the governing practices to non-state actors such as NGOs, 
business and the general public, and concerns the wider range of politics, including the 
production, accumulation and regulation of collective goods at all levels. The contemporary 
debates on governance, according to Marsh and Furlong (2002), display different ontological and 
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epistemological positions in the main. On the one hand, most governance theorists are realists in 
epistemological terms, „emphasising how the continuity of rules, norms and operating 
procedures, and sometimes of deep, non-observable structures, can and does determine the 
outcomes of decision-making in the long term‟(ibid, p. 37). On the other hand, power relations in 
governance, with specific focuses on connections between different actors, is based upon a 
relational ontology (Evans, 2012). 
 
Since the 1980s, the emergence of global environmental problems has called for a new method 
of studying environmental governance across different countries. Environmental governance 
signifies „the broad range of political, economic, and social structures and processes that shape 
and constrain actor‟s behavior towards the environment‟ (Levy and Newell, 2005, p. 2). 
Therefore, environmental governance research calls for both „interdisciplinary research‟, 
requiring the development of a common framework in which different epistemologies are 
applied to investigate different aspects of a problem or an issue; and „transdisciplinary research‟, 
referring to the integration of different disciplinary methodologies, ontologies and 
epistemologies to create shared knowledge (Jakobsen et al., 2004; Tacconi, 2011). For the scopes 
of environmental governance research, Adger and Jordan (2009) highlight three aspects: for the 
empirical strand, researchers discuss the changing landscape of policy making and 
implementation within which the non-state actors play a more important role; for the theoretical 
strand, researchers seek to illustrate the empirical changes with emphases on networks, 
hierarchies and markets; for the normative strand, researchers identify good governance policies 
to improve the machinery of government and to solve global environmental problems. In the 
process of such research, disciplinary integration needs to be combined with certain 
methodological considerations in addressing complex environmental governance issues.  
 
According to Debarbieux (2012), the term „region‟ can be viewed as one of the most striking 
features in environmental governance research. Regional environmental governance is difficult 
to conceive without consideration of national and global levels of decision-making and 
organisation. Considering this, „regionality‟, as a component of an ontological statement, refers 
to different orders of reality within an ontological perspective, and regions have a heterogeneous 
status in the creation of knowledge with an epistemological position. Different kinds of regional 
entity are involved in „regionality‟ as parts of the reality, such as nature regions, supranational 
organisations, decentralised affiliates of global organisations, and social configurations shaped 
by collective mobilisation or public participation. Therefore, environmental governance analysis 
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not only needs to take the ontologies of these regional entities for granted, but also needs to 
consider how these regional entities are established and coordinated in the various ontologies, 
how these ontologies interact, and how these factors lead to the institutional variations of 
different environmental governance regimes. 
 
In the new era of low-carbon and green economy, the modern environmental governance system, 
from a neo-Gramscian perspective, should be identified as an arena in which the „state -business-
citizen conglomerate‟ plays an integral role in policy making and implementation (Skoglund, 
2014, p. 151). The neo-Gramscian approach, differentiating from the major traditions and 
prevailing orthodoxy, manifests its philosophical stance as „a specific form of non-structuralist 
historicism‟ in international studies, which directs „an epistemological and ontological critique of 
the empiricism and positivism which underpin the prevailing theorisations‟ (Gill, 1993, p. 22). 
According to Cox (1987), Gramsci‟s framework, different from abstract structuralism, is 
consistent with the idea of historical structures and has a humanist consideration. The notion of 
historical bloc makes it possible to conceive of the historical contents of different states, by 
emphasising which social forces may be important in the formation of a historical bloc; which 
contradictions may be involved within a historical bloc, and which potential may exist for the 
formation of a historical bloc. As a result, in Cox, a neo -Gramscian perspective of historical 
change to international relations can be understood as „the consequence of collective human 
activity‟, to a substantial degree (Gill, 1993, p. 22). 
 
For this research, introducing the neo-Gramscian approach to the development of China‟s 
environmental governance also reflects the ontological and epistemological positions, with 
consideration of the historical, political, economic, and social implications on policy 
transformation as well as the varieties of contemporary political economies in China. The 
normative goal of the neo-Gramscian approach is heading for the solution of basic issues in 
political philosophy – the construction of an ethical state and society, in which economic and 
social liberation, democratic empowerment, open debate and personal development can be more 
widely attainable (ibid). Based on the ontological position of the state, business and civil society, 
the neo-Gramscian approach, aiming at a hermeneutic interpretation of the social construction of 
reality, assists to disclose the „truth‟ of hegemony in China‟s changing governance system. For 
Gramscian governance, with relational ontology as the core value, it is meaningless to discuss 
any single actor independently; and the connections between government, business and civil 
society are more valuable for in-depth interpretations of varieties of environmental governance 
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in China in the new era of green economy. The neo -Gramscian approach also provides a 
historical materialist vision to analyse the system from the bottom upwards and the top 
downwards in a dialectical appraisal of a given historical situation, and regards political 
economy as the aggregate of social relations configured by social structures ( ibid). From a 
historical perspective, this research aims to discuss the profound implications of policy 
transformation in China on the changes of historical power structures in the development of 
China‟s environmental governance. 
 
3.3 Research Methodology 
 
3.3.1 Interpretivism 
 
As defined by Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 227), the interpretive paradigm explains „the social 
world primarily from the viewpoint of the actors directly involved in the social process‟, which 
can be employed to generate understandings of social phenomena, to resolve descriptive 
questions about social issues, and to develop descriptive theories on social science research. 
Bryman and Bell (2011) state that employing an interpretive approach means that researchers can 
gain surprising interpretations within the particular targeted social context. As illustrated by 
Baker and Bettner (1997), the interpretive approach and qualitative studies aim to describe, 
understand and interpret the issues sourced from the context of social science research.  
 
Compared with the interpretivist approach, the positivist paradigm is less appropriate for this 
research. Being a positivist implies that the researcher is working with an observable social 
reality in a „value-free‟ way. Positivist researchers view the way that knowledge is produced as 
independent and objective, and prefer to establish a hypothetic-deductive structure with a linear 
and rigorous process to produce law-like generations, in order to expand the range of a theoretic 
explanation (Hallebone and Priest, 2009; Huff, 2009; Saunders et al., 2007). In this process, 
objective and precise measures associated with quantitative data such as structured 
questionnaires and experimental studies are usually adopted in testing the hypotheses (Hughes 
and Sharrock, 1997). In this research, in order to investigate the changes in China‟s 
environmental governance regimes within the multiple Chinese models of varieties of capitalism, 
the complicated hegemonic struggles between the state, business and civil society are mainly 
perceived by insiders‟ self-perceptions relating to their physical activities in constructing a social 
structure. It is impossible to treat people and institutions as being separated from their particular 
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social contexts. Thus, with a focus on insiders‟ understanding of their social activities, value-free 
assumptions in positivism are not conducive to answering the research questions. 
 
From the perspective of ontological and epistemological positions, this research aims to make a 
hermeneutic interpretation of the social construction of reality on the basis of narrative and 
discursive data. Therefore, the researcher chooses the interpretivist paradigm to resolve 
descriptive questions about social issues, which is more sensible and suitable for the discourse 
analysis of environmental governance in China‟s changing politico-economic systems. As 
transdisciplinary research, environmental governance studies usually integrate different 
disciplinary ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies to discuss hegemonic structures and 
institutional formations within a particular territory at a given moment. The logic of enquiries, in 
this research, is carried out from the personal understandings gained from government officers, 
corporate managers and NGO staff on their respective activisms to a group of images of China‟s 
changing environmental governance systems. This is the standard pattern of an induction logic, 
as „a movement from observing specific statements or instances of a phenomenon and then, from 
their similarities or differences, adducing general statements‟ (Hallebone and Priest, 2009, p. 
183).  
 
In short, with considerations of the insiders‟ self-perceptions and interactions, interpretivism can 
provide a comprehensive illustration of the particular meanings and discourses of a social 
structure (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Since this research aims to answer the „descriptive‟ 
questions with a focus on the „values‟ of insiders (Arbnor and Bjerke, 2008), the interpretive 
approach, emphasising subjective meanings of social actions and human beings‟ interactions in 
creating social reality (Bryman and Bell, 2011), is more feasible for the discussions on the 
changes of hegemonic coalitions among multiple actors in China‟s varieties of environmental 
governance, through merging a neo-Gramscian approach with China‟s institutional diversity. 
 
3.3.2 Qualitative Approach 
 
For epistemological and ontological stances, most governance theorists are realists in 
epistemological terms, so that their logic is likely to be more inductive rather than deductive 
(Marsh and Furlong, 2002). Bevir and Rhodes (2010) introduce an interpretive approach into 
governance research, concerning narratives about practices, beliefs, traditions, and dilemmas 
based on „meaning holism‟ and rethinking governance as storytelling. With the feature of 
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storytelling, most studies on environmental governance and the hegemonic struggles involved 
rest on the qualitative approach. 
 
With the shift from government to governance in a postmodern epoch, environmental 
governance, as an „interdisciplinary‟ research, reconciles many different economic and political 
factors. A neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance directs to the development of a 
common framework in which different epistemologies are used to investigate different aspects of 
an environmental issue, usually in a nominal and descriptive way. A VoC approach also provides 
a qualitative insight into a more realistic set of different logics of economic activities and rules of 
the game in varying political economies. By integrating these two theoretical approaches, it is 
feasible to conduct a qualitative research to investigate the changing varieties of environmental 
governance in China‟s contemporary politico-economic regimes. Thus, in this research, the 
researcher adopts a qualitative study to investigate the changing hegemonic positions of 
government agencies, corporations and NGOs as well as their dynamic power relations in the 
development of China‟s environmental governance in a more interpretive way. 
 
With a case study on BSRE in the Chinese rare earth industry, the researcher collects qualitative 
data via documentary review and semi-structured interviews; then carries out a critical discourse 
analysis based on the text discourses to generate statements on the discourses of environmental 
governance in the rare earth industry in China. The qualitative approach is more appropriate for 
solving the research questions and supporting the arguments as well as carrying out the 
discussions in this research. Therefore, based on the qualitative data, including both primary data 
from interviews and secondary data from documents, this research investigates China‟s 
institutional diversity and environmental governance system at an organisational level, with 
discursive and word-based descriptions in the context of China‟s changing political economies. 
 
3.4 Research Design 
 
3.4.1 Research Diagram 
 
A neo-Gramscian perspective on varieties of environmental governance, by means of introducing 
the environmental factor into varieties of regimes, brings politics and economic structures as 
well as institutional diversity into the research. Introducing a neo-Gramscian approach to 
environmental governance directs to a broad range of activism of the state and non-state actors 
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towards the environment, which influence the institutional formation of society and political 
economy. 
 
China, with distinctive historical and political heritages, contains considerable divergences and 
great uniqueness in its varieties of governance, directing to the different ways of resource 
allocation and power distribution between the state and non-state actors during different periods. 
With a further complex layer of the institutional variation of the state and power relations 
involved, from a historical perspective, there are generally two stages for the significant changes 
of China‟s institutional diversity: the first stage is from the foundation of New China in 1949 to 
the early 1990s, during which China, following a Soviet-style development mode, had 
experienced a long period of planned economy, and the highly prescriptive planning from the 
central state dominated the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of society as a 
whole; the second stage started from the 1990s with a series of far-reaching economic reforms 
towards a market economy implemented across the whole country, and the market -oriented 
transformation still matters in today‟s multiple models of VoC in China. At the same time, with a 
gradual relaxation of state control over the economic structures and even over public discourse, 
NGOs have gradually emerged between the state and the capital in China‟s state -dominated 
regime. 
 
Based on a timeline of the development of New China, as Figure 4 shows, this research 
integrates a neo-Gramscian approach with China‟s VoC to discuss the changing discourses of 
environmental governance of the rare earth industry at an organisational level. With an in-depth 
case study on BSRE, the researcher carries out an empirical study with particular focus on the 
changes of hegemonic positions of the different levels of government, BSRE and local green 
NGOs as well as their power relations in the contexts of China‟s varieties of environmental 
governance during the two periods. This is shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 Hegemonic Struggles in the Development of Environmental Governance of China’s Rare Earth Industry  
 
3.4.2 Research Questions 
 
Based on Figure 5, with a focus on the varieties of environmental governance of the Chinese rare 
earth industry from a planned economy (the 1950s to the 1990s) to a market economy (the 1990s 
to now) under China‟s unique politico-economic regimes, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, the 
research question is: 
 
What are the different roles of the state, business and NGOs and their hegemonic 
struggles in the development of environmental governance of China‟s Rare Earth 
Industry? 
 
In order to answer the above question, with a case study on the world‟s largest rare earth 
supplier, BSRE in Baotou, China, by merging a neo-Gramscian approach with China‟s VoC, the 
following sub-questions are considered: 
 
 What are the politico-economic features of China‟s planned economy, and what model of VoC 
fits China‟s regime in the planned economy? 
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 What does a planned economy mean to the environmental governance of the rare earth 
industry between the 1950s and the early 1990s in China? 
 What are the hegemonic positions of the central state and local governments as well as BSRE 
in the environmental governance of the rare earth industry during this period?  
 What are the reasons for China‟s politico-economic reform from a planned economy to a 
market economy and how does it work? 
 What model of VoC fits China‟s institutional diversity under the market-oriented economy? 
 What are the implications of the politico-economic reform on the public discourse, and what 
does civil society mean to China‟s state-dominated regime? 
 What are the implications of the transition from a planned economy to a market economy on 
the discourse of environmental governance in China? 
 What are the different hegemonic positions of government agencies, BSRE, and green NGOs  
over a series of environmental issues in the development of environmental governance of 
China‟s rare earth industry? 
 
3.4.3 Research Site 
 
Rare earth, as illustrated in the introduction chapter, with the increasing demands in a range of 
ubiquitous high-technologies throughout the world, has become one of the most important 
strategic natural resources in China (Bernstein Group, 2011; Cooney, 2010; Nesbit, 2013; 
Saefong, 2009; Tabuchi, 2010). In the new era of low-carbon and green capitalism, applying rare 
earth materials in green technology has been viewed as an energy-efficient and environmentally-
friendly solution to alleviate environmental crises (Spiegel, 2010). However, severe 
environmental pollution in the processes of mining, smelting and separating rare earth ores 
cannot be ignored. Since the concentration rate of rare earths in the ores is very low, rare earths 
must be separated and purified after mining, by means of „acid baths‟ and „hydro -metallurgical 
techniques‟, which generate a huge amount of wastewater and residues. The industrial waste 
contains various toxic chemicals and radioactive elements such as thorium and fluorine, 
poisoning groundwater and underground water systems in the nearby villages (Graedel et al., 
2011; Rusu et al., 2006; The State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2012). 
 
Particularly, long-standing rare earth smelting and separating activities in Baotou rare earth 
industry have caused a series of serious environmental problems. Especially during the 1990s, 
the mining chaos in Baotou, due to a lack of strict government control and regulation, involved 
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more than one hundred SMEs in rare earth rough processing. In order to maximise profit, all 
private SMEs engaged in immoderate mining and processing, which caused not only a serious 
waste of rare earth resources, but also led to a sharp deterioration of the local environment. 
Therefore, the researcher positions the research site on Baotou‟s rare earth industry, to 
investigate different roles of the state, business and green NGOs in environmental governance.  
 
Since the late 1990s, reacting to the serious resource wastage and environmental pollution, as 
well as responding to the dramatic growth of rare earth demands in the global market, the central 
state has gradually realised the importance of rare earths as a kind of strategic resource for 
economic development and environmental governance. Since the early 2000s, the central state 
has carried out a series of consolidation plans for China‟s rare earth industry, targeting improved 
pricing and competitiveness in the global market, as well as establishing an effective 
environmental governance system. Nowadays, after a series of successful industrial 
consolidations in China‟s rare earth industry, BSRE, as the only legitimate rare earth corporation 
in Baotou, has monopolised the whole northern rare earth industry in China and has become the 
world‟s largest supplier of rare earth materials. 
 
Therefore, the researcher carries out an in-depth case study on BSRE. The case study focuses on 
how the central and local governments, BSRE and local green NGOs play different roles in the 
development of environmental governance of the rare earth industry in Baotou. For the reasons 
for choosing BSRE to conduct a case study, during the interviews, both the senior managers of 
BSRE and the government officers from the Baotou government expressed their opinions on the 
unique advantages of BSRE as well as its representative to the Chinese rare earth industry from 
four perspectives, as follows: 
 
BSRE has strong resource advantages. Actually it fully controls the northern light 
rare earth resources. As we all know, light rare earth deposits in Baotou Bayan-
Obo Rare Earth Mining District account for more than 85% of the total deposits 
in China, and more than 60% of the global deposits. Holding such rich deposits, 
BSRE has a unique and absolute industrial advantage with relatively lower costs 
in terms of mining, transporting and processing rare earths. (GOV2) 
 
BSRE has the world’s largest professional research institute, Baotou Rare Earth 
Research Institute, with the purpose of rare earth development and exploitation. 
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Besides, we also have 18 internal R&D centres established in 18 different 
subsidiaries, and our strong scientific research and technique skills make us 
world leaders in the rare earth industry. (COM5) 
 
We provide strong support to BSRE in industrial consolidation. Apart from being 
supported by the central state at policy level, the Baotou and Inner Mongolia 
governments have also offered full support to BSRE regarding its actions in 
industrial consolidation. At present, it is the only legitimate rare earth mining 
corporation in northern China. (GOV1) 
 
... [T]hrough the industrial consolidation [of the northern rare earth industry in 
2013], we have established an integrated supply chain. We built up an integrated 
industrial chain with our 18 subsidiaries from mining, smelting and separating 
raw rare earth minerals, to deep-processing functional products including 
polishing materials, hydrogen storage materials, magnetic materials, luminescent 
materials, and catalytic materials, then to manufacturing a complete range of 
rare earth downstream products, like nickel-hydrogen batteries and magnetic 
resonance instrument. We believe such an integrated industrial chain can greatly 
improve our efficiency of resource allocations, reduce procurement costs, 
guarantee upstream product sales, and optimise internal industrial structures. 
(COM3) 
 
In short, with the strong support of the central state and the local governments, BSRE is now the 
only rare earth corporation in Baotou, and fully controls all light rare earth resources in northern 
China. Relying on the rich deposit of natural resources, BSRE secures its strong competitiveness 
in the global rare earth market. Research institutions established in BSRE also constitute a strong 
R&D capability to help develop outstanding scientific research in terms of rare earth processing 
and production. The integrated supply chain within BSRE ensures the efficiencies in rare earth 
mining, smelting and separating, and deep-processing, and saves extra expense for procurement 
and transportation. Based on the huge resource advantages and the strong financial and policy 
support from both the central state and the local governments in the industrial consolidation 
process, BSRE, at the current stage, is the largest rare earth supplier in the global market. 
 
Therefore, BSRE‟s development in the past six decades represents the development of the entire 
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Chinese rare earth industry. Thus, the research site is placed on the environmental governance of 
Baotou‟s rare earth industry at the organisational level of BSRE. Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region is the researcher‟s home region, which provides more opportunities for the researcher to 
access BSRE, local government and local green NGOs via various ‘guanxi’ (personal 
relationships in English). In the development of environmental governance of Baotou‟s rare earth 
industry, the researcher focuses on the different hegemonic positions of government agencies 
(including the central state, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region government and Baotou 
government), BSRE and green NGOs, as well as their changing hegemonic struggles in the 
process of achieving sustainable development under the complex Chinese political economies.  
 
3.4.4 Research Methods 
 
3.4.4.1 Data Collection: Semi-Structured Interview and Documentary Review 
 
In line with the inductive focus on a multi-faceted understanding of complex empirical 
phenomena, a qualitative case study approach is employed, and the fieldwork is conducted for 
the purpose of obtaining primary data via semi -structured interviews, to provide primary 
evidence for the case study and support the arguments on the development of China‟s 
environmental governance. The core data are collected from semi-structured interviews, which 
were conducted face-to-face in person during March and April 2013, and August and September 
2013. All interviews started from a series of fixed questions about interviewees‟ broad views on 
environmental governance in China, followed by a range of open questions according to their 
different positions as well as their responses. 
 
Each interview usually lasted for one hour, and the research‟s ethical issues were carefully 
considered throughout all interviews. Strictly following the ethical requirements of the 
University of Essex, the researcher sent the written explanation to all interviewees before the 
fieldwork by email to explain the purpose of the interview and the interviewee‟s rights, and to 
promise the confidentiality of participants‟ information and the specificity of data for the 
research. In China, owing to the particular traditions, guanxi plays a significant role in bridging 
interpersonal communication across the whole of society. Without such a personal social 
relationship, it is difficult for the researcher to obtain access to any useful first-hand data about 
environmental issues from the business sector, not to mention from the government agencies. 
Although it seems a little informal to contact interviewees via personal relationship and confirm 
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the interview details by phone calls, it is almost the only way to obtain better access to useful and 
in-depth first-hand data in China. For the fieldwork in China, the researcher interviewed three 
government officers from different departments in the Baotou government, five senior managers 
of BSRE, and eight environmental officers from different green NGOs, with the aims to collect 
primary data from different perspectives and constitute a more comprehensive image of China‟s 
changing environmental governance regimes. More information about the interviewees is shown 
below: 
 
 Three government officers of Baotou local government were interviewed. They are from three 
departments, namely Baotou Economic and Information Technology Commission (BEITC), 
responsible for implementing the national strategies and policies of the new industrialisation 
development from the central state, developing Baotou‟s industry and information technology 
improvement strategies, and promoting strategic adjustment, as well as optimising and 
upgrading industrial structures in Baotou; Baotou Business Bureau (BBB), responsible for 
domestic and international trade of the products manufactured in Baotou, and local economic 
and business development; and Baotou Environmental Protection Bureau (BEPB), 
responsible for local environmental governance. 
 
 Five senior managers of BSRE were interviewed. They are from four departments, namely 
Department of Marketing, responsible for procurement and marketing linkage in the supply 
chain; Department of Production Technology, responsible for production and technology 
innovation; General Office, responsible for production security, media reception, public 
relations, and social activities; Board of Directors responsible for overall corporate strategies. 
 
 Eight environmental officers from different green NGOs were interviewed, including four 
local green NGOs in Baotou and another four leading domestic grassroots environmental 
NGOs in Beijing. 
 
With the consent of all participants, all interviews were conducted in Chinese, through intensive 
note-taking. Then, the researcher translated all the transcripts of interviews carefully. In order to 
confirm there was no discrepancy and ambiguity between what the researcher translated and 
what the interviewees presented, the researcher emailed the translated transcripts respectively to 
the interviewees for confirmation, and for consistency, replies were received accordingly. With 
the final confirmation, the researcher carefully summarised and analysed the transcripts‟ contents 
77 
 
for qualitative analysis and thesis writing. 
 
Besides interviews, the researcher also collected relevant documentary data to support the 
analysis. In qualitative research, especially for the case study, documentary data, which are 
mainly collected from books, journal and magazine articles, newspapers, organisations‟ websites, 
notices, reports to shareholders, as well as memos and transcripts of speeches, can provide rich 
secondary evidence (Blumberg et al., 2011; Saunders et al., 2007). In this research, the 
researcher mainly collected government documents and reports, BSRE‟s CSR reports; and 
relevant media news concerning the environmental issues in China‟s rare earth industry. Through 
reviewing documents from different entities with different perspectives, combined with analysis 
of the interview contents, a series of features of the development of China‟s environmental 
governance can be delineated within the changing politico-economic regimes in China. 
 
3.4.4.2 Data Analysis: Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Based on the transcripts of interviews and different kinds of document, the researcher employs 
the critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach proposed by Norman Fairclough as the 
qualitative data analysis method. CDA, as an interdisciplinary approach, views language as a 
form of social practice, and aims to study how social and political discourses are reproduced in 
text and talk (Dick, 2004; Fairclough, 2001, 2003; Fairclough et al., 2011). Fairclough et al. 
(2011, pp. 366-373) summarise the main principles of CDA: it focuses on social problems; 
power relations are discursive in society; discourse constitutes society and culture; discourse is 
historical; a socio-cognitive approach can expose the link between text and society; discourse 
analysis is interpretative and explanatory of content and context; discourse is a form of social 
action. By seeking „how discourse practices within societal structures secure and maintain power 
over people‟ and discovering „the rules, assumptions, hidden motivations, conditions of 
development and change, and how and why these changes occurred or were resisted‟ (Grbich, 
2013, p. 246), the CDA approach fits well for this research purpose, to investigate the 
institutional variations of the state and the power relations that have evolved in the development 
of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry. 
 
There is a three-level methodological framework of discourse: a language text, spoken or 
written; discourse practice as text production and text interpretation; and sociocultural practice. 
The first step is a textual analysis to make data description and metaphors (Fairclough, 2003). 
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The discursive texts are multi -functional, since the textual elements affect ways of acting, ways 
of representing and ways of being (Brei and Böhm, 2013). Fairclough (2003, p. 26) points out 
that discourse figures in three main ways in social practices: genres as ways of acting; discourses 
as ways of representing, and styles as ways of being. Genres, as „the specifically discoursal 
aspect of ways of acting and interacting in the course of social events‟ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 65) , 
are regarded as the most important features of the particular discourse. Discourse, as „the ways of 
representing aspects of the world‟ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 124), involves the processes, relations 
and structures in the „material world‟, the thoughts, feelings and beliefs in the „mental world‟, 
and the history, culture and power in the „social world‟. In representing process, discourses can 
be identified and differentiated at different levels of abstractions, differing in their various 
degrees of repetition, commonality and stability over time. To identify different discourses from 
different perspectives within a discursive text, particular social or personal positions in 
„constituting particular ways of being‟ should be clarified, which constitute the variations of 
„styles‟. The second step is a process analysis to  make an interpretation of discursive practice 
(Fairclough, 2003), and discuss „how the different textual elements hang together to produce an 
overall order and discourse‟ (Brei and Böhm, 2013, p. 15). Following a process analysis, the final 
step a social analysis, from a wider perspective of political discourses, to make an explanation of 
the effects of socio-cultural, politico-economic and historical discursive practices (Fairclough, 
2003; Milne et al., 2009; Scharf and Fernandes, 2013; Vaara et al., 2010).  
 
CDA can be used to discuss how a discourse develops from the perspective of historical 
formation and powerful groups, how a discourse works from the perspective of ordering and 
exclusion, and what the outcomes have been within a particular period of time. According to 
Grbich (2013, p. 251), the CDA approach can not only uncover the connections among 
„discursive practices, texts and events, and social structure and process‟, but also clarify „social 
inequalities, hierarchies of power and non-democratic practice‟. Compared with traditional 
discourse analysis, CDA considers not only linguistic production, but also distribution and 
consumption due to changes in economic, political, cultural and social factors. In this research, 
the environmental governance of the Chinese rare earth industry has become an increasingly 
urgent social problem. By merging a neo-Gramscian approach with the Chinese VoC, the 
particular contexts of China‟s varieties of governance with the unique historical and politico-
economic trajectories are important for analysing the development of the environmental 
governance of China‟s rare earth industry. The CDA approach addresses institutional diversity in 
analysing different context discourses with focuses on social, political and historical factors in a 
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given region at a particular moment, and power relations between different actors, both of which 
are the main focuses in this research. 
 
The multidimensional critical approach to discourse analysis is a suitable approach for research 
on discourse and discursive changes of social class, political power and the state in modern 
society, in terms of Gramsci‟s concept of hegemony. Fairclough (2010, pp. 129-130) summarises 
a „dual relationship‟ of discourse to hegemony: on the one hand, hegemonic practice, hegemonic 
relation and hegemonic struggle to a substantial extent take the form of „discursive practice in 
spoken and written interaction‟; on the other hand, discourse is „a sphere of cultural hegemony‟, 
and the hegemony of a class or group is in part a matter of its capacity of „shaping discursive 
practices and orders of discourse‟. The principal target of the CDA approach is to uncover and 
clarify opaqueness and power relations, which is meaningful for investigating the hegemonic 
positions of multiple actors as well as their hegemonic relations in the particular discourse of 
environmental governance within a given regime at a particular moment. Although CDA 
provides a feasible research tool for conducting empirical studies of power relations in 
Gramscian governance, at the current stage, there has been a lack of an empirical base with such 
a vigorous methodology in the neo-Gramscian research on environmental governance; for 
example, in Levy‟s work, the three-level methodological framework of CDA has always been 
ignored when the empirical studies of Gramsci‟s framework were conducted over the 
environmental contestations. 
 
Moving to this research, the researcher focuses on the history of the environmental governance 
transformation in China‟s rare earth industry in the dynamic context shifting from a government-
led development model to a market-oriented model with Chinese characteristics. Power relations 
between the state, business and civil society in the development of China‟s environmental 
governance have manifested great divergences during the past three to four decades. With a 
historical and dynamic perspective on the relationship between hegemony and discourse, the 
researcher uses CDA to provide a feasible and practical method to analyse both documentary 
data and interview transcripts about the dynamic hegemonic struggles among different levels of 
government, corporations, and civil society in the historical discourse of environmental 
governance of the Chinese rare earth industry. Based on the discursive practices of China‟s 
contemporary institutional formations, CDA, with special emphasis on the reproduction and 
contestation of political power (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012; Fairclough et al., 2011), 
provides discursive illustrations on how the different actors shape the discursive practices and 
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the rules of the game and how the power relations are constructed and exercised in the changing 
discourse of China‟s environmental governance regimes. 
 
Following the three steps of CDA, based on the two timeline stages, first of all, this research 
carries out a textual analysis to analyse the discursive contents of the primary data via semi -
structured interviews, as well as the secondary data via documentary collection in a descriptive 
manner. A textual analysis aims to identify the changing genres of the discourse before and after 
the market-oriented reform based on the different hegemonic positions of three pillar actors in 
China‟s varieties of environmental governance, and the different styles of textual elements in 
describing the environmental issues in China‟s rare earth industry. Secondly, a process analysis is 
conducted to interpret how the different textual elements work together to interpret the discursive 
practices in the transformation of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry. 
Finally, a process analysis, with consideration of a wide range of unique Chinese historical, 
political, economic, social and cultural factors, is employed to explain the changes in hegemonic 
struggles among multiple actors over the environmental domain in the development of China‟s 
rare earth industry at an organisational level. 
 
As a critical paradigm, the methodological framework was critiqued by Widdowson (1995), who 
stated that CDA is an exercise of interpretation and thus not analysis, which led to a failure to 
distinguish between text and discourse. In 1996, Fairclough published another article in the same 
journal to defend the CDA approach, which regarded Widdowson as misrepresenting 
Fairclough‟s conception of CDA in certain ways. Fairclough (1996) points out that he has always 
made this distinction: interpretation is a kind of language use while analysis refers to making 
meaning from written or spoken texts. Notwithstanding this, CDA has been widely used to 
denote a recognisable approach to draw upon social theories and methodologies for language 
analysis. In this qualitative empirical research, CDA‟s three inter -related dimensions of discourse 
offer a meaningful and vigorous methodological framework to carry out the analysis of the 
changing discourse of varieties of Gramscian governance in China and discuss China‟s varieties 
of environmental governance at both the macro and the micro levels. With a normative and 
explanatory social critique, CDA provides „a much-needed method for analysing political 
discourse‟ (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p. 245). In this research, CDA provides a dynamic 
and more descriptive way to analyse the collected texts, including documentary data and 
interview transcripts. Based on the three-dimensional analysis, a coherent understanding of 
Gramsci‟s framework in the changing discourses of environmental governance of China‟s rare 
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earth industry is generated, with consideration of the unique politico-historical heritages and 
politico-economic regimes in different historical stages in China, which helps to clarify the 
dynamic hegemonic struggles over the environmental domain in China‟s rare earth industry in 
the transition from a planned economy to a market economy.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In order to understand the dynamics of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry, 
this research adopts an interpretivist stance and employs a qualitative case study approach. Based 
on the research diagram of Figure 5, this research investigates the different roles of the state, 
business and NGOs and their hegemonic struggles in the development of environmental 
governance in China‟s rare earth industry at an organisational level. The researcher carried out 
the fieldwork in Baotou, China, the mother lode of global rare earths, and conducted an in-depth 
case study on BSRE, which monopolised the entire northern rare earth industry in China . 
BSRE‟s development represents the changes in the rare earth industry in the New China. 
Concerning BSRE, the researcher collected primary data from semi-structured interviews with 
the Baotou local government, BSRE and environmental NGOs as well as secondary data from 
documentary collection. To analyse the empirical data, with consideration of the relationship of 
discourse to hegemony, the researcher adopted the CDA approach to uncover and clarify the 
institutional variations of the state and the power relations that evolved within the context of 
China‟s varieties of environmental governance in the rare earth industry. Since most neo-
Gramscian studies on environmental governance, for example in Levy‟s research, have not 
employed a specific analytical method such as CDA to carry out the empirical analysis, this 
study will provide a meaningful empirical base with the vigorous methodology of CDA‟s three-
dimensional analysis for bettering the methodological design in further Gramscian governance 
research. 
 
In the following two analytical chapters, first, a textual analysis is conducted to discuss the 
genres and styles of the discourses of environmental governance in China‟s rare earth industry 
before and after the market-oriented reform; then a process analysis is utilised to discuss how the 
different textual elements hang together to generate a comprehensive image of the transformation 
of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry; and finally, a social analysis is 
carried out to discuss the changes in hegemonic struggles among the different levels of 
government, BSRE and green NGOs over the environmental domain in China‟s rare earth 
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industry, with consideration of the unique context of the Chinese varieties of politico-economic 
regimes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE UNDER A PLANNED 
ECONOMY IN CHINA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
On the basis of the theoretical framework established in the literature review chapter and the 
methods summarised in the methodology chapter, this chapter discusses the discourse of 
environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry in the planned economy from the 
foundation of New China in 1949 to the early 1990s. Based on the specific politico-economic 
heritages and the unique historical trajectories, Section 4.2, from the perspective of VoC, 
identifies the model of China‟s politico-economic regime in the planned economy and briefly 
illustrates the environmental concerns in China‟s rare earth industry during that period, with 
consideration of China‟s unique regime. Then in Section 4.3, the researcher, following the three 
dimensions of Fairclough‟s CDA approach as illustrated in the methodology chapter, discusses 
the discourse of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry at an organisational 
level, based on a case study of BSRE. Firstly, investigating the environmental struggles within 
the particular empirical setting of the Chinese planned economy necessitates a deep-seated 
understanding of the uniqueness of China‟s politico-economic regime, which directs to planning 
in state capitalism and will be further illustrated in the following section. 
 
4.2 Planning in China’s State Capitalism 
 
4.2.1 Socialist Transformation from 1949 to 1978 
 
From the foundation of New China in 1949 to the early 1990s, China, following a Soviet-style 
model in its politico-economic system, had experienced a long period of planned economy 
(Knight and Ding, 2012; Wu, 2003). In the 1950s, as a relatively backward country in global 
terms, China adopted the „command economy‟ system to promote the progress of 
industrialisation (Naughton, 2007). Since then, following a wholly government-led development 
model, China experienced nearly 40 years of central planning under the control of the State 
Planning Commission (SPC) organised by the central state. The main function of planning was 
to direct economic development and industrialisation, especially to promote the development of 
SOEs (Chow, 2011). In order to govern society, the central state arranged free medical treatment, 
education, employment, and housing for all citizens (Dong, 2003). 
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The adoption of such a politico-economic system had deep historical, political and social roots. 
At the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, China had just came out of a long war 
and achieved truly national independence with the establishment of a strong government – the 
Central People‟s Government of the People‟s Republic of China. The foundation of New China 
in 1949 marked the end of a 100-year history of semi-colonial, semi-feudal society in the Old 
China. However, due to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, China‟s national security was 
still being threatened. In addition, at that time, China had a relatively lower level of industrial 
development with a huge population, resulting in serious market failure with scant agricultural 
surplus and tight supply and demand. Due to limited funds and professionals, and dispersed local 
governmental and private investments, it was difficult to expand production scale and improve 
technical levels (Knight and Ding, 2012; Naughton, 2007; Wu, 2003). Under the leadership of 
the less-experienced but powerful government in China, with a primary target of establishing an 
independent industrial system and rapidly improving the rate of capital accumulation and 
economic growth, from a historical perspective, it seemed reasonable for China to follow the 
Soviet route, develop a government-led model, and take the road of a planned economy. 
 
In 1955, the „First Five-Year Plan for the National Economy and Social Development‟ (First 
Plan for short) was issued in the Second Session of the First National People’s Congress of the 
PRC, which marked the start of the implementation of planned economic reform in China (The 
National People‟s Congress of the PRC, 1955). This First Plan confirmed the „target‟ of the 
economic recovery and development as the „establishment of the national socialist 
industrialisation‟ and the means of achieving that, through the „progressive realisation of the 
socialist transformation of the agriculture, handicraft, and capitalist industry and commerce in 
China‟, in order to institute a unified state monopoly of purchasing and marketing the products 
of private enterprises, as an advanced form of state capitalism. Since then, the central state 
implemented a nationwide „socialist transformation‟, transforming the „neo -democratic 
economy‟, in which planning and market coexist, to a „public-ownership economy‟, in which 
planning and administrative control dominated the market. The implementation of the first five -
year reform after the foundation of New China, with dramatic changes in the economic system, a 
huge number of participants, and profound influence on the whole of society, expanded and 
consolidated the collective ownership and state ownership across the whole country, which led 
China to move towards „an advanced form of state capitalism‟ (ibid; Lin and Milhaupt, 2013; 
Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011; Wu, 2003). 
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In 1956, the 8th National Congress of the CPC was held in Beijing, and the „Report on the 
Suggestions of the Second Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development 
(1958-1963)‟ (Second Plan for short) was issued (The National Congress of the CPC, 1956). The 
Second Plan fully affirmed the achievements of the socialist construction and socialist 
transformation, and proposed the new requirements for the development of the national economy 
as „further promoting the socialist transformation of the national economy to consolidate and 
expand the collective ownership and state ownership‟, which was regarded as the cornerstone of 
the transformation of state capitalism to socialism (ibid). By the end of 1956, almost all private 
enterprises had been forced by the government to convert to joint state -private ownership, and 
the „socialist transformation‟ had essentially been completed (Dong, 2003). Thus, the year 1956 
was regarded as the first step toward operating a fully „socialist‟ economy in China (Naughton, 
2007, p. 67). In short, from the foundation of New China to the late 1970s, based on the central 
prescriptive planning of deepening the socialist transformation, the state eventually owned all the 
factories across the country, controlled the national pricing system, and allocated goods and 
resources to various producers directly. At the same time, ideological and social control was also 
extremely tight in the governance of the country, and the politics were always in forms of 
„commands‟. 
 
4.2.2 Market Transition from 1978 to the Early 1990s 
 
However, the 30-year planned economy after the foundation of New China left great poverty and 
backwardness in China (Dong, 2003; Wu, 2003). The long-term combination of government 
function and enterprise management caused business to become an appendage of the 
government, which severely depressed the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity of enterprises and 
workers. Moreover, in the planned economy period, the single -minded pursuit of increasing 
industrial production neglected the needs of consumption and growth of the service and retail 
sectors. As a result, in the 1970s, the Chinese economy was teetering on the brink of collapse, 
with underdeveloped industry, low living standards, as well as poor levels of education, science 
and technology (Chow, 2011; McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Nolan and Ash, 1995). Especially 
after the „ten black years‟ of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 re-imposing Maoist 
thought as the dominant ideology, the „morale and public esteem‟ of the CPC dropped to the 
bottom level (Gittings, 2005, p. 173), and the conflicts between the economic base and the 
superstructure peaked. 
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Confronted with an unprecedented crisis of confidence, the CPC realised that the relations of 
production in the highly centralised planned economy seriously hindered the development of the 
Chinese productive forces, which appealed for a further emancipation to fit „an advanced form of 
state capitalism‟. In addition, facing increasing international competition from the global 
markets, the CPC led by Deng Xiaoping realised that the implementation of the „Reform and 
Opening-up‟ policy could continue to enhance China‟s economic power and comprehensive 
national power as well as international competitiveness. Therefore, from 1978, China began a 
new round of dramatic politico-economic reforms, by reintroducing incentives of the market to 
the command economic system. The State Economic Restructuring Commission (SERC) was 
established to direct economic reform, and transformed the economic system gradually towards a 
„market economy‟, in which non-state enterprises such as the small and medium private 
enterprises as well as international corporations were allowed to exist and encouraged to 
compete with SOEs in the Chinese market (Chow, 2011; McMillan and Naughton, 1992; 
McNally, 2012; Nolan, 2014; Nolan and Ash, 1995; Wang, 1994).  
 
In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC set the Reform and 
Opening-up policy as a new central guideline for economic development in China (Naughton, 
2007; Tevev and Zhang, 2002). Since then, by gradually reintroduci ng incentives of the market 
within the command economy system, the market force started to work together with central 
planning via a dual pricing system. However, the central administrative plans still played a 
dominant role in the economic structure, especially before the target of establishing a „socialist 
market economy‟ was proposed in the early 1990s. The legacy left by the command economy 
severely hindered the initial stage of the reform, which retained the supreme position of the 
central administrative plans in business (Knight and Ding, 2012). In fact, before the mid-1990s, 
China had never moved away from a command economy, and many institutions necessary for the 
functioning of a market economy had been rudimentary and even missing. Within such a social 
and political context, SOEs in China had dominated the entire economic structure under central 
planning.  
 
Therefore, based on the illustrations of the politico-economic discourses of two stages under 
China‟s planned economy, from the perspective of VoC, a unified state monopoly of the 
economic activities displayed a strong overtone of „state capitalism‟, in which the state 
nationalised all means of production across the country and accumulated capital in a capitalist 
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manner based on the control of SOEs. Thus, before the early 1990s in China, in the context of 
state capitalism with Chinese characteristics (Fan et al., 2011; Harvey, 2005; Huang, 2008), the 
institutional mechanisms were very simple. China‟s state sector was comprised of the different 
scales of SOEs, and all business assets were owned by the state, respectively reporting to central, 
provincial, prefectural, county and other levels of government (Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011). 
The state implemented extremely strict controls, not only over the economic structure though „a 
hierarchical personnel system‟, but also over the entire ideological and social discourse 
(Naughton, 2007). During the planned economy, the genres of China‟s governance discourse 
were highly prescriptive plans, and such a centrally planned economy had guided the process of 
China‟s industrialisation for around forty years. In such a context, the environmental concerns in 
China‟s rare earth industry will be briefly illustrated in the following section. 
 
4.2.3 Environmental Concerns in a Planned Economy 
 
China chose such a government-led development model aiming to heal the wounds of war and to 
initiate rapid recovery of the national economy. Although the different levels of government had 
attempted to improve the efficiency of a planning system under the direction of the SPC, with 
further industrialisation and urbanisation, the planned economy exhibited a number of problems. 
Most business decisions were developed by the SPC members, the majority of whom lacked the 
appropriate knowledge and experience of business operations. In such a centralised system, the 
ideological orthodoxy restricted economic debates and bred a crisis for economic dislocations.  
The unprecedented degree of socio-economic control of the CPC brought about negative 
consequences in such a closed economic system. For example: attempts were made to reduce the 
waste of production, but instead a huge amount of waste was generated on a grand scale; 
attempts were made to prevent production for profit, but the model failed to replace it with an 
ideal communist or socialist production system; attempts were made to eliminate the short -
termism of competitive capitalism, but the model lacked feasible alternative plans; and there was 
an intention to steer economic activities far from socially undesirable directions, but the model 
failed to change the underlying pattern of economic behaviour (Nolan and Ash, p. 981; 
Naughton, 2007; Nolan, 2014; Tenev and Zhang, 2002; Wu, 2003). 
 
Over time, certain irreconcilable problems emerged within such an outdated politico-economic 
system, especially reflected in the conflict between economic growth and environmental 
protection. The most peculiar, dramatic, and ultimately tragic period during China‟s planned 
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economy started from the „Great Leap Forward‟ in 1957 (Naughton, 2007). The Leap, as a 
simple intensification of the Big Push strategy, aimed to prioritise the development of heavy 
industries at any cost, in order to rapidly transform China from an agrarian country to an 
industrialised country and „surpass the UK and the US‟ in industrial outputs. Within this 
extensive development model, environmental issues were considered less important by both the 
governments and corporations. Without sufficient environmental concerns from the central state, 
the environment became the biggest victim of the rapid economic growth. Especially after 1979, 
the protected industrial sector was gradually opened to private business, and a large number of 
SMEs, with rudimentary facilities and chaotic management mechanisms, had swarmed into the 
Chinese heavy industry sector, resulting in a huge amount of three kinds of industrial waste – 
waste water, waste gas and waste residuals – seriously damaging the ecological environment 
(Tao, 2009). 
 
Especially for China‟s rare earth industry, as illustrated in Section 1.1.2 and Section 3.4.3, the 
mining, selecting, dressing, smelting and separating of rare earth ores has „severely damaged 
surface vegetation, caused water loss, soil erosion and acidification, and reduced or even 
eliminated food crop output‟ (The State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2012, p. 11). 
The light rare earth mines in Baotou contained many kinds of associated metals, so that the 
smelting and separating processes of light rare earth ores inevitably generated a huge amount of 
hazardous waste with a high concentration of ammonium nitrogen and radioactive residues, 
which has seriously damaged the local ecological environment. BSRE was founded in 1961, 
indicating the start-up of the rare earth industry in Baotou. With the instructions of highly 
prescriptive commands from the central state, BSRE had been fully engaged in maximising 
outputs to meet the output requirements of the central state, without any concern for 
environmental issues. Under the strict control and direct intervention of the central and local 
governments, BSRE had little managerial autonomy during the planned economy. 
 
In the planned economy, following the central instructions, everything 
regarding BSRE’s daily operation was determined by our Baotou government 
and the Inner Mongolia government. We [local governments] retained all 
profits or bore losses of BSRE. (GOV1, Extract 1.1 - 1) 
 
 [A]t that time, [under the planned economy], without an efficient incentive 
system and performance measure, our employees, even managers had little 
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enthusiasm for working hard. Moreover, distortion of labour information 
between the corporation and the local governments caused many vacant 
positions in the corporation as well as some virtual positions without practical 
function. (COM3, Extract 1.1 - 2) 
 
The most serious problem [of the extensive growth model] was environmental 
pollution. The different levels of government were responsible for cleaning up 
all the mess caused by SOEs [in terms of environmental damage]. SOEs in 
extractive industries engaged in immoderate mining and extensive production, 
in order to achieve the output requirements set by the central state. They 
considered nothing about environmental protection measures and investments. 
(NGO1, Extract 1.1 - 3) 
 
Extract 1.1, separately from the perspectives of the government, corporations and NGOs, 
indicates that within the central planning system, the different levels of government, relatively 
far away from daily corporate operation, usually developed inappropriate decisions for corporate 
governance and development. The defects were manifested at the corporate level, taking BSRE 
for example, not only in its position vacancies, inappropriate recruitment, and lower working 
efficiency, but also in its lack of concern regarding environmental performance. According to 
Tao (2009), during the period of China‟s planned economy, the central state had not realised the 
serious consequence of extensive economic growth on the environment, and so environmental 
protection had always given way to economic growth. There were no specific environmental 
protection regulations and institutions, which had eventually led the extractive industries to 
discharge waste water, waste gas and waste residues with no regard for the environmental effects 
of such actions. Accompanied by the rapid improvement of the national economy in the planned 
economy, a range of successive serious environmental problems had appeared. After the 1980s, 
with a gradual relaxation of Party control over economic activities, the higher profit temptation 
and the lower entry barriers of the rare earth industry attracted a large number of private SMEs, 
many of which operated illegally, chasing profits through immoderate mining and processing. 
The mining chaos in Baotou, as illustrated in Section 1.1.2, rapidly depleted the local rare earth 
resources and caused a sharp deterioration of the local environment. 
 
Large numbers of private firms, with low-level techniques and very 
rudimentary equipment, flocked to the rare earth industry. The local 
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government’s inefficient regulation and control on this traditionally protected 
but newly opened sector might be the main reason for this chaos. (COM3, 
Extract 1.2) 
 
Since most rare earth corporations in China during the 1990s operated on a small scale, the 
Chinese rare earth industry during that period featured a low concentration rate, poor research 
and development capabilities, and weak corporate-level core competency. The mining chaos 
brought about the accelerating decline of the rare earth reserves in China‟s major mining areas, 
and most of the original mine resources were depleted (The State Council Information Office of 
the PRC, 2012). Taking Baotou as an example, more than 150 private SMEs swarmed into 
Baotou‟s rare earth industry, most of which were engaged in illegal mining, which left more than 
one hundred heavily-polluted rare earth ore tailings dams, shown in Section 1.1.2. As output 
maximisation was the only target for the extractive industries, the ecological environment 
became the biggest victim of rapid economic growth under the extensive development model.  
 
4.3 Environmental Governance of China’s Rare Earth Industry under a Planned Economy 
 
Based on the illustration of the discourse of Chinese planned economy as typical „state 
capitalism‟ in Section 4.2, and the introduction to the environmental issues of Baotou‟s rare earth 
industry in Section 1.1.2, Section 3.4.3 and Section 4.2.3, this section focuses on discussing the 
discourse of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry at an organisational level, 
based on a case study on BSRE, within the particular period of China‟s planned economy. As 
illustrated in Section 3.4.4.2, the data analysis follows Fairclough‟s three-dimensional methods 
of CDA. Firstly a textual analysis is carried out in Section 4.3.1 to analyse the textual materials 
including the selected governmental documents and the transcripts of interviews, and describe 
the genres and styles of discourse of the environmental governance in China‟s rare earth industry 
under the planned economy. Following a textual analysis, a process analysis is carried out in 
Section 4.3.2 to integrate the different textual elements together and interpret the root of low 
efficiency of the environmental performance of China‟s rare earth industry. Finally, a social 
analysis is conducted in Section 4.3.3, from a wider perspective of political discourses, to discuss 
the environmental struggles between the different levels of government and BSRE in the context 
of China‟s state capitalism. 
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4.3.1 Description of the Roles of Government and Corporation in Environmental 
Governance: A Textual Analysis 
 
4.3.1.1 An Overview of Different Hegemonic Positions 
 
First of all, a textual analysis is carried out to briefly describe the different roles of the 
government and corporations in China‟s environmental governance during the planned economy. 
Before the 1990s, Chinese civil society had little bargaining power and very few opportunities to 
struggle for civil rights (Wu, 2003). The environmental officers from different NGOs, during the 
interviews, expressed similar opinions on the role of civil society under China‟s planned 
economy, and one typical response is selected as follows:  
 
Not to mention civil society [in affecting decision-makings in governance], 
even large SOEs rarely had opportunities to ‘speak for’ them in business 
operations. The government determined everything in China through the 
central planning. … [B]y the way, establishing NGOs was not permitted. 
(NGO5, Extract 1.3) 
 
From 1954 to 1956, a socialist transformation was conducted in China to facilitate the 
nationalisation of all the capitalist means of production. After that, all private enterprises, named 
as „capitalist industry and commerce‟, had transformed themselves to collective ownership and 
state ownership, respectively reporting to the different levels of government. Due to the special 
political and historical trajectories, SOEs comprised not only of enterprises invested in and 
owned by the central state, but also of those invested in and controlled by the different levels of 
local government. 
 
We are owned by the local governments. The Baotou and Inner Mongolia 
governments were the only shareholders of us before 1998’s corporate reform. 
(COM3, Extract 1.4 - 1) 
 
During the planned economy, we operated just like a ‘processing plant’, rather 
than an ‘independent business entity’. (COM1, Extract 1.4 - 2) 
 
We exercised full management and control over BSRE following the central 
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instructions. We and the Inner Mongolia government were fully responsible for 
everything regarding BSRE. (GOV2, Extract 1.4 - 3) 
 
According to Extract 1.4, BSRE, therefore, is a typical local SOE, which was invested in and 
fully controlled by both the provincial government – the Inner Mongolia government, and the 
prefectural-level government – the Baotou government. The major feature of the hegemonic 
relationship between government and corporation under the planned economic system in China, 
taking BSRE as an example, is that BSRE strictly followed the central planning and fully 
complied with the local governments‟ instructions to carry out its business activities. The central 
state determined the total mining and production quotas, the prices of rare earth materials and 
distribution of products for the rare earth industry, and then required local governments to put 
these mandatory requirements into practice at the corporate level. For BSRE, the Inner Mongolia 
government and the Baotou government needed to implement the central planning at the 
organisational level, and guaranteed that BSRE would achieve the annual production quotas.  
 
Thus it can be concluded that the feature of such a centrally planned economy was „highly 
prescriptive planning‟, and the prescriptive plans from the central state and local governments 
determined every aspect of economic activities, including how to allocate resources, what to 
produce and how to produce, how to price and distribute and so on. Taking Extract 1.1 into 
consideration, it is reasonable to conclude that, in the planned economy, the resource-based 
extractive SOEs performed passively in environmental governance and were rarely concerned 
about environmental issues during the mining and production processes. At the same time, the 
local governments also acted inefficiently in regulating local business activities and failed to 
develop effective sustainable development plans for local business. In fact, under an extensive 
economic growth model proposed by the central state, both local governments and SOEs had 
always fully engaged in maximising outputs, without any environmental concerns. In the context 
of China‟s state capitalism, the different levels of government, as the real managers of the 
different scales of SOEs, should be responsible for all environmental damage caused by SOEs.  
 
From the 1950s to the early 1990s, China‟s state capitalism had dominated the economic 
structure and the social institutional formation in a holistic manner. With the central guidelines of 
the „Great Leap Forward‟ to realise industrialisation rapidly, SOEs in the resource-based 
industries, with very little autonomy, had to strictly follow governmental instructions and engage 
in enhancing productivity, without the spare time and energy to build emission control and waste 
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treatment facilities. Such an extensive model in the Chinese heavy industries had caused serious 
environmental damage. 
 
4.3.1.2 Genres of Texts: Highly Prescriptive Plans 
 
The discursive texts are multi -functional, since they affect ways of acting, ways of representing 
and ways of being (Brei and Böhm, 2013). Fairclough (2003, p. 26) points out that discourse 
figures in three main ways in social practices: genres as ways of acting; discourses as ways of 
representing, and styles as ways of being. Genres, defined by Fairclough (2003, p. 65), refer to 
the „specifically discoursal aspect of ways of acting and interacting in the course of social 
events‟. For this research, within the discourse of environmental governance within China‟s 
planned economy, the genres of the discursive texts are the highly prescriptive plans from the 
central state. The highly prescriptive plans for the economic activities were mainly developed by 
the SPC. By means of top-down official policy documents, the central plans were conveyed from 
the higher level of government to the lower levels of government, finally becoming effective at 
the corporate level with the local governments‟ instructions. Thus, central policy documents 
constitute important elements of the genre chain in the discourse of China‟s planned economy.  
 
Two typical central government documents are chosen by the researcher, the First Plan and the 
Second Plan, to analyse the roots of the inefficient environmental governance system in the 
context of China‟s planned economy, which are briefly illustrated in Section 4.2.1. 
 
Our current goal is to ‘strive for a high rate of economic growth and socialist 
industrialisation’ … [I]n order to achieve the goals of the First Five-Year Plan, 
we should follow the Soviet model of economic development, … transforming the 
agricultural industry, the handicraft industry, and the capitalist industry and 
commerce to the joint state-private ownership … and progressively realising the 
socialist industrialisation … through nationalising all means of production and 
concentrating investments in the heavy industries. (The National People's 
Congress of the PRC, 1955, Extract 1.5) 
 
The generic structure of the First Plan consists of two parts: the target and the route of China‟s 
economic recovery and development. Achieving „a high rate of economic growth and socialist 
industrialisation‟ is the most significant national target during the period of China‟s planned 
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economy. As early as the beginning of the 19th century, many national industry giants and reform 
leaders in China proposed the idea of „saving the nation by engaging in industry‟. After the 
foundation of New China in 1949, the CPC had realised that the great improvement of economic 
strength was the only way to secure a peaceful and stable environment for such a big country to 
„stand in the world‟.  
 
In order to achieve such a national target, under the leadership of the CPC, the „Three Great 
Transformations‟ were implemented after the foundation of New China in 1949: transforming the 
means of production in the individual farming, the small-scale handicraft industry and the 
capitalist industry and commerce in China from private ownership to socialist public ownership, 
to institute a unified state monopoly of purchasing and marketing the industrial products, and 
realise an advanced form of state capitalism. In the first sentence of Extract 1.5, the term 
„socialist industrialisation‟ in the context of China‟s command economy connoted a special 
meaning: that is nationalising all industries in China. All private businesses were forced by the 
central state to transform to joint state-private ownership, and eventually to state and socialist 
public ownership. In 1955, the central state released an important guideline document „Report to 
National Industry and Commerce‟ and required all local governments to study and understand 
the „spirit of the document‟, in order to assist the central state to implement the central 
instructions of socialist transformation at the local levels. For the agriculture industry, the 
different levels of local governments guided the local individual farmers to transform private -
owned means of production to collective ownership; for the handicraft industry, the local 
governments guided and organised the local individual craftsmen to  establish „advanced 
handicraft production cooperatives‟; for the capitalist industry and commerce, the local 
governments confiscated the local bureaucratic capital and transformed national private capital 
by means of redemption (GOV1). With the highly prescriptive plans of the central government 
and regulations of local governments, the socialist transformation was almost complete within 
just three years. 
 
After completing the socialist transformation, the Second Plan was developed by the central state 
in 1956. The generic structure of the Second Plan also consisted of two parts: review and 
outlook. The Second Plan fully affirmed the achievements of socialist transformation and 
socialist construction after the First Plan was issued, and proposed the new requirements of the 
development of China‟s national economy to realise „an advanced form of state capitalism‟: 
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Till June 1956, ninety-nine percent of private enterprises had completed the 
socialist transformation and adopted joint state-private ownership. … [O]ver 
time, the percentage of state ownership is intended to increase and to exceed that 
of private ownership, in order to realise the nationalisation of capitalist means of 
production. … [F]ocusing on the heavy industries, we should continue to 
strengthen the industrial building and upgrading, in order to establish a solid 
foundation of socialist industrialisation. … [E]specially the improvement of the 
production capability of the steel and iron manufacturing industry is significant to 
realise industrialisation. (The National Congress of the CPC, 1956, Extract 1.6) 
 
Under the central instruction of promoting the socialist transformation of the national economy 
to consolidate and expand collective ownership and state ownership, China formally set out on 
the road to state capitalism. The maximisation of outputs became the only target for the heavy 
industries in China‟s planned economy. After the Reform and Opening-up policy of 1978, a 
series of economic reforms with limited market principles affected the Chinese politico-
economic system, and private business and foreign investment were gradually permitted to exist 
in the Chinese market and compete with SOEs. However, due to the deeply historical and 
political legacy left by the command economy, most industries before the early 1990s remained 
state-owned, and government intervention in business was still powerful. At the initial stage of 
reform and opening-up, the central state secured a strong capability to enforce its politico-
economic decisions on business activities, so that China retained a strong state capitalism for at 
least another ten years.  
 
As for BSRE, it was invested in and fully owned by the Inner Mongolia government and the 
Baotou government during the planned economy. A government officer gave a brief introduction 
to the „state-owned feature‟ of BSRE as following: 
 
The central government developed the mining, processing, production and 
distribution plans for BSRE annually, and then required the local governments to 
apply these indicators at the corporate level. The Inner Mongolia government 
was mainly responsible for supervising BSRE’s production at the macro level and 
urging the Baotou government to carry out feasible and practical measures at the 
micro level. The Baotou government directly controlled BSRE’s business 
activities. BSRE’s managers were assigned by the Baotou government, and all 
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employees had an ‘iron rice bowl’4. (GOV2, Extract 1.7) 
 
The term „iron rice bowl‟ is conducive to understand the  feature of „big-government‟ during that 
period of central planning. In China‟s planned economy, SOEs owned by either the central state 
or the different levels of local government dominated the economic structure in state capitalism. 
For the central SOEs, the central state developed the production targets for them, and these 
quotas were conveyed to corporate managers directly in the form of official government 
documents – also known as „red-head documents‟ started with a red title and stamped with a red 
seal – forcing corporations to abide by specified production requirements; for the local SOEs, the 
central state, based on local governments‟ annual economic reports and achievement summaries, 
developed next year‟s production plans also in the form of „red-head documents‟, which were 
usually passed down to the provincial and other lower level local governments, requiring them to 
direct local enterprises to achieve the specified output requirements (GOV1). Thus, the feature of 
China‟s politico-economic regime before the 1990s was typically „big-government‟, and all 
economic activities were required to strictly follow the central instructions. Extract 1.5 and 
Extract 1.6 constitute the basic elements of the genre chain in China‟s state capitalism. In such a 
context, the genres of governance in China‟s planned economic period were highly prescriptive 
plans, as Extract 1.7 shows. 
 
4.3.1.3 Different Styles of Texts 
 
Discourses are regarded as the „ways of representing aspects of the world‟ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 
124). In representing process of a particular discourse, different levels of abstractions can be 
identified with different perspectives of texts. The different ways of representing the same 
discourse constitute the variations of „styles‟. For this study, the researcher focuses on how the 
different interviews articulate different discourses and constitute different styles based on their 
different positions. During the fieldwork of the interviews with three government officers and 
five corporate senior managers, interviewees from the different standpoints emphasised different 
perspectives of the inefficient environmental governance system in Baotou‟s rare earth industry, 
on the basis of their different positions. 
                                                 
4
 This is a Chinese idiom, referring to an abolished system of guaranteed lifetime employment. Before 1978 in New 
China, the working units under control of the central state had controlled the daily lives of all farmers and workers, 
allocating housing, food and clothing for them. Since all industries were state-owned properties, the central state and 
local governments provided guaranteed lifetime employment to the employees, and arranged free medical treatment, 
education and housing for their whole lives. 
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There was no environmental pressure on SOEs; there was even no environmental 
awareness in the central state. What really mattered to SOEs was how to achieve 
higher productivity in a shorter time, so as to obtain more recognition from local 
authorities and the central state. (GOV1, Extract 1.8 - 1) 
 
Particularly, even a few local governments have realised the importance of green 
growth to improve their achievements. Without mandatory requirements of 
corporate green performance from the central state, green investment from local 
governments was always difficult to implement in practice at the corporate level. 
(GOV2, Extract 1.8 - 2) 
 
SOEs preferred to use the extra investment from the governments in expanding 
production capabilities. In the extreme cases, the extra funds from the 
governments directly flowed into the ‘pockets’ of corporate managers. (GOV3, 
Extract 1.8 - 3) 
 
Extract 1.8, from the perspective of the local government, indicates that the corporate inertia in 
environmental governance is rooted in a lack of environmental awareness of the central state and 
corporations. There were very few requirements for corporate green performance within the 
central planning. Without any environmental concerns, SOEs did not need to spend time and 
money in controlling environmental pollution. Internal corporate corruption was another 
important reason for the extra green investment from local governments becoming invalid, 
eventually leading to the low efficiency of environmental governing practices during the planned 
economy. Based on the government‟s standpoint, interviewees talked more about the corporate 
omission of environmental issues and the inertia of environmental practices.  
 
Although corporate omission of environmental concerns was evidenced, should corporations be 
fully responsible for such a low-efficiency environmental governance system? As described by 
Extract 1.4, the corporations in the extractive and manufacturing industries during the planned 
economy seemed more similar to the processing plants, with very little authority. Without 
environmental planning from the central state, although a few farsighted local governments had 
certain environmental concerns, as Extract 1.8 depicts, they were still powerless to carry out 
effective environmental practices at the corporate level. The senior managers in BSRE, from the 
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corporate viewpoint, emphasised the powerless position within China‟s environmental 
governance in the planned economy. 
 
Under the central guideline of maximising outputs at any cost, SOEs like us had 
neither extra energy nor extra money to engage in environmental governance. 
(COM1, Extract 1.9 - 1) 
 
For the heavily-polluting rare earth industry, the costs of establishing waste 
disposal and treatment facilities were far more than those spent on mining, 
processing and producing. (COM3, Extract 1.9 - 2) 
 
Extract 1.9 reflects the dilemma confronted by SOEs during the planned economy. BSRE, as a 
processing plant regulated by the central guideline of output maximisation and directed strictly 
by the local governments to fulfill the central quotas, could do nothing else but follow the central 
instructions and expand production capabilities. Without sufficient environmental awareness of 
the central state, the rare earth industry did not have extra money and energy, nor the initiative to 
engage in environmental governance practices. As illustrated in Section 1.1.2 and Section 3.4.3, 
the processes of smelting and separating rare earth resources inevitably generated a huge amount 
of industrial waste. As shown by Extract 1.9 - 2, the expense of improving processing 
techniques, upgrading waste emission facilities, and establishing sewage treatment ponds and 
waste recycling pools, was always too great to be afforded by SOEs or local governments in the 
mass production period. However, the corporate inertia towards the improvement of green 
performance and the certain subjective factors of SOEs were neglected in the corporate 
responses. In fact, although the central state has proposed to transit the traditional extensive 
economic growth mode to the modern intensive growth model since the 1990s, many heavily-
polluting industries still maintained a high-input, high-consumption, high-pollution and low-
efficiency production mode. 
 
Based on a textual analysis, on the basis of Extract 1.8 from the perspective of the government, 
and Extract 1.9 from the perspective of corporations, the different positions used to emphasise 
the different perspectives of the discourses of one particular story can be clearly seen. These 
extracts from the interview transcripts identify two standpoints – the state and the capital – „from 
which they are represented‟ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 129). However, these different styles and 
discourses can be integrated together to constitute a more comprehensive discursive text, which 
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is that the root of such an inefficient environmental governance system in the Chinese planned 
economy was not attributed to either local governments or SOEs, but lay with the poor 
environmental awareness of the central state. In the context of central planning, the high 
prescriptive plans from the central state determined everything in China. Therefore, without 
sufficient environmental concerns in the central planning, an extensive growth model led to an 
inefficient environmental governance system.  
 
4.3.2 Interpretation of the Root of Low Efficiency of Environmental Governance: A 
Process Analysis 
 
Following a textual analysis on the different positions of the state and business in the discursive 
texts of the environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry under the planned economy, 
a process analysis is carried out to hang all texts together to interpret the root of low efficiency of 
China‟s environmental governance. Based on a case study on BSRE, in terms of the textual data 
including the government documentary plans and interview transcripts, the researcher focuses on 
how the local governments and BSRE positioned their roles in producing a particular discourse 
of the environmental governance of Baotou‟s rare earth industry during the planned economy.  
 
From the previous discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that during the planned economy, a 
government-led development model dominated the Chinese political economy, in the form of 
state capitalism. According to Extract 1.4, under China‟s state capitalism, the central planning, 
together with the more detailed administrative instructions from the different levels of local 
government, determined all business practices, including corporate strategies, investment 
directions, outputs, product prices, and human resource management. Extract 1.5 and Extract 1.6 
illustrate the central state more intensely focusing on the output maximisation of the heavy 
industries, and accordingly, ignoring the importance of sustainable development. With the 
citation of these two prescriptive plans, it is helpful to understand the background of an 
inefficient environmental governance system in the heavy industries such as rare earth, iron and 
steel industries under the Chinese planned economy. Adopting „an extensive growth model‟ to 
promote industrialisation to the largest extent, everything such as policy, capital, and human 
resources in the heavy industries were fully geared towards maximising output. There were no 
clear regulations or particular clauses concerning the environmental performance  of the heavy 
industries within the highly prescriptive plans. Therefore, in the discourse of China‟s state 
capitalism, without the central planning of environmental governance, both local governments 
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and heavy industries, under the central guideline of maximising outputs in an extensive growth 
model, failed to be actively involved in environmental governance activities, which eventually 
led to an inefficient environmental governance system under the planned economy. 
 
This is also proved by the different styles of Extract 1.8 from the perspective of the Baotou 
government and Extract 1.9 from the perspective of BSRE, although different focuses were 
placed on the roots of the low efficiency of environmental governance. Due to the very limited 
national investment in the fledgling Chinese heavy industries, both local governments and SOEs 
were less capable of leading the heavy polluting industries towards sustainable development. The 
different textual elements hang together to produce an overall discourse of environmental 
governance in the Chinese heavy industries during the planned economy. The root of the low 
efficiency of environmental governance and the passive roles of local governments and 
corporation involved should eventually be attributed to the extensive growth model proposed by 
the central state. However, as illustrated in Section 4.2.1, due to the lower level of industrial 
development, the limited national capital, the dispersed local governmental investments and the 
lack of experienced professionals, it was difficult for the Chinese rare earth industry to develop 
sustainably in the planned economy. As Extract 1.8 shows, the expense of improving the 
environmental performance of the heavily-polluting rare earth industry are much more than those 
needed for mining, processing and producing. Thus, to secure the physiological and safety needs 
of a huge population and better the people‟s lives in a shorter period of time, output 
maximisation was the only target to promote China‟s industrialisation and modernisation before 
the 1990s. 
 
During the period of China‟s planned economy, although China began to draft the first 
environmental protection law in 1973, and successively established the Environmental Protection 
Leadership Group in 1974 as well as environmental institutions at the different levels of 
government, as introduced in Section 1.1.1, the seriousness of the environmental problems in the 
rare earth industry, especially in Baotou, had not been realised by the central state. The 
environmental information communications among the decision-makers of the central state, 
regulatory agencies of the different levels of local government, and corporations had always been 
ignored in the era of government-led development. Therefore, without sufficient environmental 
concerns from the central state and the effective feedback mechanisms from the local 
environmental bureaus to the central state, environmental governance gave way to economic 
growth during the planned economy in China. 
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4.3.3 Explanation of Hegemonic Struggles in Environmental Governance: A Social 
Analysis 
 
From a wider perspective of political discourses, a social analysis is conducted to discuss the 
conception of hegemony in the context of China‟s state capitalism during the period of the 
planned economy, with consideration of its economic, political, and historical trajectories. After 
the end of wars lasting more than 100 years in the Old China, the new central government 
established by the CPC finally realised its „hegemony‟ politically in 1949, based on the violent 
hegemonic struggle in China‟s „semi-colonial and semi-feudal society‟. After the foundation of 
New China, the CPC had conceptualised its hegemony in terms of leading a series of successes 
in World War II and national independence, which established a broad, deep and reliable mass 
base in China. The political power of the CPC was manifested by way of control over economic 
structure and civil society. The whole of society, with only one faith – „without the CPC, there 
would be no New China‟, became „subject to hegemony‟ of the state (Blecher, 2002), and 
unconditionally followed both economic and moral ways developed by the CPC. With a strong 
mass base, the CPC‟s planning was consistent with the consensual basis of hegemony and the 
general interests of the whole proletariat, to complete the transition from an agricultural country 
to an industrial country, and the transition from a neo -democratic country to an advanced 
capitalist country and then to a socialist country. 
 
Since the foundation of New China, the CPC, as the supreme dominant group, had begun to be 
concerned about how to govern the new politico-economic system and prevent the penetration of 
capitalism and foreign anticommunist forces. Among all social constructions in the New China, 
the economic system was regarded by the CPC as the weakest link to be penetrated by the 
capitalist ideology. Therefore, the SPC began to transform the private capitalism and commerce 
to joint state-private ownership and then gradually nationalised the means of production 
throughout the country. In the Old China, before the late 1940s, the bureaucratic and feudal 
capital monopolised the national economy. Stepping into the New China, the first act of the 
economic reform was to confiscate the bureaucratic and feudal capital and make it national 
property. After the completion of the socialist transformation, the CPC had obtained sufficient 
confidence and support from the public, and achieved hegemony with the full support of the 
proletariat in Chinese society.  
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In such a context, with consideration of national security, social stability, and economic growth, 
the central state confirmed the choice of central planning to further implement its hegemony in 
the New China. The central state with highly prescriptive plans determined every aspect of 
socio-economic constructions, and SOEs dominated the entire economic structure. In order to 
maintain the state power in governance, the CPC implemented extremely tight ideological and 
social control in the form of „command‟ (Naughton, 2007). NGOs were strictly forbidden, and 
private ownership was no longer allowed to exist in the market. Under such state capitalism, both 
the business sector and the public sector kept the hegemonic acceptance of the core values of the 
CPC (Blecher, 2002). The CPC manifested its intellectual and moral hegemony in Chinese 
society through developing the national economy, improving people‟s living standards, and 
constructing a socialist society. By taking into consideration Extracts 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.8 and 1.9, it 
can be concluded that the central state established by the CPC, by successfully constructing 
alliances among workers, farmers and craftsmen as well as entrepreneurs and intellectuals in 
China, dominated the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of society. According 
to Extract 1.3, civil society, under the overpowering state control in governance, had very little 
bargaining power to challenge the state hegemony, and the lack of NGOs had led to the complete 
ineffectiveness of civil society during the planned economy.  
 
After nationalising all means of production across the country, the government had wielded the 
insignia of power in corporate governance during central planning. Extract 1.7 illustrated the 
„state-owned feature‟ of BSRE in the Chinese governance regime. It is clear that the central 
decision makings for the development of BSRE were developed from the SPC, and conveyed to 
the Inner Mongolia government, then passed down to the Baotou local government, which 
needed to direct BSRE to implement the plans at the corporate level. In BSRE‟s governance, the 
central state played the role of „decision-maker‟; local governments acted as „corporate 
managers‟; and BSRE worked simply as „employees‟. Even though BSRE was one of the largest 
SOEs in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, it had very little managerial autonomy and 
could only play the role of a completely obedient follower of the central planning. 
  
Thus, during the period of the planned economy in China, at the macro level, without sufficient 
attention being paid to sustainable development from the central state, the concept of 
sustainability was far from the minds of the business sector and the local governments, and 
completely alien to the public. Environmental governance, with less influence on maintaining 
hegemonic stability among the state, business and the public and promoting economic growth in 
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the planned economy, had always been ignored by the central state in developing national 
strategies. In the planned economy, environmental problems had not been considered as a crisis 
of governance in the rapid Chinese industrialisation process, and the central state had not realised 
that the serious environmental pollution was „a new threat to hegemony‟. At the micro level, for 
BSRE‟s performance, as depicted by Extract 1.1, all profits of BSRE were retained by the local 
governments, while all losses of BSRE were also borne by them. Considering Extract 1.2, with 
the commitment that the local governments cleaned up „all the mess‟ obstructing BSRE‟s 
development, such as financial deficit, employee dissatisfaction and environmental pollution, 
BSRE simply needed to intensely focus on the improvement of its productivity, without any 
environmental pressure, leading to bad performance in environmental governing practices.  
Moreover, the rare earth industry, as a typical high-energy-consuming steel and iron industry, but 
also with the obvious nature of a heavily-polluting chemical industry, had to face many „very 
tricky‟ environmental issues, which were always difficult for the business sector to resolve alone 
(The State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2012). To implement effective environmental 
governing practices in the Chinese rare earth industry, a huge amount of investment, advanced 
technology and facilities, experienced professionals and strong government support are all 
necessary. During China‟s planned economy, due to the lower level of industrial development 
and productivity and the limited and dispersed local government investments,  it was very 
difficult to improve the green competitiveness of such a high-energy-consuming and heavily-
polluting industry. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
From the foundation of New China in 1949 to the early 1990s, China had experienced a long 
period of planned economy. The empirical findings pointed out that during the planned economy, 
the state, in order to maintain the state power in governance, implemented extremely tight 
ideological and social control in the form of „command‟, and nationalised the means of 
production throughout the country. NGOs were strictly forbidden, and private ownership was no 
longer allowed to exist in the market. In such a context, the findings in 4.2 identified China‟s 
politico-economic regime in the planned economy as state capitalism, in which a unified state 
monopoly of the market was instituted based on state control of SOEs that were owned by the 
different levels of government.  
 
Under the Chinese state capitalism, a textual analysis was carried out in Section 4.3.1 to identify 
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the genres of the discourse of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry as highly 
prescriptive planning. Based on the different styles of textual materials, a process analysis was 
conducted in Section 4.3.2 to illustrate that the root of the low efficiency of environmental 
governance of China‟s rare earth industry under the centrally planned system stemmed from a 
lack of environmental concerns on the part of the central state. Following a social analysis in 
Section 4.3.3, the empirical findings pointed out that during the period of central planning, as a 
high-energy-consuming and heavily-polluting industry, the Chinese rare earth industry, with a 
lower level of industrial development and limited investment, found it very difficult to improve 
its environmental performance. Without the concern of the state and government support, SOEs 
in the rare earth industry had no money or energy, nor the initiative to engage in environmental 
governance practices. As output maximisation was the only target for the rare earth industries, 
the ecological environment became the biggest victim of rapid industrialisation under China‟s 
extensive growth model. 
 
After thirty years of planning, China was still a poor country, and the CPC in China was 
confronted with an unprecedented crisis of confidence. To break out of this backwardness, the 
central state in China gradually realised the importance of market-oriented mechanism and 
sustainable development, and thus implemented a series of dramatic politico-economic reforms 
throughout the country. As a result, the discourse of environmental governance of China‟s rare 
earth industry is greatly divergent under China‟s market economy, which will be further 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE UNDER A MARKET 
ECONOMY IN CHINA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Moving to China‟s modern market-oriented economy from the early 1990s, on the basis of the 
theoretical framework established in the literature review chapter and the methods summarised 
in the methodology chapter, this chapter discusses the changing discourses of environmental 
governance of China‟s rare earth industry. Based on the specific political, economic and 
historical trajectories, Section 5.2, from the perspective of VoC, identifies the model of China‟s 
current politico-economic regime, with particular focuses on the activism of civil society in the 
modern Chinese governance regime and the change in the state‟s environmental attitudes. Based 
on the illustrations of the discourse of the Chinese economic transition from a planned economy 
to a market economy, Section 5.3, following the three -dimensional methods of CDA, focuses on 
the changing discourses of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry based on a 
case study of BSRE. Firstly, to investigate the changing environmental struggles in the rare earth 
industry within China‟s modern market-oriented economy, it is necessary to identify the 
uniqueness of China‟s current politico-economic regime, which will be illustrated in the 
following section. 
 
5.2 From a Planned Economy to a Market Economy in China 
 
5.2.1 An Overview of the Transition 
 
As illustrated in Section 4.2.2, after thirty years of planning, China was still a poor country, and 
the CPC was confronted with an unprecedented crisis of confidence. Facing increasing 
international competition from the global markets, from 1978, the central state launched a series 
of far-reaching economic reforms. Tenev and Zhang (2002) divided the market-oriented reforms 
in China since 1978 into two periods: first, from 1979 to 1992, by reintroducing market  
mechanisms and incentives within the domain of direct state ownership and control, market 
forces began to work together with the central administrative plans via a dual pricing system; 
second, from 1993 to the early 2000s, this period featured significant large-scale changes in 
corporate reform of SOEs. Since central planning still played a key role in the economic 
activities, and SOEs still dominated and controlled the entire economic structure at the first stage 
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of the market-oriented reforms, the researcher views the Chinese market economy beginning 
from the early 1990s, which is a more prevalent timeline division, to discuss the changes in the 
discourses of China‟s varieties of environmental governance, with a case study on BSRE in 
Baotou‟s rare earth industry. 
 
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping visited southern China and developed the new national target of 
„establishing the socialist market economy‟, which marked the start of the new wave of market-
oriented reforms. In the following year, the Third Plenary Session of the 14 th Central Committee 
of the CPC issued the „Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Some Issues Concerning the 
Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure‟, clarifying the necessity of the creation 
of a modern enterprise system and the development of private and foreign-invested enterprises in 
China. Owing to the gradually opening domestic market and the fiercer competition from the 
global market, all the SOEs had undergone different levels of „major surgeries‟ in terms of their 
administrative structure, ownership, governance structure and so on in the 1990s. During the 
corporatisation process of Chinese SOEs, managers were empowered with the „broad authority 
to use and dispose of the property entrusted to them by the state for management and business 
purposes‟ (Broadman, 1995, pp. 26-27), involving autonomy in procurement, production and 
price-setting, and accountability for profits and losses, as well as discretion to close down or 
declare bankruptcy. In order to improve the operating efficiency and competitiveness of SOEs, 
boards of directors were set up for the purpose of effective corporate governance to replace the 
traditional government control over business operations, and new owners such as individual 
minority shareholders, employee shareholders and institutional investors emerged. Until the 
early 2000s, the majority of large SOEs had completed the corporatisation process and were 
listed on domestic or even foreign stock exchanges; for small-and-medium SOEs, most of them 
had to sell their shares to insiders such as managers and employees to realise corporatisation and 
ownership diversification (Tenev and Zhang, 2002).  
 
The market-oriented reforms in the 1990s, mainly based on corporatisation and ownership 
diversification, created „economic entities with a relatively high degree of autonomy that are 
subject to significant market pressure and whose capacity to decide and structure the parameters 
of their mutual interactions are growing‟ (ibid, 2002, p. 1). According to McMillan and 
Naughton (1992), the success of the market-oriented reforms in China was subject to several 
conditions: massive entry of non-state enterprises; introduction of competition among SOEs and 
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non-state sectors; and improvement of SOEs‟ performance with state-imposed market-like 
incentives. This process marked „a shift of economic power towards households‟ (ibid, p. 131).  
 
The transition from a planned economy to a market economy in China during this period, with 
even more large scale and deeper influence than the transition from a neo-democratic economy 
to a planned economy during the 1950s, brought about dramatic changes to China‟s politico-
economic system, manifesting not only in the economic structure, but also in the changes in 
political sectors. In 1998, the SPC was renamed by the Premier, Zhu Rongji, as the State 
Development Planning Commission (SDPC), which focused more on macroeconomic 
management and strategy development, rather than direct intervention in micro-level business 
activities. In 1999, a decision of making a „strategic adjustment‟ in the state-owned sector by 
„withdrawing what should be withdrawn‟, was made in the Fourth Plenary Session of the 15 th  
Central Committee of the CPC, which marked significant progress in building market institutions 
during the market-oriented reforms (Tenev and Zhang, 2002). In 2003, under the direction of the 
Premier Wen Jiabao, the SDPC, through merging the State Economic Restructuring Commission 
(SERC) and the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), was reorganised into the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Since then, the term „planning‟ has 
completely disappeared from the national macro-control departments in the Chinese central 
government, which declared to the world that China was no longer adopting a centrally planned 
economy (Chow, 2011). In 2008, the NDRC transferred certain functions concerning the 
industrial sector to a newly established agency, the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT), which had more independence to develop industrial standards and 
regulations, and implemented macroeconomic regulations and controls through cooperation with 
the Ministry of Commerce (MC). 
 
In short, it is reasonable to conclude that China‟s reform of transiting from a planned economy to 
a market economy was remarkably successful, generating far-reaching impacts on the national 
economic system (Dacosta and Carroll, 2001; Guthrie, 2003; Hou, 2011; Liew, 1995; McMillan 
and Naughton, 1992; Sachs and Woo, 1994; Zhang and Liu, 2009). With the introduction of a 
market mechanism, the central state began to pay attention to the green competitiveness of SOEs 
within an increasingly open market. The environmental governance issue was formally contained 
in the agenda of the central state in the mid-1990s. In 1995, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 14th  
Central Committee of the CPC issued the „Ninth Five-Year Plan for the National Economy and 
Social Development‟, particularly strengthening the transition from the extensive economic 
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growth model to the intensive growth model. In 1997, the 15th National Congress of the CPC 
identified „sustainable development strategy‟ as one of the core strategies for socialist 
modernisation, and strengthened the significance of protecting natural resources and the 
environment. In 2002, the 16th National Congress of the CPC confirmed „continuous 
improvement of capacity for sustainable development‟ as one of the key goals of building a 
„moderately prosperous society‟ (Li, 2008). 
 
5.2.2 Multiple Models of Varieties of Capitalism in a Market Economy 
 
According to McCann (2014), China‟s politico-economic system contains multiple tactics and 
models, and the literature is also contradictory: Oi (1995) regards China‟s system as a kind of 
„local state corporatism‟; Brandt and Rawski (2008) view China as being on its way to an „open 
and globalised capitalist system‟; Schweinberger (2014) describes the contemporary Chinese 
model as one of „state capitalism‟, which is one of the main impediments to China‟s further 
sustained growth; Huang (2008, 2010) treats China as a „totalitarian state‟ which rejects free 
markets and entrepreneurialism; Johnson (2002) utilises a „soft totalitarian state‟ to depict the 
Chinese economic model, explaining the one-party state political model in China; Garrick (2012) 
points out that the party-state plays a dominant but far from exclusive role in its „market 
socialism‟ system. Therefore, many scholars claim there was not a „real model‟ in China‟s mind 
during its reform process over the past three decades (McCann, 2014, p. 287). 
 
In fact, the recent historical story of China‟s economic development can help to identify the 
model of China‟s current regime. Starting from the foundation of New China in 1949, the central 
state displayed an urgent desire for rapid economic growth. In order to greatly improve industrial 
productivity, a „big push industrialisation‟ policy was implemented. In the 1950s, since 
agriculture made up 70% of the national economy, and it was difficult to extract much wealth 
from farmers via taxation, the state purchased agricultural products from collective farms at 
extremely low prices to divert funds towards developing heavy industries. The state also tried to 
lower the costs of urban industrialisation, through adopting the lowest interest rates, providing 
the lowest wage levels, and paying the lowest prices for inputs; accordingly, the state set prices 
for all goods at very low levels. As a result, the demand for products was far greater than supply, 
leading to a serious shortage of many products (McCann, 2014, p. 278). Although achieving an 
„advanced form of state capitalism‟ was subject to certain dreadful inefficiencies, it did help 
China to achieve tremendous economic growth with „average annual growth of 4.2 percent in per 
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capita GNP‟ from 1950 to 1975 (Brandt and Rawski, 2008, p. 5). However, the Chinese 
command economic system was operated with a considerably lower degree of centralisation and 
was influenced by a jumble of authority relations, which diverged greatly from that of the Soviet 
Union (McCane, 2014; McNally, 2012). This finally led to local planning administrators having 
much more practical power than central planners, causing low efficiency of the central planning. 
Industrial enterprises lost managerial autonomy and many of them were controlled by local 
governments. In the planned economy, under rigid politico-economic control, there were no real 
labour markets (McCann, 2014, p. 279). 
 
In order to overcome the limitations of state capitalism under a command system, since 1978, 
China has engaged in a protracted and impressive reform for market-driven changes and further 
liberalisation, which were gradual at first, then increasingly radical, and have even lasted to the 
present day (McCann, 2014). Deng Xiaoping‟s Reform and Opening-up policy of 1978 impacted 
nearly all areas of Chinese society, including the domestic political system, foreign affairs, and 
especially the entire economic structure (McCane, 2014; McNally, 2012). The first major 
economic change was to introduce new policies with market consideration into rural areas. Farm 
households were allowed to contract agricultural land to plant and cultivate, but the peasantry 
had to „sell‟ a certain amount of cultivated crops to the state at very low prices or even give them 
away for free. Great progress was also made in the rural industry: TVEs emerged and developed 
across the country to fill niches in demand, and they began to compete with existing SOEs 
(Svejnar, 2008, pp. 79-80), although in the early stages after the 1978 reform, TVEs still featured 
as collectives, mostly involved in central planning activities (McCann, 2014); and as late as 
1988, it was still illegal for private firms to have more than eight employees (Bardhan, 2010). In 
order to spur market awareness, to develop urban and rural collective industries, and to promote 
the efficiency of the state sector, in 1979, the state implemented a „dual track pricing system‟ to 
coordinate the market and plan in an awkward way: market prices were only applied to 
production beyond the plan quota; while the planning apparatus still dominated prices and 
strategies for the majority of corporate activities. To be more specific, for example, once a 
producer satisfied the basic requirements for collective purposes, he could „distribute after -plan 
residuals at increasingly flexible prices‟ (Brandt and Rawski, 2008, p. 10; Knight and Ding, 
2012, p. 47). At the same time, SOEs were given increased managerial autonomy to develop 
strategies and retain profits (McCann, 2014). 
 
In October 1992, at the 14th National Congress of the CPC, the „socialist market economy‟ was 
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officially endorsed to extend the market incentives to all economic sectors. This was Deng 
Xiaoping‟s last but one of his most important „decisive personal interventions in Chinese policy-
making‟ before his retirement (Naughton, 2007, p. 100). After that, reforms in China focused 
more on market-driven mechanisms, such as dramatic downsizing of SOEs and mass 
redundancies in state-owned industry, as well as massive expansion of international economic 
activity (Knight and Ding, 2012; McCann, 2014). With the government‟s gradual 
decentralisation of power in terms of business, since the mid -1990s, China‟s coastal regions, 
known as the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), have begun to incorporate huge overseas 
investment and attract internal migrant workers across the whole country (McCann, 2014). At the 
same time, TVEs‟ privatisation process has transformed most of them into private SMEs (Huang, 
2008). The most dramatic changes of the corporatisation process of SOEs have been manifested 
in some of them going bankrupt due to years of financial trouble, while the majority of the rest 
transformed into „modern enterprises‟, and the remainder were eventually sold off to new 
investors (McCann, 2014, p. 292). However, regarding industries with strategic importance, such 
as the power and energy industry, the petrochemical industry, the communications industry, the 
steel and iron industry, banks, arms, and so on, the central government has always maintained 
ownership and control over them. 
 
Therefore, based on a historical perspective, McCann (2014) points out that China has been 
engaged in an unfinished project which continues to evolve. China‟s current emergent capitalism 
shows the duality of institutional diversity: a state-dominant form of capital accumulation based 
on large SOEs dominating the economic lifeline; while a vibrant network of private 
entrepreneurs forms the bulk of the private sector (McCann 2014; McNally, 2012). With a 
gradual transformation from a government-led development model to a market-oriented 
economic model, China‟s contemporary economy, on the basis of its particular historical, 
political and economic trajectories, can be seen as „a combination of many models and systems‟, 
and a mixed economy of state, semi-state actors such as collectives and TVEs, and private actors 
(McCann, 2014, p. 295).  
 
Compared with the impressive reform of the economic system,  the changes in the political 
system were not obvious. According to Brandt and Rawski (2008, p. 16), China‟s traditional 
politics addressed the „government of men‟ rather than laws, leaving impressive influences even 
on modern society. Until now, lower level governments and individual officials are required to 
deeply understand the central guidelines to clearly define what to do and what to avoid, and 
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periodical discussions on the guidelines are organised to facilitate a better understanding of 
instructions from top leaders of the CPC. Johnson (2002, p. 154) points out that all Asian 
capitalist developmental states can be featured as „soft authoritarian governments‟, which 
constrain freedom of speech of the press and the populace and restrict the impacts of public 
opinion on the government; and the central state in China regards „authoritarian rule‟ as 
„indispensable‟ to national growth. In 1982, workers‟ right to strike was even removed by Deng 
Xiaoping from the Constitution, in order to prevent labour unrest caused by the gradually 
abolished system of guaranteed lifetime employment, protected by the institutions of danwei 
(enterprise in English) (McCann, 2014). The CPC has been committed in maintaining economic 
growth and promoting China‟s international status, in return for „public acquiescence to its 
autocratic rule and anachronistic ideology‟ (Brandt and Rawski, 2008, p. 17). Most Chinese 
citizens seem to have accepted this, or at least have accommodated themselves to such a political 
economy, resting on a „grand but unspoken bargain‟ between the CPC and Chinese civil society 
(ibid, p. 17; McCann, 2014). In the context of the steady collapse of the traditional state socialist 
system and the gradual emergence of new market-oriented legitimacy in China, Naughton (2007, 
p. 100) concludes that Deng‟s legacy features „an unbalanced combination of vigorous economic 
reforms and relative political stagnation‟, due to the lack of Western traditions of civil society, 
individual rights, impersonal trust, and public-private division (Hsu, 2007). In recent years, with 
a gradual relaxation of Party control on public discourse, the activism of NGOs in China has 
been gradually emerging and flourishing to effect certain changes of hegemonic relations 
between the state, capital and civil society in particular ways in China‟s modern environmental 
governance system. 
 
5.2.3 Civil Society in China’s Varieties of Governance  
 
Compared with the impressive reform of the economic system, the goal of the political reform 
was to maintain and fine-tune the existing regime, in order to accommodate and neutralise the 
conflicting demands in a gradual manner in China (Brandt and Rawski, 2008; Shi et al., 2014). 
Since the reform era promoted the emergence of new market-oriented legitimacy in China, the 
private sector has been gradually embedded in the state‟s political advisory and legislative bodies 
politically, especially in terms of their power of negotiating with local governments. In the 
process of seeking strong social support, the state in China still acts as the „dominant and 
overarching force leading China‟ (McNally, 2012, p. 184), and secures a soft-authoritarian 
regime. Thus, China‟s current politics also contain considerable divergences and great 
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uniqueness, and its distinct historical-geographical heritage leads to a further layer of variation in 
its governance regime.  
 
Since the 1990s, with the gradual relaxation of state control over public discourse, the 
environmental awareness of Chinese civil society has gradually improved (Ho and Vermeer, 
2006; Lan et al., 2006), and civic NGOs have been emerging and developing significantly in 
terms of number, scope, capacity and impacts. Since the mid-1990s, civil society studies in 
China have emerged. However, the idea of civil society, derived from Western historical 
experience, seems to be problematic as a way of understanding social changes in Chinese society, 
which is integrated with different institutional foundations, historical trajectories and social 
characteristics (Saich, 2001). The western conception of civil society connotes the development 
of a public-social sphere independent from the state (Heberer, 2012). According to Metzger 
(1998), within a Western context, civil society is related to bottom-up movements based on 
citizens and their interest organisations, and related to the development of a sphere autonomous 
from the state and a non-utopian worldview. However, under the complex of the Chinese 
politico-economic system, the notion of civil society cannot be simply conceptualised as a 
democratic force of ideological struggle, but should be understood based on the particular 
historical and political experience of China, to „ fit Chinese empirical pegs into Western 
theoretical holes‟ (Saich, 2006, p. 60). In the modern state-building and institution-building 
process in China, the state has always exerted an overpowering control and subsequent monitors 
to restrict the Chinese citizens‟ activities (Heberer, 2012), resulting in a deficiency of civil 
liberties in China. Within the Chinese „strong state-strong society‟ (Tang, 1996), or a „quasi civil 
society‟ (He, 1997), or a „state-dominated civil society‟ (Frolic, 1997), the state always acts as a 
political architect to construct the structures of the weakly developed civil society and the 
strongly established state (Migdal, 1998). 
 
Under the Chinese soft authoritarian governance regime, NGO activism, as the only legitimate 
means to effect transformative movement of the democratisation process in China, has become 
an exclusive channel for the public to struggle for hegemonic power in China. The fragmented 
ruling system and complex administrative levels, including provincial level, prefectural level, 
county level, township and village level local governments, formerly kept information locally, so 
that many central plans and administrative provisions to address social needs could not be 
conveyed and consistently implemented from the central state to the lower levels of government; 
similarly, many regional social problems and contradictions could not be completely reported to 
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the central state; which might cause different degrees of grievances among the public and harm 
social stability. For this reason, NGOs, from the grassroots perspective to satisfy social needs, 
fulfill social responsibilities, redress public grievances and promote public participation, have 
gradually become tolerated by the state in China‟s state-dominated society (Lee et al., 2012; 
Spires, 2011; Yu and Guo, 2012). 
 
According to Huang (2013), the gradual relaxation of the state‟s control over people‟s day-to-
day lives has spurred the development of NGOs to build China‟s nascent civil society. Especially 
after some seriously natural or manmade disasters, the Chinese state emphasises more the 
operations of grassroots organisations to assist in handling emergencies. To satisfy these social 
needs, especially with the deepening of liberalisation policies after the 1990s, NGOs focusing on 
the public welfare, social betterment, education, and local self-defence are widely established, 
which are mainly sponsored by local elites, with international aid in some cases. With more and 
more societal demands emerging, NGOs have gradually gained footholds, shaping a trajectory of 
civil society development in China. The flourishing of NGOs, via involvement in public affairs 
and even in business activities through particular methods, promotes the development of Chinese 
civil society; while at the same time, NGO activism is greatly impeded by government 
restrictions, incompetence, and lack of trust (Chen, 2010; Yang, 2003). The state tries to 
integrate the existing NGOs into bargaining processes, but strictly controls them, and prevents 
them acting autonomously from the government (Heberer, 2012).  
 
5.2.4 Change of the State’s Environmental Attitudes 
 
With the deepening of the reform and opening-up, the CPC realised the productive forces 
lagging behind Western countries were mainly manifested in labour-intensive means of 
production, low-quality labour, poor technical levels, high energy consumption, huge resource 
waste, and heavy environmental pollution under the extensive economic growth model. To 
further develop China‟s productive forces to fit the „advanced form of state capitalism‟ and 
achieve the „socialist market economy‟, environmental issues have officially been put on the 
agenda of the central state. 
 
After the Reform and Opening-up policy of 1978, a huge influx of SMEs in extractive industries 
increased the prominence of resource and environmental pressures. As China‟s economy gained 
momentum based on reckless expansion of production, industrial pollution spread rapidly 
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nationwide (Ho and Vermeer, 2006). With more open minds to the societal influences on public 
affairs and increasing environmental awareness of Chinese citizens, the environmental issue has 
become one of the most prominent triggers of intensifying social conflicts between civil society, 
business and government agencies. Environmental degradation and the corresponding social 
disharmony have become one of the biggest challenges to China‟s growth. Confronted with a 
sharp rise in soil, water and air pollution and the corresponding growing discontent of the 
Chinese citizens, in order to improve the living environment to benefit residents‟ health and 
reassure the public, the central state proposed the concept of „scientific development‟ in 2003, 
through which environmental protection was set as a critical factor to socio-economic 
development, and as a test of how well the state can serve the people and build its capabilities 
(Lan et al., 2006). Furthermore, with the deepening of opening-up, especially after China‟s 
access into the WTO in 2002, China has been widely criticised as one of the largest greenhouse 
gas emitters in the world. Facing strict international standards and heightened international 
pressure, China has begun to elevate the importance of environment protection in developing the 
national development strategy, in order to construct an environmentally harmonious society to 
mitigate criticism at home and abroad. 
 
Since the state has realised that certain collective activities in the public environmental arena 
ought to involve social organisations, the existence and activis m of green NGOs have been 
tolerated to a certain extent. The first grassroots green NGO in China, Friends of Nature, was 
established in 1993 (ibid). Different from those in Western countries, civic green NGOs in China 
are „primarily initiated and run by a few dedicated individuals‟; thus, most of them lack 
widespread societal support (Tang and Zhan, 2014, p. 197). Since the 2000s, with the deepening 
of reform and opening-up, the state has been increasingly tolerant to civil society‟s participation 
in environmental monitoring. In 2003, the „Cleaner Production Promotion Law‟ was issued, 
which encouraged public participation in environmental monitoring, and required relevant 
authoritative institutions to disclose environmental information on the media, securing for the 
public the right to know about corporate pollution activities and local environmental conditions. 
Yang (2005) suggests that environmental NGOs, functioning as both sites and agents of 
politically democratic change caused by environmental movements, have begun to help local 
governments to monitor corporate behaviour from a grassroots perspective, and encourage and 
persuade corporations to focus on their environmental performance. Civic environmental NGOs, 
with a largely non-oppositional stance towards government, have made limited but inspiring 
progress in affecting environmental decision-making, and have increasingly negotiated with the 
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different levels of government institutions in defining their precise role in the Chinese political 
process (Tang and Zhan, 2014). 
 
5.3 Environmental Governance of China’s Rare Earth Industry under a Market Economy 
 
Based on the illustrations of the discourse of the Chinese economic transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy in Section 5.2.2, with ever more concerns over sustainable 
development and the green performance of the business sector from the central state as shown in 
Section 5.2.4, this section focuses on the changes in the discourses of hegemonic positions of 
government agencies, corporations and NGOs as well as their hegemonic struggles in the 
environmental governance of the rare earth industry under China‟s market economy after the 
1990s, with a case study on BSRE. By following the three-dimensional analysis of CDA, first of 
all, mainly based on the transcripts of interviews with the government, corporations and NGOs, 
Section 5.3.1 carries out a textual analysis to appraise the genres and styles of the environmental 
governance of China‟s rare earth industry under the market economy. Following a textual 
analysis, a process analysis is carried out in Section 5.3.2, combining the different textual 
elements to discuss the industrial consolidation of China‟s rare earth industry in pursuit of 
sustainable development and green growth in a holistic manner. Finally, a social analysis is 
conducted in Section 5.3.3, from a wider perspective of political discourses, to discuss the 
changing hegemonic struggles among government agencies, corporations and NGOs within the 
context of China‟s contemporary varieties of environmental governance based on a series of 
contested issues over the environmental domain in China‟s rare earth industry. 
 
5.3.1 Description of the Changing Positions of Government, Corporations and NGOs: A 
Textual Analysis 
 
5.3.1.1 An Overview of the Changing Hegemonic Positions 
 
With a gradual transition from a planned economy to a market economy, as illustrated in Section 
5.2, China has gradually set out on the road of intensive economy growth, in place of the 
traditional extensive growth pattern. The central state has realised the significance of sustainable 
development, and has started to emphasise the environmental performance of the high-
consumption and heavily-polluting industries. With ever more concerns over the green 
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performance of SOEs from the central state, the roles of local governments and local SOEs in 
environmental governance have changed, taking BSRE for example: 
 
In the planned economy, we [the Baotou government] were responsible for 
governing environmental pollution of BSRE. After its corporate reform, we 
were no longer the shelter for its losses due to the environmental damage. We 
are only exercising guidance and supervision over BSRE to improve its green 
performance. (GOV1, Extract 2.1) 
 
In the planned economy, we [BSRE] only needed to follow the central 
instructions to engage in mining and processing without any consideration of 
environmental cost. … [A]fter the corporate reform, we began to consider our 
green competitiveness, responding to regulatory pressure from governments, 
market pressure from investors and customers, and social pressure from green 
NGOs. (COM3, Extract 2.2) 
 
Since the early 1990s, with a relaxation of state control over economic structure and ultimately 
public discourse (Saich, 2001), grassroots green NGOs have emerged in China. The rise of civil 
society in the Chinese context, mainly exemplified and embodied as NGOs with aims to promote 
public participation, political transparency, government integrity and efficiency, and democratic 
and scientific decision-making, has gradually attracted more academic attention regarding the 
study of the changing governance model in China (Yu and Guo, 2012). NGOs, as a new 
phenomenon in post-Mao China, have developed significantly in terms of number, scope, 
capacity and impacts since the 1990s. As illustrated in Section 5.2.3, the fragmented ruling 
system and complex administrative levels formerly kept information locally, so that many central 
plans to address social needs could not be conveyed and consistently implemented from the 
central state to the lower levels of government, which caused certain grievances against the 
central state‟s governance; similarly, many regional social problems and contradictions could not 
be completely reported to the central state; which might cause different degrees of grievances 
among the public and harm social stability. For this reason, grassroots NGOs, with missions to 
satisfy social needs, fulfil social responsibilities and redress public grievances that the 
government cannot do well, have gradually been tolerated more by the government and allowed 
to survive in China‟s state-dominated society. In recent years, with increasing opportunities for 
green NGOs to monitor and disclose corporate activities via the mass media from a grassroots 
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perspective, corporate environmental information disclosures have been ever more transparent 
for both the state and the public in China. 
 
Relying on the power of the mass media, green NGOs like us, under 
government supervision, are playing an increasing role in facilitating collective 
action and balancing power between government and business in 
environmental governance. (NGO7, Extract 2.3) 
 
From Extracts 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, it can be seen that changes of the politico-economic system led 
to great changes in the roles of the three entities in China‟s environmental governance: the 
government has changed its hegemonic position from a manager or governor to a supervisor or 
planner, to guide and supervise the improvement of corporate green performance, especially for 
those in heavily-polluting and resource-based industries, to transform their traditional extensive 
production model with fewer environmental concerns to an intensive production mode 
considering sustainable development; the corporation has had to place more focus on green 
competitiveness, responding to pressures from government agencies and other stakeholders; 
green NGOs, on the basis of the increasing influence of the mass media, have gradually played a 
more visible role in balancing the power of the state and capital in China. 
 
 
5.3.1.2 Genres of Texts: Government Supervision 
 
5.3.1.2.1 Supervision of SOEs 
 
The period before the 1990s in China was a typical „big-government‟ era, during which central 
planning had always strictly controlled economic activities across the country and SOEs had 
dominated the economic structure in China‟s state capitalism. In the 1990s, with the central 
state's instruction to implement corporatisation of SOEs, a modern enterprise system and private 
investors have gradually emerged within the SOEs. For BSRE, in order to proceed with its 
corporatisation, the Baotou government has attempted to attract more investment from private 
business entities, transforming the original government holding of shares to joint ownership. In 
1997, by attracting more than ten private investors to realise the equity reallocation within BSRE, 
Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi-Tech Company Limited was established to be listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, which brought about a series of great changes to BSRE: 
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I think the biggest change was that the group [BSRE] realised the equity 
reallocation: our shareholders were not limited to the local governments, but 
involved many private business entities. As a result, for corporate governance, 
we obtained enough managerial authority, and became a relatively independent 
economic entity from the local governments from then on. (COM4, Extract 2.4) 
 
Independent from the strict control and direct intervention of the local governments, the 
corporate decision-makings in BSRE were now made by the newly established board of directors; 
the managers were no longer assigned by the local governments, but directly appointed by the 
board of directors, and involved in sharing corporate benefits or undertaking losses; the 
employees no longer had lifetime employment positions but began to compete for contract 
positions. With the introduction of market mechanisms into staff recruitment, problems such as 
absence of positions or virtual positions within the old organisational structures have been 
eliminated; the old and rigid staff classification system and wage distribution system have been 
eradicated, and the modern human resource management system and incentive system have been 
established. However, although all the SOEs in the Chinese rare earth industry had completed 
corporate reforms by the end of the 1990s, through attracting more private investors to become 
involved in corporate governance, they have maintained a strong state-owned overtone in nature. 
A government officer explained this as follows: 
 
It is no doubt all rare earth ores are the national property. As one of the most 
valuable and strategic natural resources, rare earths’ mining and processing as 
well as exporting should be always under strict macro control of the 
government. For example, at present, it is regulated by the central state that the 
rare earth ores can only be mined by three authorised rare earth SOEs. (GOV2, 
Extract 2.5) 
 
As a worldwide phenomenon that many key industries including extractive industries are either 
directly or indirectly controlled and monitored by the state, China‟s rare-earth industry has 
always been regarded as the key national strategic asset, and the state plays more of a key role 
than in other industries. Therefore, after the corporate reform of BSRE, although the decision-
makings in terms of daily business operations were no longer made by the local governments, 
the Baotou and Inner Mongolia governments have still been the two largest shareholders of 
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BSRE and own BSRE. The local governments, at the current stage, supervised BSRE‟s business 
activities strictly, but ‘decentralised the management power to the corporate level’ (COM3). 
Here, decentralising management power to the corporation means that managers in SOEs have 
more managerial autonomy in corporate governance. The government officers also describe the 
changing role of the local governments in the corporate governance of BSRE after its corporate 
reform:  
 
Since the early 2000s, both the Baotou government and the Inner Mongolia 
government have changed their roles from managers to supervisors in BSRE’s 
governance. (GOV2, Extract 2.6) 
 
Therefore, for the business sector, the genres of the discourse of China‟s current varieties of 
governance have transited from highly descriptive plans to government supervision, owing to the 
corporatisation and ownership diversification of SOEs since the 1990s. Government supervision 
of SOEs, as a new way of acting, measures „a success for social stability and economic 
development‟ (Zhang, 2013). 
 
For environmental governance of the rare earth industry before the SOEs‟ corporate reform, 
from Extracts 1.1, 1.8 and 2.1, it can be concluded that the local governments were fully 
responsible for cleaning up all environmental mess caused by BSRE, and BSRE was committed 
to improving productivity and increasing output without any consideration of environmental cost. 
Such an extensive growth model caused serious environmental damage to the local environment.  
As illustrated in Section 1.1.2 and Section 4.2.3, Baotou‟s rare earth industry has brought about 
hundreds of heavily polluted rare earth tailings dams and seriously poisoned local farms and 
villages. Stepping into the new era of green growth, with the central requirement of transforming 
the traditional extensive growth pattern to an intensive growth pattern, the question of how to 
realise the sustainable development of China‟s extractive industries has been formally put on to 
the agenda of the central state. After the nationwide corporate reform, according to „Consult on 
Establishing the Chinese Nationwide Rare Earth Groups’ released by the SETC, since the 2000s, 
‘the route of pursuing output-maximisation and profit-maximisation at the expense of 
environment in Baotou has been approaching a dead end’ (The State Economic and Trade 
Commission of the PRC, 2001). With more focus from the central state placed on the 
environmental performance of the Chinese rare earth industry, the new genres of discourse of 
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China‟s environmental governance under the market economy also turned out to be government 
supervision. Taking BSRE as an example: 
 
 We [BSRE] have to accept the periodic environmental monitoring from the 
different levels of environmental protection authorities, such as BEPB, Inner 
Mongolia Environmental Protection Bureau (IMEPB), and the MEP of the 
central government. We should strictly comply with waste-emission regulations 
and energy-conservation plans developed by the MEP, in order to meet all the 
national environmental standards. (COM5, Extract 2.7) 
 
For environmental governance of the rare earth industry, the central state develops various green 
indicators on resource mining, energy consumption and waste emission, to standardise and 
restrict corporate behaviour. In order to implement these indicators, the regulatory institutions  
and monitoring authorities at different levels of local government are required by the central 
state to undertake periodic inspections of local business activities. Owing to the complex 
geomorphology and regional environment in China, the MEP has to cooperate with local EBPs 
to strengthen environmental regulations (Galarraga et al., 2011; Harashima, 20000; Lo et al., 
2001). Thus, the genres of environmental governance under China‟s multiple model of VoC can 
be viewed as „government supervision‟, and local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) 
become the most important actors for carrying out targeted environmental projects to help local 
business improve environmental performance. 
 
5.3.1.2.2 Supervision of NGOs 
 
As stated by Gramsci (1971), civil society stands between the state and the capital. NGO 
activism in China, as a new phenomenon, emerged in the 1990s, and has been regarded as the 
most important way to promote the development of civil society and the only legitimate way for 
the public to participate in public affairs. Under the Chinese soft authoritarian regime, the state 
has always shown contradictory attitudes towards NGO activism: the government recognises that 
NGOs can provide certain social services for local residents better than the government can, to a 
certain extent; but the fear and suspicion of NGO activism challenging governmental authorities 
has resulted in the government‟s strict control over NGOs‟ activities (Lee et al., 2012; Li, 2011; 
Spires, 2011). In order to standardise NGOs‟ activities and restrict their power, as early as 1989, 
the State Council of the PRC issued the „Regulations on Registration and Administration of 
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Social Organisations‟ (1989 Regulation for short), which regulates that: any candidate that 
intents to register as a legal NGO in China must firstly obtain sponsorship of a government 
institution, so as to regulate, organise, and monitor its activities; then with the approval of its 
sponsor, the departments of civil affairs in local governments could decide whether an applicant 
can be registered legally as a NGO, based on a set of financial, geographic and membership 
requirements. The governmental sponsors also need to monitor NGOs‟ activities, conduct annual 
reviews, write annual performance summaries, regulate illegal activities of NGOs and facilitate 
investigation from other government institutions (The State Council of the PRC, 1989).  
 
The ‘dual administration system’ has been widely considered as the largest legal 
barrier for the grassroots associations to register as legal NGOs. (NGO5, 
Extract 2.8 - 1) 
 
 The [dual administration] system has been the largest legal obstacle for a 
vibrant civil society to consolidate. (NGO6, Extract 2.8 - 2) 
 
Therefore, although NGO activism is widely regarded as the only legitimate means to effect 
transformative movement and the exclusive channel to build China‟s nascent civil society in 
China‟s democratisation process (Huang, 2013), such a „dual administration system‟, as Extract 
2.8 proved, has been the biggest legal barrier for the green NGOs to act autonomously from the 
state and for more vibrant civil society to consolidate. As a result, many NGO candidates in 
China are unable to obtain an appropriate governmental sponsor to support them to register 
legally, and there are much more unregistered than registered social organisations engaged in 
various civil affairs (Beja, 2006; Howell, 2012; Huang, 2013; Spires, 2011; Unger, 2008). With 
the surging number of unregistered NGOs emerging across China after the mid-1990s, the State 
Council of the PRC revised the 1989 Regulation, and issued the „1998 Amendment on 
Regulations on Registration and Administration of Social Organisations‟ (1998 Amendment for 
short). According to the 1998 Amendment, departments of civil affairs have rights to stop the 
projects carried out by „illegal social organisations‟ (The State Council of the PRC, 1998). 
However, it is obviously unsustainable or even impossible for local governments to handle such 
a huge amount of „illegal‟ activities carried out by massive numbers of unregistered social 
organisations. By 2010, there were more than 420,000 civil society organisations registered in 
China, and the number of non-registered grassroots social organisations was estimated to be 
anywhere up to eight million. The unregistered NGOs have engaged in various fields such as 
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technology, education, culture, health, labour, environmental protection, legal service, social 
service, countryside economy, poverty alleviation and so on (Huang et al., 2013). Thus, there 
was much criticism of the suitability and legitimacy of the 1998 Amendment (Li, 2011). 
 
At the current stage, Chinese decision-makers are still at a crossroads regarding the rapid 
development of NGOs. What they can do is either revise the 1998 Amendment to satisfy the 
latest social needs and foster NGOs‟ development through relaxing the strict registration 
requirements, or leave the 1998 Amendment as it is, which may postpone the resolution of the 
legal legitimacy of a large number of social organisations and increase tension between NGOs 
and governments (ibid). According to Ge (2010), due to the recent escalation in China‟s political 
conservatism, it may not be possible to amend the 1998 Amendment in a short time. However, in 
recent years, the Chinese government has tolerated most unregistered NGOs‟ existence in 
practice, focusing more on the legality of NGOs‟ activities rather than the legality of NGOs 
themselves, which has left a broader space for the gradual expansion of NGOs in Chinese civil 
society. 
 
Since environmental problems have been a new crisis of governance, the activism of 
environmental NGOs in China has provided the most important material for studying the 
potential of civil society in China‟s environmental governance (Yu and Guo, 2012). In China, the 
assessments of local governments‟ contributions are determined by their „achievements‟,  which 
are mainly manifested in social stability, economic growth, and sustainable development. 
Therefore, certain NGOs that can help local governments to improve their achievements directly, 
such as foundations providing educational subsidies, charities concerned with street children and 
orphans, as well as helping patients with incurable diseases, can carry out activities within a 
relatively relaxed political environment; while the other NGOs, with aims to expose local 
problems such as environmental pollution and labour rights violations, usually survive in a tough 
environment with strict government restrictions. Even for the registered environmental NGOs, 
their green activities against local environmental pollution have always been strictly monitored 
and constrained by the local authorities. The fact is that local governments were far more 
motivated to protect local business which could create job opportunities and promote local 
economic growth, even though they did not strictly uphold environmental statutes (Lee et al., 
2012). The different interests of internal government agencies will be further discussed in 
Section 5.3.3.1. As a result, environmental NGOs in China, shaped by various constraints, are 
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less successful in influencing government decisions and corporate behaviour in practice, than 
their counterparts in Western countries (Tang and Zhan, 2008). 
 
Due to the political trajectory of state-dominated society as well as the historical 
root of local business protection in China, our fighting against industrial 
pollution problems is strictly constrained by the local authorities. (NGO8, 
Extract 2.9) 
 
Extracts 2.8 and 2.9 show that in the context of a „state-dominated civil society‟ in China, the 
state integrates the green NGOs into bargaining processes, but strictly bans them from acting 
autonomously from the state. Thus, within the Chinese context, the potential of green NGOs in 
environmental governance has been largely restricted.  
 
In recent years, with ever stricter environmental requirements from the central state, green NGOs, 
relying on the increasing influence of the mass media, have been more actively involved in 
environmental monitoring of industrial pollution. Nowadays, the assessments of local 
governments‟ achievements are not only determined by social stability and economic growth, but 
also closely related to sustainable development. Green NGOs, to a certain extent, can provide 
more timely and accurate information on local environmental situations, and help local 
environmental authorities to prevent sudden occurrences of irreparable environmental problems. 
 
We are exercising multiple non-point sources monitoring of the local 
environment and committing to reporting environmental damage in a timely 
manner to local EPBs before irreversible environmental consequences emerge. 
(NGO3, Extract 2.10 - 1) 
 
Our environmental monitoring reports have gradually come to be considered by 
local governments. (NGO7, Extract 2.10 - 2) 
 
In order to improve the efficiency of environmental monitoring, the different levels of local 
government have begun to consider the monitoring reports from the local green NGOs. However, 
with the concern that radical movements of green NGOs may challenge the local authorities and 
affect the enthusiasm of local investments, green NGOs are still regulated under local 
governments‟ dual administration system. Within such a context, it is reasonable to conclude that 
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the genres of environmental governance between the governments and NGOs should also be 
government supervision. 
 
5.3.1.3 Different Styles of Texts 
 
In this section, focusing on the different „styles‟ of the discourses presented by the different 
interviewees within the researcher‟s fieldwork, an illustration is provided of how the 
interviewees express their different opinions on environmental governance and articulate their 
different roles according to their different positions. The interviewees from government, 
corporations and NGOs have different emphases when they illustrate their conceptions of 
environmental governance as well as their changing roles in China‟s environmental governance 
after the nationwide corporate reform. Certain typical extracts of transcripts of interviews with 
distinctive personal standpoints are selected as follows:  
 
The Governmental Perspective 
 
Environmental governance is a relatively new term to China. In my viewpoint, 
it should be an integrated system involving tireless efforts from the state and 
business. Also, it is closely linked with the flourishing of green NGOs. These 
participants should act together to build an effective environmental governance 
system. (GOV3, Extract 2.11 - 1) 
 
I believe we are playing an important role in guiding, regulating, monitoring 
and supporting Baotou rare earth industry in terms of improving its green 
performance. The mining chaos in the 1990s left more than 180 million tons of 
toxic mine tailings, covering more than 10km2. We should take the lead in the 
remediation of the pollution. (GOV1, Extract 2.11 - 2) 
 
After corporate reform, we think BSRE should play an increasingly active role 
in environmental governance. … BSRE should have more environmental 
concerns and focus to exercise strict controls over the emissions, in order to 
stop the pollution forever. Anyway, any repair of further environmental damage 
caused by BSRE should be undertaken by itself. (GOV2, Extract 2.11 - 3) 
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NGOs play an active role in monitoring environmental pollution. We believe 
they can provide useful green suggestions to government agencies and 
corporations. (GOV3, Extract 2.11 - 4) 
 
The Corporate Perspective 
 
In my opinion, environmental governance of the rare earth industry depends on 
the continuous improvement of government regulations, since the government 
still plays a primary role in guiding and supervising the whole system [of 
environmental governance]. (COM1, Extract 2.12 - 1) 
 
Establishing an efficient environmental governance system in the rare earth 
industry requires a huge amount of financial investment and technical inputs, 
which cannot be undertaken by us [BSRE] or any SOE alone. … We believe the 
local governments should play a more active role so that we can cooperate with 
them to carry out more environmental projects. (COM3, Extract 2.12 - 2) 
 
The NGO’s Perspective 
 
Environmental governance should be multi-level plus multi-actor, where 
governments, corporations, and NGOs like us can play different roles. Every 
actor is indispensable and irreplaceable. (NGO5, Extract 2.13 - 1) 
 
… [A]lthough the media is not strictly regarded as a part of governance, it has 
been the most important means for us to express the green appeal. (NGO8, 
Extract 2.13 - 2) 
 
With the assistance of the increasing influence of the mass media, it is possible 
for us [environmental NGO] to play an active role in environmental monitoring 
and governing, by means of developing different ‘strategies and skills’ towards 
environmental vandalism of business. (NGO7, Extract 2.13 - 3) 
 
We are … supervised by local governments … but help them [local 
governments] monitor local pollutants. … We also act as a partner to help 
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some far-sighted corporations to improve their green images. (NGO5, Extract 
2.13 - 4) 
 
According to the responses from the government, corporations and green NGOs in terms of the 
environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry, it should be clear seen that there are 
different styles among different interviewees in articulating their different understandings of 
environmental governance: interviewees from the government address more the corporate 
initiatives and the increasing importance of NGOs in the modern environmental governance 
system; interviewees from BSRE indicate the importance of government regulations and 
supervision; and interviewees from the NGOs emphasise more their increasingly important roles 
in balancing the power relation between the state and business. 
 
During the interviews with the government officers, the researcher explained the concept of 
hegemony in a neo-Gramscian framework. The officers completely agree that the theoretical 
framework from a Western experience with a focus on the increasing roles of non-state actors in 
governance is also feasible for analysing China‟s modern environmental governance system, 
although the power of civil society has still been too weak to  directly influence the public 
decision-makings. The governmental identity constitutes the styles of interviewees from the local 
government, who have a more plural view on the integrated discourse of environmental 
governance. According to Extract 2.10, although the different levels of government should 
secure a leading role in establishing an effective and efficient environmental governance system, 
large SOEs in heavily-polluting industries, which are directly involved in environmental 
governance, should also play a significant role in societal responses to environmental issues and 
actively engage in improving their green competitiveness. In addition, green NGOs, under the 
government‟s administrative supervision, should help local governments to monitor the local 
pollutants and promote the local achievement of sustainable development. 
 
From a corporate perspective, it can be seen that BSRE‟s managers regard government agencies 
as the most important actors in environmental governance, even after the corporate reform of 
BSRE. In their opinions, within such a heavily-polluting, high-consumption and resource-based 
extractive industry, the corporate capability of environmental governing is greatly restricted due 
to the huge amount of environmental investment. Government agencies should not only develop 
environmental indicators and supervise their implementation at the corporate level, but also 
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provide sufficient financial and technical support as well as policy preferences to help the 
corporations to improve green competitiveness.  
 
Compared with the perspectives of government and business, responses from the green NGOs 
focus more on their increasingly „indispensable and irreplaceable‟ role as highlighted by a neo-
Gramscian governance framework. In their opinions, environmental governance, as a complex 
system signifying a broad range of economic, political and social structures, refers to different 
ways of humans influencing the natural environment, not only involving state actors such as the 
central state developing macro plans and sub-national actors such as cities, localities and regions 
deploying their own strategies, but also including non-state actors such as corporations 
implementing sustainable strategies and NGOs facilitating collective action. The fact is that 
green NGOs have still been very difficult to behave as equal partners with governments and 
SOEs in environmental governance in China‟s state-dominated governance regime, and their 
green movements against local industrial polluting activities have always been restr icted by the 
local authorities. 
 
Although the interviewees with different positions expressed their understandings of 
environmental governance with different emphases, these discursive texts comprise a more 
comprehensive discourse for the modern Chinese environmental governance system in the 
market economy within a neo-Gramscian consideration. Environmental degradation in China has 
been mainly caused by high-speed economic growth and industrialisation, incredible population 
growth, and strikingly increased levels of consumption. A series of environmental problems, 
such as climate change, air pollution, water scarcity, forest degradation, soil and land 
deterioration and biodiversity destruction, have been emerging in China. However, contemporary 
environmental governance finds it difficult to keep pace with the rapid development of the 
national economy. With the emergence of the above environmental problems as a global 
phenomenon, the traditionally centralised command-and-control model no longer works well 
because of multiple non-point source polluters (Evans, 2012). Therefore, with a shift from 
government to governance, it is necessary to place emphasis on the roles of the non-state actors 
in dealing with environmental issues in China. From all the above responses of the different 
standpoints, together with Extracts 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 overviewing the changing roles of three 
entities, there is a common view that a gradual change towards a neo-Gramscian governance has 
occurred within China‟s environmental governance since the 1990s, although the governance 
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regime in China‟s contemporary multiple models of VoC still differs greatly from Gramsci‟s 
governance in Western countries. 
 
5.3.2 Interpretation of the Industrial Consolidation: A Process Analysis 
 
5.3.2.1 The First Attempt at Industrial Consolidation from 2001 to 2003 
 
This section, based on a process analysis, turns to discuss how the different textual elements 
extracted from interview transcripts, government documents, corporate reports, and media news 
hang together to produce a complete image of the development of China‟s rare earth industry and 
illustrate the different roles of three actors in the process of industrial consolidation, which aims 
to improve the green competitiveness of the entire Chinese rare earth industry in the global 
market. Extracts 2.7, 2.9 and 2.10, together with Extracts 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13, jointly identify 
government supervision as the new genres of discourse of the environmental governance in the 
context of a combination of multiple models of VoC in China. Government agencies still play a 
primary role in guiding, regulating, and supervising corporate behaviour and NGO activism in 
the modern environmental governance system. As early as 2001, several relevant departments in 
the central state joined together to implement the rare-earth-mine geological environment 
restoration and control, in order to promote the green upgrade of the entire industry. 
 
As Extract 1.2 shows, a large number of SMEs in the mining chaos in Baotou‟s rare earth 
industry not only wasted a huge amount of resources, but also caused a series of serious 
environmental problems. The mining chaos, depicted in Section 1.1.2, has led to the world‟s 
largest rare earth production base facing a scattered, chaotic and poor situation. A quote that 
arose during the interviews, ‘rare earth is not earth, but sold with earth’s price’ (COM4), is the 
truth of the chaotic rare earth market in China within the 1990s. In the 2000s, reacting to the 
dramatic growth of global rare earth demands in many industries, the Chinese government 
realised the importance of rare earths as a kind of strategic resource for China‟s economic 
growth and sustainable development. After the completion of corporate reform of the SOEs in 
the rare earth industry, in 2001, the SETC proposed a two-year plan to consolidate the entire 
Chinese rare earth industry to two (northern and southern) rare earth groups, in order to 
maximise the competitiveness of the rare earth industry in China and minimise resource waste 
and environmental pollution. 
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From the mining stage to the deep-processing stage, the whole process should 
be fully controlled by the limited authorised large SOEs with much stronger 
economic and technical strengths. (The State Economic and Trade Commission 
of the PRC, 2001, Extract 2.14) 
 
According to the central guidelines in terms of industrial integration, the northern and southern 
rare earth groups would be established on the basis of geographical areas and product categories.  
The northern group, formally named by the SETC as the China North Rare Earth Group, was 
designed to consolidate the light rare earth industry in northern China, which was supposed to be 
dominated by BSRE, and integrated with Gansu Rare Earth Group in Gansu Province and some 
other backbone enterprises in Sichuan Province and Shandong Province. The China South Rare 
Earth Group was supposed to focus on the heavy rare earths, led by a large SOE (pending) to 
consolidate the rare earth enterprises in Shanghai, Jiangsu Province, Jiangxi Province, Hunan 
Province and Guangdong Province (The State Economic and Trade Commission of the PRC, 
2001). For the shareholding structure, the state-owned shares would take up more than half, 
maintaining a strong state-owned overtone in the governance of the rare earth industry. Such an 
industrial consolidation would be effective in eliminating mining chaos and strengthening deep-
processing (ibid). An article published on the largest government portal website in China, 
people.cn, states the importance of industrial integration as follows: 
 
For such a strategic natural resource, it is quite reasonable for several large 
SOEs to monopolise, not only benefiting the improvement of industrial 
competitiveness and pricing capability in the global market, but also being 
conducive to establishing an effective environmental governance system, on the 
basis of adequate funds, advanced technology and facilities and experienced 
professionals. (Du and Wang, 2014, Extract 2.15) 
 
Therefore, the first consolidation attempt of establishing the northern and southern rare earth 
groups was regarded as a meaningful attempt by the central state to guide China‟s rare earth 
industry towards healthy, stable and coordinated development. In the central state‟s opinion, 
BSRE was regarded as the most appropriate SOE to integrate companies in the northern rare 
earth industry, with huge potential to make better use of limited rare earth resources and 
minimise environmental damage.  
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All rare earth ores in Baotou belong to the state. … It is sensible for BSRE, the 
only SOE in Baotou’s rare earth industry, to monopolise rare earth mining and 
processing in Baotou. (GOV1, Extract 2.16) 
 
According to Extracts 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16, respectively selected from government documents, 
online news and interview transcripts, a consensus can be reached that the rare earth industry in 
China should always be under the macro control of the central state and operated by the 
authorised large SOEs. These three extracts provide a discursive implication that industrial 
consolidation is a better way to ensure further sustainable development of the industry. 
Following the central instructions, the different levels of local government should play a leading 
role in this process, and following local authority guidelines, all sizes of corporation in the 
different regions should actively coordinate for the purposes of industrial consolidation. 
However, in practice, such an integration plan in the rare earth industry was suspended and 
eventually ceased in 2003 after two years of effort, due to many „resistance movements‟ from the 
different local governments and rare earth corporations. 
 
Towards the consolidation of the rare earth industry, the strongest resistance, according to the 
interviewees‟ opinions, came from the local businesses, which were directly involved in mergers 
and acquisitions (COM3). First of all, in China‟s rare earth industry, there were much fewer 
SOEs than private SMEs, which had survived from the mining chaos in the 1990s. Thus, the 
integration of other SOEs and private SMEs made it necessary to overcome the cross-ownership 
issue, which had not been properly handled by the government agencies. In addition, the local 
private corporations had become the important sources of local economic growth. They were 
qualified with many local preferential policies under the local governments‟ protection, so that 
they were reluctant to be merged as subsidiaries of the large SOEs from other regions, such as 
BSRE in Baotou; not to mention the resistance of local SOEs which had absolute priority in local 
businesses facing mergers. Therefore, both private rare earth corporations and SOEs, afraid of 
losing the protection of the local governments and encountering worse treatments after being 
merged with large SOEs from other regions, had usually taken opposite attitudes and practices 
against industrial consolidation. Moreover, there were still many illegal  rare earth corporations 
surviving from the 1990s‟ mining chaos and they survived outside of the government‟s control 
and regulation, which also brought great difficulties for the integration of China‟s rare earth 
industry (COM5).  
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The resistance against the industrial consolidation also stemmed from the local governments. A t 
the beginning of the 2000s, after nationwide corporate reforms, local economic growth was 
mainly determined by the development of local SOEs as well as local private enterprises.  In 
order to secure local economic growth and improve local achievements, most local governments 
were reluctant to see their local rare earth businesses being managed or operated by larger SOEs 
in other regions (GOV1). Thus, such resistance – local protectionism with the different interests 
left by the old and rigid economic system in China‟s planned economy – seriously hindered 
industrial consolidation across different regions. 
 
Under such a complex situation, without enough pre-mediation and pre-communication between 
the central state and local governments as well as local enterprises, the first attempt at integration 
finally failed. In 2010, an article published on sina.com, one of the largest Chinese web portals, 
pointed out that the Chinese political change in 2002 was another crucial reason for the 
suspension of industrial consolidation. Hu Jintao became the new paramount leader in China in 
2002, and with the great change of the central government agencies in 2003, the consolidation 
attempt of China‟s rare earth industry was temporarily suspended. 
 
The whole integration process of the rare earth industry was always under the 
strict control of the SETC. In 2003, Hu Jintao’s government reconstructed the 
SETC, and changed its missions and responsibilities. Such a big political 
change led the consolidation plan to be suspended for a long time. (Song, 2010, 
p. 1) 
 
Thus, the different textual elements extracted from government documents, interview transcripts, 
and media news hang together to illustrate the first attempt of rare earth industrial consolidation 
and explain the roots of its failure. In this process, the central government still functioned as a 
supreme leader to develop plans and make decisions, and required coordination between the 
local governments and the local enterprises. However, without sufficient pre-mediation and pre-
communication of the detailed compensation and integration schemes among the central state, 
local authorities and local businesses, the dramatic consolidation plan for the Chinese rare earth 
industry was eventually suspended in 2003. 
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5.3.2.2 The Second Industrial Consolidation from 2009 to 2012 
 
Ho and Vermeer (2006) point out that the environmental awareness of Chinese civil society and 
the public‟s receptiveness to government environmental programmes improved greatly in the 
2000s. In such a context, after the first attempt of industrial consolidation failed in 2003, several 
local NGOs in Baotou, after a three-year on-site investigation, held a press conference relying on 
the local media, and exposed the serious environmental pollution of the rare earth industry with a 
large amount of statistics and photographs of the rare earth tailings dams on the outskirts of 
Baotou in 2006. After that, the environmental issues in China‟s rare earth industry have 
gradually been exposed, attracting ever broader attention from both domestic society and the 
global media. 
 
The environmental issues of China‟s rare earth industry have attracted a broad range of Western 
media coverage: the Sunday Times published the article ‘Chinese Pay Toxic Price for a Green 
World’ to describe the heavily-polluting industrial city of Baotou (Hilsum, 2009). The article 
‘Earth-Friendly Elements, Mined Destructively’ published in the New York Times focuses on 
another rare earth production base in Jiangxi Province which has also caused huge damage to the 
local ecology and environment (Bradsher, 2009). The Daily Mail published the article ‘In China, 
the True Cost of Britain’s Clean, Green Wind Power Experiment: Pollution on a Disastrous 
Scale’, pointing out that the true cost of Britain‟s wind power experiment is serious 
environmental deterioration in China caused by the rare earth industry (Parry and Douglas, 2011). 
The article ‘Pollution the Big Barrier to Freer Trade in Rare Earths’ published by Reuters 
indicates that serious environmental pollution of the rare earth industry has led China to squeeze 
exports (Stanway and Regan, 2012). The environmental issues of China‟s rare earth industry  
have also attracted unprecedented attention from Hu‟s new central government. 
 
As discussed in Section 5.3.1.2.1, although the corporate reform during the 1990s changed the 
features of SOEs across the entire country, the different levels of government have still been the 
major shareholders of SOEs in China‟s rare earth industry. With ever more attention from the 
central state on the environmental governance of the Chinese rare earth industry, since 2005, 
under the new government‟s leadership, the MIIT has begun to take over the development of the 
rare earth industry. In 2012, the State Council Information Office of the PRC published the 
„White Book‟ to outline the development of China‟s rare earth industry under the control of the 
MIIT after 2005. According to the White Book, in 2006, the MIIT began to control the total 
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amount of mining of rare earths in China. In 2007, the MIIT began to implement mandatory 
production management to control the total amount of rare earth production, in order to realise 
sustainable development. In the same year, the MEP, in conjunction with the MIIT, the MC and 
the MLR, began to develop a series of detailed plans for environmental governance of the rare 
earth industry. In 2008, the MIIT issued the „National Mineral Resource Plan (2008-2015)‟, 
developing the protective pattern of rare earth mining and requiring local governments to 
implement the plan through cooperating with local rare earth enterprises. Since then, all business 
activities in the rare earth industry such as mining rare earth ores and producing rare earth 
materials have again been strictly under the governmental regulation and supervision. In 2009, 
the MIIT substantially increased tax charged on rare earth production, strictly restricted rare 
earth mining rights, and continuously prohibited the exploration of new rare earth mines and the 
expansion of existing mines‟ production capability (The State Council Information Office of the 
PRC, 2012).  
 
In order to implement the rational and orderly exploitation of rare earth mines, upgrade deep-
processing and energy-saving technologies, and realise low emissions in China‟s rare earth 
industry, a consensus was reached in the central state to establish an effective environmental 
governance system via efficient industrial consolidation. In 2009, the „2009-2015 Rare Earth 
Industry Development Plan‟ was confirmed by the MIIT, which aimed to consolidate the 
Chinese rare earth industry to the three large SOEs, including BSRE, China Minmetals Non-
Ferrous Metals Corporation, and Jiangxi Copper Corporation (The Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology of the PRC, 2009). According to this plan, BSRE, with strong financial 
support and preferential policies supported by the central state and local governments, was 
required to integrate all rare earth enterprises in northern China via different strategies of 
mergers and acquisitions. In fact, under the ever stricter rare earth mining control from the 
central state since 2005, the only way for the rare earth mining corporations to survive in 
northern China was to join BSRE: 
 
Different from the dispersed distribution of the heavy rare earth resources in 
southern China, reserves of the light rare earth resources are concentrated in 
Baotou’s Bayan Obo Mining District. Nowadays, we [BSRE] are the only 
enterprise authorised to conduct mining legally, so that we have the supreme 
advantage to integrate the northern rare earth industry. (COM5, Extract 2.17)  
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Owing to the strict resource control, decided by the central state and implemented by the local 
governments, up until 2006, the number of rare earth smelting and separating corporations in 
Baotou had decreased from more than one hundred to 35, due to the lack of resource supply. In 
2008, Baotou Steel Rare Earth International Trade Corporation (BSREITC) was established, and 
BSRE made its sales department an independent subsidiary, in order to attract more downstream 
rare earth enterprises to join its downstream supply chains. For the downstream corporations in 
the northern rare earth industry, refusal of any of them to join BSREITC meant they would lose 
supplies of rare earth materials immediately, which would be a fatal blow to their business.  
 
The only result for those SMEs which did not want to join the BSRE Group was 
‘to close down’. The direct reason was the lack of rare earth supply for 
production. Apart from that, in most cases, they were forced to be closed by the 
government authorities with a common ‘excuse’: serious environmental issues 
due to their rudimentary and outdated production and emission facilities. 
(NGO2, Extract 2.18) 
 
In the opinions of the local green NGOs, those SMEs in Baotou‟s rare earth industry were 
completely profit-driven, and were never concerned about environmental issues, not to mention 
upgrading production equipment and establishing waste treatment facilities. Thus, those heavily-
polluting corporations had to close down, due to the huge amount of environmental pollution 
fines ticketed by the local governments. 
 
Since 2011, with the instructions of the central state, the local governments have carried out a 
series of rectification programmes for the remaining 35 rare earth corporations in Baotou. 
Through asset audits and environmental audits, the local governments forcibly shut down 23 
corporations that did not meet the rare earth production requirements and environmental 
standards: four of them were shut down directly due to illegal mining and heavily polluting 
activities; and the others were closed with government financial compensations due to their 
unsatisfactory operations and lower production efficiencies (Zhou, 2014a). For the remaining 12 
corporations, they were forced to accept BSRE‟s acquisition requirements and became 
subsidiaries of BSRE. The entire consolidation process showed a strong overtone of „big-
government‟, in which the local governments, under the central state‟s prescriptive instructions, 
helped BSRE to consolidate the rare earth industry in northern China via mandatory 
administrative measures. The following text extracted from a government document shows the 
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administrative role of the local governments in the consolidation process. According to the 
government mandatory requirements: 
 
By the end of 2012, all the remaining 12 companies have had to sign the 
‘Consolidation and Restructuring Framework Agreement’ with BSRE, and 
gratuitously transferred their 51% shares to BSRE. BSRE should develop 
unified strategies for these new subsidiaries, and provide a full range of 
support for them regarding human resources, technology, capital, raw 
materials and so on. (The People’s Government Office of Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region, 2011, Extract 2.19) 
 
As shown by Extract 2.19, under the central government‟s instruction and the local governments‟ 
regulation, by utilising the advantage of mineral resource monopoly, BSRE has integrated the 
upstream and downstream enterprises into the supply chain for benefit-sharing. After 2012, 
BSRE has fully controlled the rare earth industry in northern China, and become the world‟s 
largest supplier of rare earth materials. 
 
 With strong government support, we [BSRE] have successfully overcome the 
‘cross-ownership’ issue. (COM3, Extract 2.20 - 1) 
 
For the current Chinese rare earth industry, we have almost realised ‘one voice 
to global market, one route to export, one way to sell, and one standard of 
pricing’, especially for the northern light rare earth industry. (COM5, Extract 
2.20 - 2). 
 
From the consolidation process of the rare earth industry in northern China, it is clear that the 
different textual elements from interview transcripts, government documents and media news 
hang together to enrich the discourse of such an integration process. In the process of 
consolidation, the central state and local governments played a leading role in regulating the 
market mechanism, constraining resource utilisation and providing financial and technical 
support. BSRE was also actively involved in the consolidation. With increased economic 
strength and a more advanced R&D level, BSRE can make better use of natural resources with 
the most advanced equipment, tailored to rare earth mining and processing, as well as 
discharging and recycling, to achieve the maximum yields with minimum pollution. Extract 2.2, 
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from the corporate perspective, points out that BSRE‟s current initiative of enhancing 
environmental competitiveness not only reacts to regulatory pressure from the government, but 
also responds to market pressure and social pressure from other stakeholders. However, in the 
NGOs‟ points of view, to the largest extent, BSRE‟s continuous improvement of green 
performance at the current stage is mainly targeted at performing well in annual environmental 
assessments from the MEP and obtaining the approval of next year‟s exporting quotas from the 
MC, which will be further discussed in the following social analysis, based on a series of 
contested issues regarding BSRE‟s environmental certification. 
 
To force the rare earth industry to improve the environmental competitiveness in the global 
market, the MEP released the „Guide to Environmental Information Disclosure of Listed 
Companies (Draft)’ in 2010, which required the Chinese listed companies, especially in the 
heavily-polluting industries, to publish annual environmental reports to disclose environmental 
information. 
 
Companies [listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange] are required to accurately, timely and comprehensively disclose 
environmental information to the public … [which] includes periodic 
disclosure and temporary disclosure. … [L]isted companies in heavily-
polluting industries are required to publish annual environmental reports to 
disclose environmental information periodically, and to release temporary 
environmental reports when severe human-induced environmental damage 
emerges or when companies are subject to huge environmental penalties. (The 
Ministry of Environmental Protection of the PRC, 2010, pp. 2, 4, Extract 2.21)  
 
With ever more environmental concerns from the central state, green performance has been one 
of the most significant standards for evaluating corporate market competitiveness in China. As 
Extract 2.21 shows, with the government‟s requirement, in order to display its strength in 
improving the efficiency of environmental governance of the rare earth industry in northern 
China and fulfil its mission of industrial consolidation, BSRE has begun to release its annual 
CSR report since 2009. According to the 2010 and 2012 CSR reports of BSRE: 
 
CSR practices in terms of environmental protection are important for 
improving the green performance of the Chinese rare earth industry. ... With the 
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supervision of environmental protection departments in the different levels of 
government, BSRE has been committed to improving the performance of energy 
conservation and environmental protection. (Baotou Steel Rare Earth Group, 
2010, p. 2, Extract 2.22 - 1) 
 
BSRE has started to expand its sewage treatment centre, upgrade discharge 
facilities and strictly control dust sources within mining and processing 
areas. ... BSRE has also begun to develop detailed plans for governing the 
heavily polluted rare earth ore tailings dams. (Baotou Steel Rare Earth Group, 
2012, pp. 19-20, Extract 2.22 - 2) 
 
Combining the governmental perspective in Extract 2.11 and the NGO‟s opinion in Extract 2.13, 
at the current stage, BSRE, as the only legitimate rare earth mining and processing group in 
northern China, should play a leading role in the environmental governance of Baotou‟s rare 
earth industry, not only continuously upgrading its original production equipment and emission 
facilities, but also helping its newly merged subsidiaries to deal with resource-wasting and 
waste-discharging issues, so as to improve the green performance of the entire group. 
 
At the same time, with a gradual relaxation of state control over public discourse, environmental 
NGOs have more opportunities to express their green appeals. Extract 2.11 from a governmental 
perspective indicates the indispensable role of green NGOs in the modern environmental 
governance system in China, although NGOs have been difficult to be an equal partner with 
government agencies and corporations. From Extract 2.13, in NGOs‟ opinions, they develop 
different strategies and skills towards environmental vandalism in industrial activities, which 
will also be further discussed in the following social analysis. Especially in recent years, replying 
to the far-reaching impacts of the mass media, environmental NGOs have begun to work 
effectively to assist the government to supervise corporate behaviour from a grassroots 
perspective, and help corporations to improve their green images in the modern environmental 
governance system. In fact, the second consolidation of the northern rare earth industry in China , 
to a certain extent, originated from the green NGOs‟ environmental information disclosure at a 
press conference in 2006, although their activities of green appeal and environmental reports 
were strictly controlled and restrained by the local governments after the press conference.  
Under the „dual administration system‟, the „non-oppositional stance‟ to the central state and the 
138 
 
local authorities has secured the survival and growth of grassroots green NGOs, which limits 
their role in creating an inclusive political process in China. 
 
5.3.3 Explanation of Hegemonic Struggles in Environmental Governance: A Social 
Analysis 
 
5.3.3.1 Contestation in the Environmental Governance of China’s Rare Earth Industry 
 
With a transition from a planned economy to a market economy, the regime in China evolved 
from state capitalism to the current complex politico-economic system that contains multiple 
models of VoC, which direct to the changes of genres of environmental governance from highly 
prescriptive planning to government supervision. According to Levy and Newell (2005), 
corporations and NGOs, as significantly hegemonic struggles over complex politico-economic 
systems, have played increasing roles in challenging the traditional „big-government‟ mode in 
environmental governance. However, China‟s traditional politics addressed the „government of 
men‟ rather than laws, which left impressive influences even on the modern governance regime 
(Shi et al., 2014). In China, the state has still achieved its hegemony over business and civil 
society on the basis of a „soft authoritarian‟ regime (Johnson, 2002; McCann, 2014), and the 
genres of hegemony in environmental governance retain a „big-government‟ overtone. Until the 
present day, lower level governments and individual officials have still been required to deeply 
understand the central guidelines and organise periodical discussions on the central instructions 
from top leaders of the CPC. Most citizens seem to have accepted, or at least have accustomed 
themselves to such a „soft-authoritarian‟ governance regime, resting on a „grand but unspoken 
bargain‟ between the state and civil society (Brandt and Rawski, 2008). To provide a more 
explicit and dynamic understanding of the hegemonic struggles among the state, business and 
NGOs over the environmental issues in China, in this section, the researcher selected four 
contested issues in the development of environmental governance of China‟s rare-earth industry 
to discuss the contradictions and struggles involved in the current politico-economic regime in 
China. 
 
Payoffs 
 
In recent years, with the deepening of the political and economic reforms in China, the 
environmental awareness of the Chinese citizens has been greatly improved. In 2006, several 
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local green NGOs held a press conference to expose the serious environmental pollution of rare 
earth tailings dams on the outskirts of Baotou, which attracted extensive concerns from the entire 
rare earth industry, local residents, international NGOs and global media, as well as 
unprecedented attention from Hu Jintao‟s central government. With more attention from the 
central state placed on the local industrial pollution in Baotou, corporate environmental 
information disclosures have been ever more transparent to both the state and the public in China.  
The local farmers and villagers had embarked on a long bargaining road with BSRE, appealing 
for payoffs for their losses, such as withering of crops, deaths of livestock, and treatment of 
diseases like osteoporosis, diabetes and chest problems. This compensation dispute, which had 
lasted for nearly three years since 2009, has also directly affected the BSRE‟s environmental 
certification conducted by the MEP since 2011 (Zhai, 2012). 
 
Under the central guideline of rare earth industrial consolidation, since 2009, BSRE has begun to 
integrate all the other rare earth companies in Baotou. The fact is that when the local farmers and 
villagers heard the nearby SMEs would be merged by BSRE, which possessed sufficient 
economic strength to make payoffs for their losses, they gathered immediately to ask for payoffs 
from BSRE. Especially after the industrial consolidation, BSRE has become the sole target of 
public criticism towards environmental pollution. However, it has always been difficult to reach 
agreements on the specific amount of payoffs between BSRE and local residents. Each 
successful merger and acquisition in BSRE was inevitably accompanied with a certain degree of 
social disturbance among the local residents. Without satisfactory payoffs, a series of „illegal 
demonstrations‟5 was organised, to not only directly influence the normal operations of BSRE 
and its new subsidiaries, but also to affect the appraisal of achievements of the local 
governments in terms of social harmony and sustainable development.  
 
To secure the smooth operation of local business and secure social stability, the Inner Mongolia 
government required the Baotou government and BSRE together to make payoffs to local 
residents. In order to seek an efficient way to deal with the compensation disputes in a quiet 
                                                 
5
Although according to Article 35 of the ‘Constitution of the People's Republic of China’, Chinese citizens enjoy 
freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demonstration, different levels of 
government have always implemented very stringent restrictions on demonstrations for a rather long time. 
Especially after the „Law of the People's Republic of China on Assemblies, Processions and Demonstrations’  issued 
in 1989, demonstrations need to go through a series of complex government approval processes in order to be 
carried out legally, with the result that it is almost impossible for the public to engage in legal demonstrations 
against local authorities. 
Available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm; 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383911.htm. 
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manner, in 2012, several local green NGOs, led by the Baotou Environmental Science Institution 
(BESI), were chosen by the Inner Mongolia government to conduct an assessment o f local 
environmental damage and to represent local residents to negotiate with BSRE and the Baotou 
government in terms of detailing the amounts of payoffs and further governing plans. All actors 
involved were happy to do this: for local governments, they preferred a quicker way to solve 
compensation disputes via NGO mediation, since the increasing discontent among the masses 
with different forms of demonstrations directly influenced their performance in government 
achievement evaluation in the aspect of social stability; for local residents, they preferred a more 
efficient way to obtain reasonable payoffs, and they preferred to trust the environmental 
pollution evaluations from NGOs, which are marked with a neutral and objective position in 
carrying out green activities and involved as a third party, rather than those from BSRE, or even 
from the Baotou government, which were involved as a „referee‟ and a „player‟; for BSRE, under 
significant pressure from local governments, the „endless bargaining process on payoffs‟, which 
has already affected BSRE‟s normal operations and green performance, needed to be ended as 
soon as possible; and for local green NGOs, it was an excellent opportunity and great honour to 
be chosen by the government as a „mediator‟, which not only helped them to expand their 
influence, improve their reputation and attract more funds, but also softened the „love-hate‟ 
relationship with the local authorities to obtain a relatively relaxed environment in which to 
survive and operate.  
 
[W]e can represent the local residents to negotiate with BSRE and the Baotou 
government, avoiding the direct contradictions between the two sides. (NGO1, 
Extract 2.23 - 1) 
 
Our mediation can be much more easily accepted by both BSRE and the Baotou 
government, as well as the local residents, to avoid the endless bargaining. 
(NGO3, Extract 2.23 - 2) 
 
The local NGOs offered relatively objective assessments of the local environmental damage, but 
also developed reasonable payoffs for local residents, avoiding the dilemma of the endless 
„bargaining activities‟ between the local residents and BSRE. Within only a matter of weeks, 
reasonable amounts of payoffs were developed and agreed upon by all sides (NGO4), and the 
local residents finally obtained satisfactory payoffs. The resolution of the three-year 
compensation dispute greatly enhanced the green image of BSRE. BSRE‟s payoffs were a good 
141 
 
start for the fulfillment and betterment of its social responsibility after monopolising northern 
China‟s rare earth industry.  
 
In this process, the Inner Mongolia government still played a key role as a „boss‟ in guiding and 
controlling the entire process of payoffs. The only requirement from the „boss‟ was to end the 
payoff dispute as soon as possible and to avoid a wave of widespread social disturbance in 
Baotou. The Baotou government and BSRE were chosen as the „executor‟ to make the payoffs, 
although the Baotou government claimed that it would no longer help BSRE to clean up any 
environmental mess after the BSRE‟s corporate reform; without the Baotou government‟s 
financial support, BSRE would certainly not have been willing to spend a large amount of 
money, which had originally been earmarked for expanding production or upgrading equipment, 
on payoffs. The local environmental NGOs were chosen or „arranged‟ as the „mediator‟ to 
alleviate the conflicts between BSRE and local residents. It seems that they represented the local 
residents in negotiating with the local authorities and business; in fact, to a certain extent, under 
the Chinese state-dominated regime, they were also „captured‟ by the local authorities  to be their 
greening tools in mediating the contradictions and solving the payoff issues. 
 
Environmental Assessment 
 
With the completion of the rare earth industrial consolidation in northern China, the 
environmental performance and green competitiveness of BSRE represents the entire image of 
China‟s northern rare earth industry. To verify the consolidation programme in the northern rare 
earth industry valid for bettering environmental governance, the central state and the local 
governments have paid increasing attention to BSRE‟s green performance. Responding to the 
central requirement of improving its green competitiveness in the global rare earth market, 
BSRE needs to continue to upgrade production and emission technology and equipment, not 
only at the original site, but also covering all the newly acquired subsidiaries with relatively 
rudimentary facilities, in order to reduce the industrial waste discharges to reasonable levels as 
regulated by the MEP. BSRE, with abundant capital and professionals, is expected to commence 
governing the heavily polluted rare earth tailings dams left by both the BSRE‟s new subsidiaries 
and the closed SMEs in the 1990s‟ mining chaos. 
 
Since 2011, to strengthen government supervision of the green performance of corporations in 
the Chinese resource-based industries, the MEP has begun to publish annually a list of 
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environmentally friendly enterprises. The corporations whose names are not on the list, 
regardless of whether they are private corporations or SOEs, would directly be  confronted with a 
temporary suspension of production for immediate rectification and lose the following year‟s 
export quotas allocated by the MC. Since 2012, the MEP has been implementing ever more 
stringent environmental standards with stricter environmental monitoring and assessment 
measures, in order to promote the rational, orderly, intensive, and environmentally friendly 
development of China‟s rare-earth industry (The State Council Information Office of the PRC, 
2012).  
 
For BSRE, as the largest SOE in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, its economic 
performance directly determines the local economy as well as the achievement of the local 
governments. As the world‟s largest rare earth supplier, BSRE has always been approved with 
the largest export quota. However, in 2012, the name of this enterprise did not appear on the first 
list of qualified export enterprises published by the MC, since it failed to pass the first and 
second environmental assessments conducted by the MEP (Zhai, 2012). At the beginning of July 
2012, the MEP released an announcement ‘Interim Measures on Management of Rare Earth 
Mandatory Production Plan’, and finally warned BSRE that if it failed to be listed on the third 
environmental assessment list published at the end of July, it would face suspension of 
production for immediate environmental rectification and lose all the export quota for the 
following year approved by the MC (The Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2012). 
 
 In order to help BSRE pass the [third] environmental assessment, the Inner 
Mongolia government invested 6 billion Renminbi (RMB) Yuan and developed 
a detailed plan to support BSRE in governing the polluted rare earth tailings 
dams. (NGO3, Extract 2.24) 
 
Faced with the final warning of the MEP, both the local governments and BSRE developed 
specific plans to improve BSRE‟s green performance. The Inner Mongolia government invested 
6 billion RMB Yuan to help BSRE govern rare earth tailings dams and expand sewage treatment 
ponds and waste recycling pools (Zhou, 2014b). BSRE also invested 2.2 billion RMB Yuan in 
upgrading production and emission facilities (COM3). An unprecedented amount of more than 8 
billion RMB Yuan was invested in resolving the environmental issues in the Chinese rare earth 
industry (Zhai, 2012). With the strong financial and technical support of the local governments, 
the name of BSRE finally appeared on the third list of environmental assessment. „ The result of 
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the third assessment had been expected before it was formally published’ (NGO3). According to 
the two selected special business reports, respectively from the most influential financial website 
and business newspaper in China, the direct effects of such a huge amount of investment for 
environmental governing practices in Baotou‟s rare earth industry can be identified. 
 
On 27th July, the MEP published the third list of enterprises in the mining 
industry that passed environmental assessment, and the name of BSRE was 
finally listed on it, but followed by a label ‘smelting separating section’ in 
brackets. … It would be absurd for the leading SOE in the rare earth industry 
to suspend production for environmental rectification due to the national policy 
constraints. (Zhai, 2012, p. 1, Extract 2.25) 
 
As the leading rare earth corporation in China, the next year’s export quota of 
BSRE being approved by the MC was just ‘a matter of time’. (Zhou, 2014b, p. 
1, Extract 2.26) 
 
The editor Zhai Ruimin, from 163 Finance, and the journalist Zhou Zhou from National 
Business Daily respectively expressed their views towards BSRE‟s name being listed on the 
environmental certification list. The interesting thing is that, in order to obtain the environmental 
certification and the following year‟s export approval, BSRE finally shelved i ts mission of 
governing the rare earth tailings dams, and passed the environmental assessment via the rapid 
expansions and upgrades of emission and waste treatment facilities. In fact, the rare earth tailings 
dams have always been the most serious environmental problem in Baotou‟s rare earth industry. 
With more than fifty years‟ buildup of waste emissions since the start of Baotou‟s rare earth 
industry in the 1961, more than one hundred tailings dams are left on the outskirts of Baotou, 
necessitating a very long-term recovery plan. BSRE has been required by the central state to take 
the lead in managing these tailings dams, which has caused BSRE to be repeatedly unlisted on 
the environmental certification. The environmental issues of rare earth tailings dams were 
eventually stripped from BSRE for it passing the environmental assessment, not only preserving 
the seriousness of the national environmental policy of the MEP, but also providing a chance for 
the improvement of BSRE‟s green performance, and for the healthy development of the entire 
Chinese rare earth industry. The different positions of multiple actors and the hegemonic 
struggles among them in managing the tailings dams will be discussed as another contested issue 
in the following section. 
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At the same time, the successful resolution of the payoff dispute enhanced the green image of the 
entire BSRE Group, which was appraised by the central state as a good start for the fulfilment 
and betterment of BSRE‟s CSR practices, and helped BSRE pass the environmental assessment. 
 
We believe that the smooth resolution of the payoff dispute helped the MEP to 
make the final decision on BSRE’s certification in the third-round 
environmental assessment in 2012. (NGO3, Extract 2.27) 
 
In this process, the local governments played the most important role in helping BSRE clean up 
environmental messes. To help BSRE pass the third-round environmental assessment, the local 
governments came up with such a good idea to shelve BSRE‟s task of governing the tailings 
dams, with the „excuse‟ that several decades may be needed to restore the heavily polluted sites; 
so that it is not fair to evaluate BSRE‟s green performance based on the current situation of 
tailings dams. In fact, the central state also needed such an „excuse‟ to get the world‟s largest 
rare earth supplier out of such a dilemma; and also „hush‟ those corporations whose names still 
failed to be listed on the environmental certification. NGOs also played an active role in 
negotiating payoffs with local residents and BSRE. No matter whether or not the local grassroots 
green NGOs were „captured‟ by the local authorities, local farmers and villagers received 
satisfactory amounts of payoffs, for which they had strived for a number of years. BSRE, as 
Extract 2.2 shows, „responding to huge regulatory pressure from government agencies, market 
pressure from investors, competitors and customers, and social pressure from green NGOs and 
the populace‟ (COM3), began to engage more in improving its green supply chain management 
via upgrading production equipment and establishing emission and recycling facilities. From 
2011 to 2012, to ensure their names appeared on the environmental certification lists of the MEP, 
over forty million RMB Yuan was invested in the environmental governing practices in China‟s 
heavy industries, which also significantly improved the green performance of the entire rare 
earth industry in China (Zhai, 2012). 
 
Tailings Dams 
 
The most difficult task for the improvement of BSRE‟s green performance is how to govern the 
hundreds of heavily polluted tailings dams left by the 1990s‟ mining chaos, which requires not 
only an enormous amount of funding, advanced technology and facilities, outstanding research 
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and development teams, but also the strong financial and policy support of the government. It is 
impossible for BSRE to undertake this task alone even after BSRE‟s consolidation of northern 
China‟s rare earth industry. In 2006, the environmental problems of tailings dams were exposed 
by several green NGOs. The NGOs‟ green activities hit a nerve with the local authorities, which 
took tough actions to block the further spread of information: all the videos about the press 
conference on the internet were deleted; and at one time, all the involved NGOs were asked to 
„keep their mouths closed‟ to outsiders unless they had the permission of the relevant 
government departments (NGO4). However, such a serious environmental problem had already 
attracted widespread attention before the information blackout, and a large amount of domestic 
media and international media sent their journalists to Baotou to report on the local pollution 
issues. 
 
In 2011, the central state issued clear instructions to govern the heavily polluted tailings dams 
immediately led by BSRE, and required the local governments to make every effort to provide 
complete support. Especially during the period of BSRE‟s environmental performance 
assessment in 2012, which will be further discussed as another contested issue in the following 
section, governing tailings dams became one of the most important missions for both BSRE and 
the local governments. The Inner Mongolia government appropriated a large amount of special 
funds to support BSRE‟s environmental remediation, and required the Baotou government to 
assist BSRE in carrying out practical plans, allocating the funds rationally and implementing 
practices effectively. However, since the toxic and radioactive waste in rare earth tailings dams 
has poisoned the underground water system, it may take several decades to recover from the 
effects of the heavy pollution. 
 
In this process, the green NGOs played a role of „environmental monitor‟ to expose the polluting 
activities of SOEs; this is the best they were able to do to fight against SOEs in China‟s 
environmental governance at the current stage. Under the „dual administration system‟, green 
NGOs are strictly banned from acting autonomously from the government (Heberer, 2012), so 
that it is impossible for them to fight against SOEs‟ environmental vandalism directly. The local 
governments, as a „referee‟ and a „player‟ in environmental monitoring and governance, on the 
one hand, admitted the existence of tailings dam issues; but on the other hand, they attempted to 
conceal the seriousness of pollution. After the media exposure of environmental problems, the 
local governments had to express their willingness to undertake the responsibility of 
environmental remediation with BSRE. In order to obtain 2012‟s environmental certification, 
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under the BEITC‟s instructions, BEPB needed to provide practical suggestions on both the 
remediation of tailings dams and the improvement of BSRE‟s green supply chain management. 
To assist the implementation of greening advice, other financial departments and business 
administration departments were also required to fully support BEPB in implementing governing 
practices at the corporate level. However, BEPB only obtained all-round support at that 
particular moment, and most of the time BEPB had still been powerless in decision-making. This 
is an awkward situation for EBPs in China‟s scientific and sustainable development. BSRE, like 
a child under the shelter of his parents, displayed an innocent view that the environmental mess 
of tailings dams were mainly left by the SMEs in the 1990s‟ mining chaos; while showing a very 
positive attitude to bravely taking over the issue that was historically intractable for the central 
state, so as to pass the 2012 environmental performance assessment. 
 
Different Interests of Government Agencies 
 
Due to the special historical, political and economic roots, government agencies in China usually 
prioritise economic targets over environmental protection goals, in order to promote economic 
growth and improve people‟s living standards, in return for „public acquiescence to its autocratic 
rule and anachronistic ideology‟ (Brandt and Rawski, 2008, p. 17). Regarding the Baotou 
government, BBB emphasises local business and economic development; while BEPB focuses 
on green performance of local businesses. In order to improve the green performance of the rare-
earth industry, large amounts of money are always needed, even more than the investment 
required for production. From the BBB‟s point of view, BSRE should not allocate the majority 
of investment to upgrading production equipment and installing emission facilities, since 
maximising the outputs and the profits, expanding the production capacity and promoting the 
local economic growth should be the ultimate goals. For BEPB, any environmental damage by 
BSRE would directly affect its achievement and evaluation, so that BEPB makes all efforts to 
guarantee that BSRE is operating in an environmentally friendly manner. Such an implicit 
conflict, in which BBB usually holds the advantage over BEPB due to the traditional  thinking 
that „economic success is the success of local governance‟, hinders the efficient cooperation 
between internal government institutions to develop and implement environmentally friendly 
projects. 
 
The ‘cats’ [local environmental protection bureaus] are bred by their ‘hosts’ 
[local governments]; so that whether the cats can catch the ‘mouse’ [illegal 
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enterprise] and how many ‘mice’ they can catch are fully determined by the 
‘hosts’, not by the ‘cats’. (GOV3, Extract 2.28 - 1) 
 
The extractive industries rely on the government to gain legitimacy and critical resources, while 
the government is also heavily dependent on the extractive industries to fulfil both its political 
and financial goals (Shi et al., 2014). Such a business-political tie results in the ineffectiveness of 
BEPB in administrative supervision and management. 
 
We [BEPB] undertook field testing, and then required BSRE to develop viable 
rectification programmes against its environmental weaknesses, but never 
received any response; and we can do nothing more. (GOV3, Extract 2.28 - 2) 
 
In fact, it has always been difficult for environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) to seek the 
support of other government agencies with „real power‟. For example, like the BBB, „the 
officials themselves are being held administratively and politically accountable for the successes 
of businesses in their jurisdiction, … [which] means officials also benefit from maintaining 
personal ties with firm managers‟ (Shi et al., 2014, p. 64). In other words, government officials 
in the key sectors are heavily dependent on the mining sectors and the mineral rights for both 
public revenue and personal wealth. Thus, local government agencies with more executive 
power in business, for example BBB, are usually unwilling to assist EPBs. The same 
embarrassment is also manifested in the executive power of the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP) in the central state. In the case of BSRE‟s environmental certification, 
although the MEP had carried out green evaluation on BSRE‟s performance and issued 
suggestions on improving BSRE‟s green performance for a long time, both the local 
governments and BSRE had not taken effective measures, until the MEP sought the assistance of 
the Ministry of Commerce to restrict BSRE‟s export quotas in the following year due to its poor 
green performance.  
 
In recent years, with the increasing emphasis on environmental performance of the extractive 
industries from the central state, assessments of local governments‟ achievements are not only 
based on economic growth and social stability, but have also become gradually related to 
sustainable development. On the one hand, in order to be highly evaluated by the central state, 
for example in Baotou, both the Baotou and Inner Mongolia governments have similar interests 
to BSRE on profit maximisation. On the other hand, the local governments have to take stricter 
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measures to monitor BSRE‟s operations for the purpose of abiding by the national environmental 
protection standards. To promote internal cooperation between different government 
departments, the Baotou government established BEITC for internal control in government. Any 
new economic development plan made by BBB or environmental development plan made by 
BEPB should be reported to BEITC for approval to be put into practice. BEITC also engages in 
administrative coordination to urge departments such as BBB to assist the BEPB in 
implementing certain significant environmental projects at the corporate level, such as in the 
case of BSRE‟s environmental assessment, where the Inner Mongolia government invested huge 
amounts of money to help BSRE clean up its environmental mess and all the other departments 
in the Baotou government were required to provide full support for BEPB‟s environmental 
rectification plans. However, most of the time, it is still hard to seek the assistance of BBB and 
BEITC to implement an environmental plan developed by BEPB. It is an awkward situation for 
the further implementation of the „scientific development‟ programme in China‟s local 
governance, but it is a necessary stage of development, due to the profound influence of 
economic priorities and actions after the foundation of New China. 
 
5.3.3.2 Gramsci’s Framework in China 
 
For Gramscian studies on environmental governance, Levy and Newell (2005) emphasise that 
corporations are directly involved in the process of energy reservation, resource depletion, and 
waste emission, and play a significant role in environmental governance to implement and 
negotiate environmental policies. In China, it can be clearly seen that the state still plays a key 
role in forcing business to improve environmental performance. The central state develops 
various indicators on resource mining, energy consumption and waste emission, to standardise 
and restrict corporate behaviour of the rare-earth industry. In order to implement these indicators 
at the corporate level, the regulatory institutions and monitoring authorities at lower levels of 
government are required to undertake periodic inspections and provide necessary support 
(Galarraga et al., 2011; Harashima, 2000; Lo et al., 2001).  
 
In BSRE‟s case, on the one hand, the local governments rely on the economic performance of 
BSRE to fulfil both financial and political goals (Shi et al., 2014); on the other hand, the local 
governments also need to strictly focus on BSRE‟s green performance, ensuring all the national 
production and emission standards can be met. Although the local governments claimed that they 
were no longer the BSRE‟s shelter in dealing with environmental problems, and there also exists 
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disagreement and contestation about the green growth of the local economy between different 
government institutions, both the Inner Mongolia government and the Baotou government still 
play significant roles in helping BSRE to make payoffs to local residents, govern rare earth 
tailings dams, pass environmental performance evaluation, and improve green performance. 
 
Nowadays, with the increasing environmental awareness of Chinese civil society, any further 
serious environmental issues related to BSRE will inevitably attract the attention of the public 
and cause different levels of disturbance among civil society, not only directly influe ncing the 
achievement evaluation of the local governments concerning social stability and sustainable 
development, but also resulting in a huge number of payoffs to the local residents. Thus, with the 
central state attaching ever more attention to the sustainable issues in the process of local 
economic development, green growth has become an important criteria for the achievement 
assessment of local governments. In order to create a „win-win scenario‟, with the financial and 
policy support of the local governments, BSRE should continuously improve its green 
performance.  
 
From BSRE‟s first CSR report published in 2009, it can be seen that, reacting to the increasing 
environmental pressures from government agencies, shareholders and civil society, BSRE has 
been aware of its responsibility of resource protection and energy conservation as well as 
emission reduction (Baotou Steel Rare Earth Group, 2009). In 2010, BSRE released its second 
CSR report, clearly identifying „securing sustainable development and building environmentally-
friendly enterprise‟ as the major principle for the corporate development strategy (Baotou Steel 
Rare Earth Group, 2010, p. 1). In 2012, on the basis of the painful lessons from managing the 
rare earth tailings dams, the board of directors in BSRE developed the new principle – ‘if we take 
measures earlier, environmental problems may be solved proactively; if we take actions too late, 
environmental problems may never be resolved’ – for the improvement of green performance  
(COM5). Under the new principle, BSRE renewed a large amount of outdated equipment and 
carried out more than 40 environmental projects. According to BSRE‟s 2012 CSR report, BSRE 
has completely abandoned the original organisational structure and eliminated the outdated 
equipment, and continuously enhanced the green performance ( Baotou Steel Rare Earth Group , 
2012). However, „for the rare earth tailings dams, they are still a big issue for BSRE although 
what has already been done is much better than before’ (COM3), and the Chinese rare earth 
industry still has a long way to go in terms of „real‟ sustainable development. 
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Levy and Newell (2005) view civil society as a significant battleground for broader social and 
political conflicts, and a neo-Gramscian perspective regards NGOs as the autonomous social 
groups challenging the power of the state and the capital in environmental governance. However, 
green NGOs in China, under the „dual administration system‟ of the state, have been much less 
successful and autonomous in political negotiations and contestations than those in Western 
countries. With consideration of the strong state power in China, Spires (2011, p. 1) proposes 
that grassroots NGOs and the authoritarian state coexist in a model of „contingent symbiosis‟, in 
which the state allows grassroots NGOs to operate while relieving some of the state‟s social 
welfare obligations. Thus, certain NGOs helping vulnerable groups can develop within a 
relatively relaxed context; while the other NGOs, with aims to expose local problems such as 
environmental pollution and human rights issues, always survive under the government‟s strict 
supervision. Huang (2013) and Li (2011) also illustrate the „love-hate‟ relationship between the 
state and NGOs: on the one hand, NGOs can provide certain social services that the government 
cannot do as effectively; on the other hand, NGOs‟ success in alleviating social suffering in the 
eyes of the local governments is a public indictment of the failed local bureaucracy. The major 
obstacle for the vibrant development of NGOs in China‟s environmental governance stems from 
the authoritarian nature of the Party state and its hostility to grassroots democracy. 
 
In recent years, as Extract 2.13 shows, relying on the increasing role of the mass media, green 
NGOs have played a more active role in monitoring local environmental vandalism and 
facilitating collective action from a grassroots perspective in China. Under the dual 
administration system, they have developed different legitimate strategies to deal with 
environmental pollution caused by different types of enterprise. Typical responses from NGOs 
regarding their strategies have been selected as follows: 
 
We can fight against the environmental vandalism of foreign-funded enterprises 
in a relatively direct manner. We can contact their senior managers responsible 
for corporate environmental performance directly and ask them to focus on 
environmental performance. Or we can report to local EPBs and appeal for 
local authorities to exercise regulation. (NGO5, Extract 2.29 - 1) 
  
Private enterprises, especially those with a long history under local 
protectionism, always have a certain ‘guanxi’ (relationship in English) with 
local authorities. In dealing with their environmental problems, we usually rely 
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on the influence of the mass media, to expose their polluting activities. 
However, our environmental information disclosure has still been strictly 
supervised by local authorities (NGO8, Extract 2.29 - 2) 
 
We try our best to avoid a ‘head-on collision’ with SOEs’ polluting activities, 
and usually act as a ‘facilitator’ to help them improve environmental 
performance by providing information and technical support, as well as a 
‘mediator’ to help them to communicate with the public about the 
environmental issues. (NGO6, Extract 2.29 - 3) 
 
The views of the strategies of grassroots green NGOs to fight against the polluting activities of 
different enterprises were similar, as shown by Extract 2.29. In recent years, the role of the mass 
media has also been quietly changing: acquiring a new role as a „mouthpiece of society‟, 
although still firmly keeping their original role as a „mouthpiece of the Party‟ (Yang, 2005; Zeng, 
2009). Relying on the increasing influence of the mass media, certain environmental NGOs have 
made limited but inspiring progress in monitoring the local environment and facilitating 
collective action. 
 
For example, Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (IPE), as a leading civil environmental 
NGO in China, has developed two maps/databases of current water and air pollution in China, 
and published the latest pollution lists through different media channels such as newspapers, 
press conferences and internet media since 2006. Up until 2013, in response to IPE‟s 
environmental information disclosure, more than 200 corporate giants have spoken out to explain 
to the public why their manufacturing facilities in China or their Chinese suppliers violated the 
Chinese air and water laws (NGO5). In order to get off IPE‟s „blacklist‟, up until 2012, more 
than 50 corporations had taken corrective actions and agreed to accept IPE-supervised 
environmental audits of their factories (Lee et al., 2012). With the stricter requirements of 
environmental monitoring from the central state, and the growing desires of the multina tionals to 
secure their reputations in the Chinese market, IPE has become one of the leading environmental 
„watchdogs‟. Many transnationals such as Apple, Motorola, Pepsi, HP, and Timberland were 
exposed by IPE as polluters in China. Certain far-sighted corporations like Wal-Mart and Nike 
embraced IPE as a partner in improving the environmental management of their Chinese supply 
chains. As stated by May Qiu, Nike‟s health, safety, and environment manager for the Asia 
152 
 
region, „the IPE web site provides a really good platform for us to reduce the risk of 
environmental violation along our supply chains in China‟ (cited in Lee et al., 2012, p. 39).  
 
Rather than taking „direct actions‟ to fight against corporate pollution activities, green NGOs in 
China, under government supervision, usually play the role of „environment monitor‟ or  
„conflict mediator‟, as shown in the case of BSRE. However, under the state-dominated society, 
requests from local governments and corporations to engage local green NGOs in environme ntal 
governance usually have clear purposes, either for dispute mediation or for green propaganda. 
Thus, the issue of how to avoid grassroots NGOs being further „captured‟ by local authorities 
and large corporations as their greening tools has challenged the future hegemonic relations in 
China‟s environmental governance, which requires more observation and investigation on the 
development of civil society in the foreseeable future with the further deepening of China‟s 
democratisation process. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
Since the early 1990s, China‟s politico-economic regime moved from a planned economy toward 
a market-oriented economy. However, the unique historical and politico-economic trajectories of 
one-party dominance over 5,000 years still retain the „big-government‟ overtone in China‟s 
institutional diversity. From the perspective of VoC, the empirical findings pointed out that 
China‟s politico-economic regime has transformed from state capitalism to the current 
combination of multiple models of VoC. The state maintains control over the commanding 
heights of the economy via SOEs, while private- or hybrid-owned corporations are flourishing in 
retail and manufacturing industries. With a gradual relaxation of state control over the economic 
structures and even over public discourse, NGOs, as the only legitimate means for civil society 
to participate in public affairs, have gradually emerged in China, surviving under the 
government‟s „dual administration system‟. With the deepening of the reform and opening-up, 
environmental issues have officially been put on the agenda of the central state. 
 
In such a new context, a textual analysis was carried out in Section 5.3.1 to identify the genres of 
the discourses of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry, shi fting from highly 
prescriptive planning to government supervision. Based on the different styles of the textual 
elements, the different consciousness of environmental governance from the perspectives of 
three pillar actors were displayed with different focal points. In Section 5.3.2, a process analysis 
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was carried out to combine the different textual elements to illustrate the two attempts at rare 
earth industrial consolidation in pursuit of sustainable development. Followed by a social 
analysis in Section 5.3.3, from a wider perspective of political discourses, on the basis of a series 
of contested issues over the environmental domain in China‟s rare earth industry, the hegemonic 
positions of government agencies, corporations and green NGOs as well as their  hegemonic 
struggles in the modern environmental governance system in the rare earth industry were 
critically investigated. The state still plays a leading role in regulating and coordinating 
hegemonic alliance building in the environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry. 
Under government supervision, the potentials of non-state actors in securing sustainable 
development have gradually been unlocked. Corporations have begun to place more focus on 
their environmental performance, so as to satisfy the government requirements, meet the national 
standards and increase green competitiveness in the global market; while green NGOs have 
increasingly played the roles of environmental monitor and conflict mediator, rather than taking 
direct actions to fight against corporate pollution activities. In the initial stage of China‟s 
sustainable development, the state still matters significantly in dealing with all kinds of 
environmental issues in business, for example, in BSRE‟s case, making payoffs, governing 
polluted sites, supporting corporate green upgrade; although there still exists disagreement 
regarding green growth plans within government agencies. 
 
Based on the empirical findings in the two analytical chapters above, this research dynamically 
investigated the changing discourses of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry, 
and bridged the empirical gap in discussing the neo-Gramscian framework of environmental 
governance at an organisational level within the unique Chinese politico-economic regime, with 
particular emphasis on the reconfiguration of state power in China‟s contemporary institutional 
formations and political contestations. Linking to the theoretical framework of this research, the 
empirical findings extend the Western-biased neo-Gramscian approach to China‟s unique 
institutional diversity and enrich the macro-level VoC divisions with the micro-level hegemonic 
struggles in China‟s institutional formations, which will be further discussed in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Based on the previous two timeline analytical chapters, the empirical findings illustrated the 
changes of China‟s varieties of governance from a planned economy to a market economy, the 
changes in environmental concerns of multiple actors in the rare earth industry from an extensive 
growth model to an intensive growth model, and the changes in the different roles of the state, 
business and civil society as well as their changing power relations in the development of 
environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry. This chapter links all empirical 
findings to the theoretical framework of this study, through summarising the changes of China‟s 
institutional diversity at the macro level, and the changes in the hegemonic struggles among 
three pillar actors over the environmental domain in the rare earth industry at the micro level, as 
well as the distinctive discourse of civil society in the modern environmental governance system 
in China in Section 6.2. Then on the basis of these empirical findings, Section 6.3 focuses on 
how the empirical studies in this research enrich the relatively abstract typology divisions and 
relatively „lean‟ societal theory in the VoC approach; and Section 6.4 illustrates how this 
empirical research encourages the neo-Gramscian environmental governance research to move 
forward in the future. 
 
6.2 Empirical Findings: Changing Discourses of Environmental Governance of China’s 
Rare Earth Industry 
 
Following Fairclough‟s CDA approach (Fairclough, 2010), as illustrated in Section 3.4.4.2 in the 
methodology chapter, the previous two analytical chapters carried out the three-dimensional 
analysis of CDA – a textual analysis, a process analysis and a social analysis – to investigate the 
changing discourses in environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry. Based on the 
theoretical framework as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5, and the empirical findings on the re-
configuration of state power in regulating and coordinating political contestations and 
accommodations in the development of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry, 
as well as the changes in hegemonic struggles between the state and non-state actors therein, the 
researcher draws a new diagram as shown in Figure 6 to summarise these changes. From Figure 
6, it can be clearly seen that the Chinese political economies, from the perspective of VoC, have 
experienced a transformation from state capitalism to a combination of multiple models of VoC, 
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as the pink rounded rectangles show. On the basis of the particular historical, political and 
economic trajectories of China‟s VoC, from the neo-Gramscian perspective, the changes in 
hegemonic struggles among government agencies, corporations and NGOs over the 
environmental contestations in China‟s rare earth industry are shown in the green rounded 
rectangles. From the perspective of varieties of governance, based on the case study of BSRE in 
China‟s rare earth industry, the empirical findings in Section 4.3.1 and Section 5.3.1 identified 
the changing genres of the discourses of China‟s environmental governance from a planned 
economy to a market economy as shifting from highly prescriptive planning to government 
supervision at the macro level, which are shown as orange arrows within the green rounded 
rectangles. 
 
 
Figure 6 Changes in Hegemonic Struggles in the Development of Environmental Governance of China’s Rare Earth 
Industry 
 
In the context of state capitalism in the planned economy, within the left green rounded 
rectangle, there were only two ingredients, government and corporation, connected via „highly 
prescriptive plans‟. As shown by Extracts 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10, extracted from 
the interview transcripts and the central state documents, the highly prescriptive plans from the 
central state dominated the logics of economic activities and rules of the game in Chinese state 
capitalism. All social discourses and activities were determined and arranged by the central state 
in China. With the full acceptance of the core values of the CPC, as concluded in Section 6.2, 
business and civil society, with little environmental awareness, became subjects of the hegemony 
of the state in governance during the planned economy. 
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For civil society, as exemplified by Extract 1.3, the freedom of speech of the press and the 
populace and the establishment of NGOs had been strictly prohibited under the authoritarian 
governance of the state. As the only legitimate means to effect alternative governance in China, 
the absence of NGO activism during the planned economy resulted in the inability of civil 
society to get involved in environmental governance under Chinese state capitalism. For 
corporate operations, as shown by Extract 1.4, the different levels of government acted as the 
real managers of SOEs in China‟s planned economy; while SOEs functioned as „processing 
plants‟ to fulfil government orders within state capitalism under the control of the authoritarian 
state. Taking BSRE as an example, without any authority in corporate governance, what BSRE 
could do was to engage itself in maximising the outputs to meet the central state‟s production 
requirements. The Inner Mongolia and Baotou governments, as the real managers of BSRE, 
retained all profits or bore all losses of BSRE, so that they were naturally responsible for 
„cleaning up‟ all the environmental pollution caused by BSRE. Under the government‟s 
protection, BSRE formerly engaged in immoderate mining and extensive processing activities, 
without any environmental concerns. For the local governments, without any emphasis on and 
requirement for environmental performance from the central state, what they were really 
concerned about was pushing BSRE to achieve the output requirements. As a result, under such 
an authoritarian hegemony in China‟s planned economy, the state‟s lack of environmental 
awareness eventually led to extensive production activities in China‟s rare earth industry and 
brought about huge environmental cost for the sake of rapid economic growth. 
 
Since the early 1990s, China‟s regime has gradually transformed itself from a planned economy 
to a market economy, and government supervision of business and civil society has also 
gradually replaced the traditional highly prescriptive planning. With a shift from government to 
governance, China‟s political economy, from the perspective of VoC, has moved from state 
capitalism to the current combination of multiple models of VoC, containing different tactics, 
strategies and models within the same national boundaries, as shown by the right pink rounded 
rectangle. With the increasingly open minds of the CPC to the effective mechanisms of Western 
capitalism in both the politico-economic and social spheres, the central state began to realise the 
importance of sustainable development, as well as the huge potentials and indispensable roles of 
non-state actors in environmental governance. In recent years, under government supervision, 
corporations and green NGOs have begun to play visible roles in hegemonic coalitions with 
different levels of government. Under the market-oriented economy, three pillar actors in 
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governance began to construct a triangle relationship in the right green rounded rectangle, which 
is similar to the neo-Gramscian framework in Western countries. However, the hegemonic 
relations between the three actors are completely different from those in Anglo-Saxon contexts. 
As the orange arrows show, the state still plays a leading role in China‟s modern environmental 
governance system, and government supervision of business and NGO activism dominates the 
entire triangle relationship. 
 
From the empirical findings, large SOEs in China, especially in heavy industries, which are 
directly engaged in the process of resource depletion, energy use and hazardous emissions, have 
begun to commit themselves to improving their green competitiveness initiatively after their 
corporate reforms in the 1990s. For example, after the corporate reform of BSRE, the Baotou 
and Inner Mongolia governments were still the two largest shareholders of BSRE and own 
BSRE, although they have decentralised the management power to the corporate level. The local 
governments have been required by the central state to undertake periodic inspections of BSRE‟s 
business activities, and the MEP began to carry out annual environmental assessments of BSRE 
with the cooperation of local EBPs to strengthen environmental regulations. Mainly reacting to 
the regulatory pressure from the central and local governments, as well as responding to the 
market pressure from investors, international competitors and consumers and the social pressure 
from green NGOs and the populace, BSRE began to place more focus on the improvement of its 
environmental performance and has released its CSR reports since 2009. In order to pass the 
annual environmental assessments from the MEP, as discussed in Section 5.3.3.1, BSRE needs to 
continue to upgrade production and emission technology and equipment, not only at the original 
site, but also covering all the newly acquired subsidiaries with relatively rudimentary facilities, 
in order to reduce the industrial waste discharges to reasonable levels, as regulated by the MEP.  
 
Also since the 1990s, with improvements in education, and more open minds to the Western 
experience of societal influences on public affairs, the public‟s environmental awareness and 
receptiveness to government environmental programmes have gradually improved. Moving to 
the market economy, with the relaxation of state control over public discourse, green NGOs have 
emerged since the 1990s to promote public participation in China‟s environmental governance , 
and initiated the construction of a triangle relationship with government agencies and 
corporations in contemporary alliance building. However, different from that in Western 
countries, the discourse of civil society in the unique context of China‟s varieties of governance 
is distinctive, which was briefly illustrated in Section 5.2.3, and discussed over a series of 
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contested issues in environmental governance of Baotou‟s rare earth industry in Section 5.3.3.1. 
Due to the lack of a civil society tradition in the planned economy, the civil rights and the public 
awareness were always neglected in the Chinese logics of political rule and economic activities 
after the foundation of New China. Under today‟s soft authoritarian governance regime in China, 
civil society cannot simply be understood as a democratic force of ideological struggle, or a 
significant ingredient of governance with political power; instead, it usually designates an 
informally structured network of NGOs in China‟s varieties of governance, which accepts the 
core values of the CPC and secures a non-oppositional stance to the state. In China, NGOs have 
become the exclusive route for public pursuit of civil liberties in China, and the history of NGO 
development has shaped the trajectory of China‟s nascent civil society. However, with  
acquiescence to the autocratic rules of the state and accommodation of the CPC‟s hegemonic 
ideologies, NGOs in China have always been strictly banned from acting autonomously from the 
government and confronted by many restrictions to their desire to be a powerful force in securing 
hegemonic stability and balancing power between the state and capital, due to the strict 
government supervision of their activism.  
 
The empirical findings in this research identified the biggest legal obstacle for the vibrant 
development of NGO activism in China as the dual administration system on NGO registration 
and operation, which was shown by Extract 2.8. In recent years, the empirical findings pointed 
out that relying on the increasing influence of the mass media, certain green NGOs with different 
strategies, as Extract 2.9 has shown, have made some limited but inspiring progress in China‟s 
environmental governance. In most cases, as discussed in BSRE‟s case in Section 5.3.3, green 
NGOs in China‟s modern environmental governance system play a visible role in facilitating 
environmental monitoring work and mediating environmental disputes, but their potential to be a 
forceful actor in securing hegemonic stability has been greatly restricted by the dual 
administration system. Under strict local government supervision, certain NGOs that can help 
local governments to improve their achievements directly, such as foundations providing 
educational subsidies, charities concerned with street children and orphans, as well as helping 
patients with incurable diseases, can carry out activities within a relatively relaxed political 
environment; but the green NGOs, with aims to expose local environmental problems, usually 
survive in a tough environment with strict government restrictions. In addition, local 
corporations have always maintained a hostile position towards local green NGOs‟ 
environmental disclosure; thus, such a contradictory relation is marked by the red double-headed 
arrow between corporations and NGOs. 
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There are also three green double-headed arrows to connect government, corporations and 
NGOs; which usually connotes a method of „mutual exploitation‟ on the basis of a non-
oppositional stance towards the state, rather than „cooperation‟ or „counterwork‟ between the 
three actors in the discourse of Western countries. As discussed in Section 5.3.3.1 and Section 
5.3.3.2, first of all, between the local governments and the local SOEs, the green double-headed 
arrow means that the local governments still provide financial and policy support to improve the 
local SOEs‟ environmental performance, such as in the case of the 2012 environmental 
assessment of BSRE; while the local SOEs also need to improve their green competitiveness 
continuously, in order to achieve sustainable development and assist the local governments to 
realise higher achievements, so as to create a win-win scenario. Secondly, between the local 
governments and green NGOs, the green double-headed arrow means that the local governments 
provide sponsorship for the establishment and registration of the local NGOs; while the green 
NGOs help local governments to monitor local environmental changes and prevent the sudden 
appearance of irreversible environmental damage as well as playing the role of mediator to ease 
disputes between the local enterprises and the populace. Thirdly, between corporations and green 
NGOs, the green double-headed arrow means that certain far-sighted corporations embrace 
green NGOs as partners to improve their green images in the Chinese market, as shown in the 
IPE‟s small case discussed in Section 5.3.3.2. In the case of BSRE‟s payoffs to the local 
residents, NGOs were chosen as the mediators to solve the payoff disputes, which not only 
helped BSRE to improve its green performance, but also helped the local NGOs to expand social 
influence and attract more funds, as well as softening the „love-hate‟ relationship between the 
local governments and the local NGOs.  
 
Now, the Chinese decision-makers are still at a crossroads regarding the rapid development of 
NGOs at the current stage. The „love-hate‟ relationship vividly describes the hegemonic 
struggles between the state and civil society in China: on the one hand, the state has realised the 
importance of roping NGOs into a soft authoritarian governance regime to undertake certain 
social responsibilities and promote the demoralisation process; on the other hand, the suspicions 
and fear that vibrant and powerful grassroots movements could challenge the authorities  have 
resulted in strict government control over NGO activism. In recent years, although it is still not 
likely that the central state will amend the 1998 Amendment to relax the strict registration 
requirements for NGOs, as illustrated in Section 5.3.1.2.2, the state has already shown a certain 
degree of tolerance towards most unregistered NGOs‟ existence, with more focus on the legality 
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of NGOs‟ activities, rather than the legality of NGOs themselves. This has left a broader space 
for the expansion of grassroots NGOs in the foreseeable future, promoting China‟s 
democratisation process. The „love-hate‟ relationship between government agencies and NGOs 
in China‟s state-dominated governance regime requires more empirical studies and further 
observation in the foreseeable future with the further deepening of China‟s democratisation 
process. 
 
In summary, based on a timeline, this research followed the three dimensions of Fairclough‟s 
CDA approach to carry out a textual analysis to describe the different roles of the state, business 
and civil society under the different genres of discourse; then a process analysis was conducted 
to interpret how the different textual elements hang together to construct the entire discourse of 
China‟s environmental governance; and finally a social analysis was carr ied out to explain the 
hegemonic struggles in alliance building and accommodation between state and non-state actors 
in the development of China‟s environmental governance. At the initial stage of China‟s 
sustainable development, the state still matters significantly in dealing with all kinds of 
environmental issues in business, for example, in BSRE‟s case, making payoffs, governing 
polluted sites and supporting corporate green upgrade; although there still exists disagreement 
regarding green growth plans within internal government departments, as discussed in Section 
5.3.3.1. Corporations, especially those in heavy industries, are required to focus on their 
environmental performance and to set out on a real sustainable development road. At the initial 
stage of the development of civil society, green NGOs usually play the roles of environmental 
monitor and conflict mediator, rather than taking direct actions to fight against corporate 
pollution activities and influencing decision-making in the public environmental programmes.  
 
With consideration of the specific politico-economic heritages and particular historical 
trajectories, the critical discourse analysis in this research provides a dynamic and 
comprehensive understanding of the history of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth 
industry and bridges the empirical gap for China‟s environmental governance studies within the 
neo-Gramscian framework. Based on the empirical findings on the changes in China‟s 
institutional diversity at the macro level, and the changes in hegemonic struggles among three 
pillar actors over the environmental domain in the rare earth industry at the micro level, as well 
as the distinctive discourse of civil society, the researcher links them to the theoretical 
framework of this research, and illustrates how this empirical study on the changing discourses 
of varieties of environmental governance in China‟s rare earth industry contributes to both the 
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„comparative capitalisms‟ studies and the neo-Gramscian studies under other non-Western 
regimes in future, which will be further discussed in the following Section 6.3. 
 
6.3 Theoretical Contribution: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective on China’s Varieties of 
Environmental Governance 
 
6.3.1 Varieties of Capitalism in China 
 
Returning to the beginning of this research, the researcher suggested that investigating the 
environmental struggles in China‟s rare earth industry within the particular empirical setting of 
Chinese governance system necessitates a deep-seated understanding of the uniqueness of 
China‟s politico-economic system, which is significantly dissimilar to both the Anglo-Saxon 
model in the US and the UK, and the coordinated market economies in France, Germany and 
Japan. As illustrated in Section 2.1 in the literature review, post-World War II capitalism has 
manifested in different logics of economic activity and rules of the game (Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Jessop, 2014; Morgan, 2011; Scott, 1986; Whitley, 2005, 2007), and the state, business and civil 
society under different regimes have different ways of influencing their respectively political 
contestations and negotiations (Levy and Newell, 2005). Thus, the VoC approach provides a 
deep insight into various systems of institutional formations and different logics of economic 
activities, and a dynamic understanding of China‟s changing VoC over time is meaningful for 
discussing the changing hegemonic relations between the three pillar actors in the development 
of China‟s environmental governance. 
 
Although the main divisions of different typologies of regimes in comparative capitalism studies 
have been reviewed in Section 2.1, such as Hall and Soskice‟s LMEs and CMEs (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001), and Rawls‟ varieties of regime (Rawls, 2001; Freeman, 2007), as well as 
Whitley and Morgan‟s VoC in the four different types of state (Whitley, 2005, 2007; Morgan, 
2009), it is hard to position one typology to fit the complex Chinese politico-economic system. 
The unique historical-geographical heritage leads to a further layer of variation in China‟s VoC. 
With considerable divergences and great uniqueness in its politics, China‟s politico-economic 
regime contains multiple tactics, with multiple models of VoC within the same national 
boundaries. In this research, based on the specific politico-economic heritages and particular 
historical trajectories in China, Sections 4.2 and 5.2 identified how the politico-economic regime 
of the New China transformed from state capitalism to a combination of multiple models of VoC.  
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A unique duality for the present Chinese political economy can be identified, which is that the 
state continues to control capital accumulation via large SOEs, while a vibrant network of private 
and hybrid ownership corporations form the bulk of the private sector (McCann, 2014; McNally, 
2012). The current Chinese politico-economic regime, as a combination of market autonomy and 
administrative regulation, enriches the conventional divisions of VoC with „a form of state-
manipulated market economy‟ (Harvey, 2005, p. 122). 
 
However, the VoC approach to the contemporary diversification of political economies is no 
longer firm-centred (Hall and Soskice, 2001), since institutional pluralism has also been 
documented in the modern VoC. The contemporary diversity of politico-economic regimes is 
steered by the varieties of participation of the state, business and civil society in institutional 
formations along different lines (Buhr and Frankenberger, 2014; McCann, 2014; Morgan, 2011; 
Whitley, 1999, 2007). Many scholars in „comparative capitalisms‟ studies critique the VoC 
approach as providing the abstract and macro-level divisions of post-World War II economic 
structures, with a lack of micro-level consideration of diversity of hegemonic positions of 
multiple actors and their strategic interactions with each other in contemporary alliance building 
(Bieling, 2014; Bailey and Shibata, 2014; Bruff and Ebenau, 2014; Bruff and Hartmann, 2014; 
Coates, 2014; Gallas, 2014; Jessop, 2014; Weiss, 2014). Thus, toward the critique of the VoC 
approach, identifying the changes in China‟s distinctive institutional diversity necessitates an 
independent and dynamic analysis of the political contestations and negotiations among the 
different levels of government, corporations and NGOs in China‟s unique governance regime,  
which will be further discussed in the following section. 
 
6.3.2 Varieties of Governance in China 
 
Up until now, Gramsci‟s thoughts have been widely used to discuss the power structures within 
the global political economy (Cox, 1983; Jessop, 2013; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Levy and 
Egan, 2003; Levy and Newell, 2005; Levy and Spicer, 2013; Mouffe, 1979; Murphy, 1998; 
Spicer and Böhm, 2007). Historically, hegemonies founded by powerful states have undergone a 
complete social and economic revolution (Cox, 1983), which modified the national economic 
and political structures of „big government‟ before the 1990s (Evans, 2012). Since the 1990s, 
with the shift of power from government to governance, the hegemonic struggles between the 
state, business and civil society have been the crucial elements in constituting a combination of 
political, economic and social structures on a given terrain as well as in the global political and 
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social order. Thus, the neo-Gramscian approach, integrating agency, dynamics and power into 
field-level politics, provides a collective perspective on the different dynamics of contemporary 
political contests engaging a variety of actors, which enrich the „lean‟ societal theory and 
politico-economic theory in VoC, and offer a rich theoretical framework for further comparative 
capitalism studies. A neo-Gramscian perspective on China‟s VoC help the VoC approach to 
contextualise the institutional variations of governance in China; and more specifically, provide 
an interpretative and dynamic understanding of the exercise of state power to regulate and 
coordinate the hegemonic coalitions between the state, business and civil society in China‟s 
unique governance regimes from a planned economy to a market economy. 
 
However, although the neo-Gramscian approach provides a valuable theoretical framework with 
which to analyse the unique institutional diversity in the environmental governance of China‟s 
rare earth industry and the hegemonic struggles among the state, business and civil society that 
evolved therein, most neo-Gramscian studies on environmental governance, as critiqued in 
Section 2.3.4 and Section 2.3.5 in the literature review chapter, set within the neo-liberal 
countries, such as the US, the UK, and Australia. In other words, most Gramscian governance 
studies are Anglo-Saxon centred, and as such are always overly focused on a pluralistic 
interpretation of Gramsci from a neoliberal perspective. Although essentially implying that all 
three main actors have similar access to power in environmental governance, most Gramscian 
governance research overemphasises the corporate political power and NGOs‟ counter-
hegemonic power to outmanoeuvre state power, with less attention given to clarifying the re -
regulation and re-configuration of state power in contemporary alliance building. 
 
The researcher has been more critical of the de -empowerment of the state in neo-Gramscian 
studies, with the institutional variations of the Chinese state and the power relations that evolved 
as well as the hegemonic struggles within the Chinese state -dominated governance regime. Thus, 
a comprehensive understanding of the unique features of China‟s varieties of governance also 
necessitates the VoC approach, with a deep insight into the distinctive politico-economic regime 
in China. Many scholars in comparative capitalism studies place particular emphasis on the re-
empowerment and re-regulation of the state in contemporary political contestations along 
different lines, so as to develop the debate on capitalist diversity: for example: different roles of 
the state in contemporary alliance building (Freeman, 2007; Mäkinen and Kourula, 2012; 
Morgan, 2009; Rawls, 2001); varying degrees of government involvement in political systems 
(Steurer, 2013); different types of state and complementary institutions (Whitley, 2005, 2007); 
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and different mechanisms of state power to impose specific patterns of valorisation, 
appropriation and dispossession (Jessop, 2008, 2014). Bob Jessop has clear ideas on the paradox 
of state power, which is embedded in the structural coupling of the economic and political, and 
linked to different forms of civil society (Jessop, 1997, 2008). Even in the most neo-liberal 
countries, the state is still important in creating and preserving the institutional framework for the 
neo-liberal market and guaranteeing the proper functioning of markets (Harvey, 2005), as well as 
resolving economic, political and social problems in a coherent way, facing the emerging crisis 
of neoliberalism (Jessop, 2010). These studies view that the state still matters today in 
constructing the institutional variations and securing the functioning of organisational structures 
in varieties of governance, especially in non-market areas, such as environmental pollution and 
climate governance. Thus, the emphasis of institutional variations of the state and the diversity of 
power relations therein in the VoC studies provides a new perspective to extend the Western-
based neo-Gramscian approach to other non-Western regimes. 
 
The unique Chinese institutional diversity provides an important counterpoint to the varieties of 
governance structures in Western countries. Thus, with increasingly pluralistic themes of roles of 
government agencies, corporations and civil society as well as ever more complicated hegemonic 
struggles among them under China‟s distinctive governance regime, the researcher merged a 
neo-Gramscian approach with the VoC approach to construct a valuable framework – varieties of 
governance – with which to discuss the hegemonic struggles among the state, business and civil 
society in the development of China‟s rare earth industry at both a macro and micro level. The 
neo-Gramscian perspective on China‟s varieties of governance, with a dynamic understanding of 
organisational fields populated by multiple actors to advance their respective interests in rational 
ways through strategic interactions with others, is meaningful for clarifying the institutional 
variations of the different types of state and the diversity of hegemonic struggles evolved therein 
in the development of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry and identify the 
varieties of governance in China with both historical depth and comparative breadth. 
 
On the basis of the development of politico-economic regimes from state capitalism in a planned 
economy to a combination of multiple models of VoC in a market-oriented economy in China, 
from a neo-Gramscian perspective on China‟s varieties of governance, the empirical findings in 
the analytical chapters identified the changes in genres of China‟s varieties of governance, at the 
macro level, shifting from highly prescriptive planning to government supervision, based on the 
case study of BSRE in the governance of China‟s rare earth industry. 
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More specifically, the development of China‟s institutional diversity after the foundation of New 
China can be divided into two main stages, on the basis of a shift from state capitalism to a 
combination of multiple models of VoC. From the 1950s to the early 1990s, China had 
experienced a long period of state capitalism, in which the prescriptive central planning 
determined nearly every aspect of economic activities and social life. The establishment of 
political rules and economic structures were under a government-led development model, and 
the institutional diversity was monotonous and strictly limited by the newly established but 
powerful central state. According to the First Plan quoted as Extract 1.5 and the Second Plan 
quoted as Extract 1.6, as the national development principles during the planned economy, it can 
be seen that, since the state nationalised all means of production across the country around the 
mid-1950s, SOEs had always dominated the entire economic structure under state capitalism, 
and highly prescriptive plans from the SPC had determined all economic activities. According to 
Extract 1.5, in order to strive for a high rate of economic growth and socialist industrialisation, 
the central state implemented „Three Great Transformations‟ to transform the agriculture, 
handicraft and capitalist industry and commerce into national properties, and accumulate capital 
in a capitalist manner on a national level. Through the socialist transformation to nationalise all 
private and capitalist means of production, according to Extract 1.6, the central state 
concentrated investments in development of heavy industries in China, especially the steel and 
iron manufacturing industry, so as to realise industrialisation rapidly. As illustrated in Section 
4.2.1, on the basis of a series of significant accomplishments led by the CPC, including the 
foundation of New China in 1949, the completion of the socialist transformations in the 
following years, and the rapid improvements of the rate of capital accumulation and the 
populace‟s living standards since the late 1950s, the CPC had won sufficient confidence and full 
support of the proletariat in Chinese society, and both SOEs and Chinese citizens became 
subjects of the hegemony of the central state in governance during the planned economy. 
 
Since 1978, with the deepening of the reforms and opening-up of the Chinese market, a series of 
economic reforms with limited introduction of market principles had begun to effect changes in 
ways of acting in governance in China. By gradually reintroducing markets and incentives within 
a planned economic system in New China, the market force started to work together with central 
planning via a dual pricing system. However, until the target of establishing a „socialist market 
economy‟ was proposed in the early 1990s, the central administrative plans had still played a 
dominant role in Chinese political rules and economic activities, and SOEs still controlled the 
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entire national economy. Thus, before the early 1990s, China had never moved away from a 
command economy, and many institutions required to facilitate and operate a market economy 
had been rudimentary or missing completely. During the planned economy from the 1950s to the 
early 1990s, from Extract 1.3, in a „socialist‟ but state-dominated society, it was forbidden for 
the populace to establish NGOs; thus no NGOs existed under such a high command era in China. 
As pointed out in Section 5.2.2, under such rigid politico-economic control, there were no real 
labour markets, nor freedom of speech for the press or the public.  
 
In the context of such state capitalism, both the business sector and the populace maintained the 
hegemonic acceptance of the core values of the CPC, and the central state manifested its 
intellectual and moral hegemony in its method of adopting a government-led development model 
and nationalising all private means of production to „work out a path of socialist modernisation 
with Chinese characteristics‟ (Liu, 2011, p. 1). In short, the empirical findings pointed out that, 
during the planned economy, due to the special historical and political trajectories in China, the 
central state determined all economic activities via the strict control of SOEs, such as the number 
and variety of products, pricing and distribution of goods and services, proportion of 
consumption and investment and so on; and all social activities such as education, employment, 
housing, medical treatment and so forth. Under such an authoritarian governance system, the 
populace accepted, or at least became accustomed to government control and highly prescriptive 
plans, with public acquiescence to the CPC‟s supreme power and autocratic ideologies in 
governance. 
 
Since the early 1990s, the politico-economic system in China has gradually transformed to a 
market-oriented economy, in which market and plan have coexisted until now. Deng Xiaoping‟s 
visit to southern China in 1992 marked a new wave of market-oriented reform, during which the 
new national target of „establishing a socialist market economy‟ was confirmed. Since then, the 
state has begun to decentralise management power in the economic system to the corporate level, 
and introduced a series of market mechanisms to the Chinese economic system, which 
manifested in the dramatic downsizing of SOEs, the mass redundancies in state-owned industries, 
the nationwide corporate reforms to establish modern enterprises and the massive expansion of 
private and foreign-funded enterprises in the Chinese market. Based on the case study on BSRE 
in Baotou‟s rare earth industry, from Extracts 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.6 and 2.11, it can be concluded that, 
for SOEs‟ corporate governance, the different levels of government have changed their role from 
„manager‟ to „supervisor‟. Moving to the market-oriented economy, owing to the complex 
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institutional foundations, the profound historical, political and economic impacts, and the 
complicated geomorphology and regional environment, the empirical findings summarised in 
Section 5.2.2 depict China‟s contemporary politico-economic regime as a combination of 
multiple models of VoC, with a mixed economy of state actors such as SOEs, semi -state actors 
such as collectives and TVEs, and private actors such as domestic private enterprises and 
foreign-funded enterprises. 
 
Compared with the dramatic changes of government control over the economic sphere, under the 
multiple model of VoC in today‟s China, there have been relatively fewer changes  in the social 
sphere. China‟s traditionally historical and political trajectory of „government of men‟ rather than 
„laws‟ is meaningful even in present society.  Although the state has relaxed restrictions on public 
discourse to promote China‟s democratisation process, the freedom of speech of the press and 
the populace has still been constrained under the soft authoritarian governance of the CPC, so as 
to secure a „grand but unspoken bargain‟ between the CPC and Chinese civil society. Although 
the state has realised that certain collective activities in the public environmental arena ought to 
involve NGOs, NGOs‟ activism, as the only legitimate way for the public to participate in public 
affairs, has been strictly supervised by the relevant authorities under a dual administration system. 
Although the state has gradually become open to the mass media‟s new role of „mouthpiece of 
society‟, the original role of „mouthpiece of the Party‟ is still firmly secured. As a result, due to 
the lack of Western traditions of civil society, individual rights, impersonal trust and the public-
private division, the historical and political trajectories of „government of men‟ in a command 
economy have left impressive influences on today‟s varieties of governance in China.  
 
This research, by merging the neo-Gramscian approach with the VoC approach at an 
organisational level, discussed the institutional variations of the state in governing China‟s rare 
earth industry and the power relations that evolved therein. With consideration of  China‟s unique 
historical roots, political trajectories, national cultures and social traditions, it can be clearly 
concluded that the overtone of „big government‟ still manifests in today‟s governance regime in 
China, and the state achieves its hegemony over civil society and the business sector in 
governing China‟s rare earth industry based on the soft authoritarian regime, in which the plan 
and the market coexist. A dynamic understanding of China‟s varieties of governance enriches the 
abstract divisions of regime in the VoC research and extends the Gramscian governance studies 
to a wide range of state-dominated regimes. On the one hand, the empirical findings concerning 
the changing politico-economic regimes in China, as shown by the two pink rounded rectangles 
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in Figure 6, with consideration of micro-level hegemonic struggles between the state, business 
and civil society, provide a collective and dynamic understanding of the diversity of institutional 
foundation and formation in China and enrich the relatively abstract divisions in the VoC 
approach. On the other hand, the empirical findings concerning the changing hegemonic 
struggles under the different governance regimes in the development of China‟s varieties of 
environmental governance, as shown by the two green rounded rectangles in Figure 6, with 
macro-level consideration of politico-economic diversity, provide a deep insight into the 
diversity of politics and logics of economic activities for the neo-Gramscian approach, and help 
to identify the uniquely political and economic characteristics of the Chinese contexts directing 
to the distinctive hegemonic coalitions and bargaining processes over the environmental regime. 
 
Thus, based on a neo-Gramscian perspective on China‟s varieties of governance, the analytical 
chapters in this research, through combining a macro-level analysis of institutional diversity with 
a micro-level understanding of organisational struggles, identified the changing discourses of 
environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry with both historical depth and 
comparative breadth. On the basis of the dynamical investigation of the institutional diversity of 
Chinese governance regimes from a planned economy to a market economy, the researcher 
proposed a neo-Gramscian perspective on China‟s varieties of environmental governance to 
investigate the exercise of state power in regulating and coordinating hegemonic alliance 
building over the environmental domain in the development of environmental governance of 
China‟s rare earth industry, with a particular focus on the discourse of civil society, which will 
be further discussed in the following section. 
 
6.3.3 Varieties of Environmental Governance in China 
 
Since the 1980s, with the deepening of globalisation and internationalisation, the emergence of a 
huge number of environmental problems has called for a new method of environmental 
governance. As a new threat to hegemony in governance, as pointed out by Levy and Newell 
(2005), Gramsci‟s hegemony is meaningful in illustrating the particular assembly of economic, 
political and discursive relations that bind a network of state and non-state actors in 
environmental governance. Based on the neo-Gramscian understanding of hegemony, Levy and 
his colleagues illustrate how the state agencies, corporations and NGOs establish hegemonic 
coalitions in building policies and norms in environmental governance (Levy and Egan, 2003; 
Levy and Newell, 2005; Levy and Kaplan, 2008; Levy and Spicer, 2013; Levy et al., 2015). 
169 
 
 
Returning to Section 2.3.4 in the literature review, at the current stage, most studies on China‟s 
environmental governance in Chinese academia place more focus on how the different levels of 
government regulate the sustainable development process or how the heavy industries have 
changed their extensive production model to the intensive production model, and usually lack an 
integral consideration of the institutional variations of the state and power relations that evolved, 
as well as a dynamic framework to incorporate multiple actors into China‟s varieties of 
governance, which has called for a new method of environmental governance. Gramsci‟s 
hegemony has been widely used by Levy and his colleagues to illustrate the particular assembly 
of economic, political and discursive relations that bind a network of actors in environmental 
governance. Levy and his colleagues‟ research, with particular emphasis on the importance of 
private regimes in challenging groups with superior resources, contributes greatly to neo-
Gramscian studies on environmental governance. 
 
However, although Levy uses the neo-Gramscian framework to imply that all three main actors 
have similar access to power in environmental governance, most of his writings are overly 
focused on a pluralistic interpretation of Gramsci and fail to provide clear interpretations and 
explanations on the exact themes of government roles and how they function in constructing 
contemporary governance regimes. Thus, to a certain extent, a western-biased perspective 
prevents the neo-Gramscian approach being applied in other governance regimes. For example, 
Southern Africa has experienced a long period of regional cooperation; under such regionalism, 
inter-governmental organisations play a key role in an effective region-building process to 
combat the negative impacts of climate change (Nathan, 2012; Saunders et al., 2012; Söderbaum,  
2007). The countries in East Asia, such as China and Indonesia, as well as Japan and its emulator 
states such as South Korea and Singapore, formerly took a soft government-led path-dependency 
(Brandt and Rawski, 2008; Johnson, 2002; McCann, 2014). Under such soft authoritarianism, the 
different levels of government still play a key role in leading environmental governance 
development. Post-World War II capitalisms have displayed great variations of hegemonic 
struggles among the state, economic structure and civil society over the environmental domain; 
thus, there is a need to have a more plural view of what is going on in other politico-economic 
systems of the world, with macro consideration of VoC. 
 
Therefore, the researcher has integrated the neo-Gramscian approach and the VoC approach into 
the discourses of varieties of environmental governance in China‟s rare earth industry, to analyse 
170 
 
the institutional variations of the state in China‟s environmental governance of the rare earth 
industry and the hegemonic struggles involved therein from a planned economy to the current 
market-oriented economy. During a planned economy, the state achieved its hegemony by way 
of highly prescriptive commands, and all SOEs functioned as „processing plants‟ to fulfil 
government orders. Without the environmental awareness of the central state, environmental 
governance formerly gave way to economic growth under an extensive growth model. Moving to 
the current market-oriented economy, the unique historical and politico-economic trajectories 
still retain the „big-government‟ overtone in China‟s institutional diversity. Under government 
supervision, corporations have begun to place more focus on their environmental performance, 
so as to satisfy the government requirements, meet the national standards and increase green 
competitiveness in the global market; and green NGOs have increasingly played the roles of 
environmental monitor and conflict mediator. In the initial stage of China‟s susta inable 
development, the state still matters significantly in dealing with all kinds of environmental issues 
in business, for example, in BSRE‟s case, making payoffs, governing polluted sites, supporting 
corporate green upgrade; although there still exists disagreement regarding green growth plans 
within government agencies. Here a particular focus is placed on the application of the neo-
Gramscian approach in illustrating the unique discourse of civil society in China‟s varieties of 
environmental governance. 
 
The neo-Gramscian framework has been widely used in governance research, from a neo-liberal 
perspective, to address the potential of civil society to outmanoeuvre their rivals and balance the 
power relation between economic structures and political rules. In most neo-Gramscian studies 
on environmental governance, for example by Levy, civil society is regarded as a significant 
battleground for broader social and political conflicts, and NGOs are regarded as the autonomous 
social groups challenging the power of the state and the capital in environmental governance. 
However, different from Western countries, NGOs in China, as the only legitimate means to 
involve the populace in public decision-makings and to effect transformative change in China‟s 
democratisation process, have always been under strict government control. Under the 
government‟s „dual administration system‟, green NGOs in China have been much less 
successful and autonomous in political negotiations and contestations than those in Western 
countries. As the empirical findings show, the major obstacle for the vibrant development of 
green NGOs in environmental governance in China stems from the authoritarian nature of the 
Party state and its hostility to grassroots democracy. Although the state has s hifted more focus to 
the legality of NGOs‟ activities, rather than the legality of NGOs themselves in recent years, 
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green NGOs still need to secure a „non-oppositional stance‟ to government agencies in order that 
they can survive and grow. Thus, with particular emphasis on the unique discourse of civil 
society in China, the empirical findings in this research extend the Anglo-Saxon neo-Gramscian 
perspective to a state-dominated governance system, and draw a completely different image of 
civil society from Levy‟s governance research, with consideration of the institutional variations 
of the state and power relations that evolved as well as the specific political heritages of China‟s 
modern governance regime. 
 
With a deep understanding of the Chinese historical and political trajectories and a sensitive 
insight into the delicate relationship between the state and civil society in China, this research 
analysed the uniqueness of the discourse of civil society in China‟s varieties of environmental 
governance, identified the green NGOs as important material for analysing the involvement of 
Chinese civil society in China‟s contemporary varieties of governance, and displayed a series of 
distinct images of NGOs‟ activism in environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry 
based on several contested environmental issues discussed in Section 5.3.3.1. Based on the case 
study on BSRE over a series of contested environmental issues in the environmental governance 
of Baotou‟s rare earth industry, it can be concluded that the local green NGOs, under 
government supervision, usually played the roles of environmental monitor and dispute mediator, 
rather than fighting against the corporate polluting activities directly. Based on the fact that 
certain far-sighted corporations started to embrace green NGOs as their partners to improve their 
environmental management and green image in the Chinese market (for example IPE, which was 
briefly introduced in Section 5.3.3.2), with the deepening of the democratisation process in 
China, green NGOs may play the role of a „more equal partner with government entities in 
environmental conservation projects‟, and be more effective in advocating their environmental 
concerns with relatively fewer administrative constraints (Tang and Zhan, 2008, p. 439). 
However, as shown by the discussion of BSRE‟s payoff issue in Section 5.3.3.1, under China‟s 
soft authoritarian governance regime, the researcher was also concerned that the requests for 
cooperation with local green NGOs from local governments and local SOEs or even local large 
private corporations to promote green propaganda and mediate payoff disputes are more likely to 
challenge their neutral positions and bottom lines and lead certain NGOs with ambitions to 
improve social impacts and attract more funds to be captured by local authorities as their 
greening tools. This requires further observation and more empirical evidence in future studies 
on NGO activism in China‟s environmental politics. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
The discussion chapter summarised the empirical findings in the previous two analytical chapters 
and linked the empirical findings to the theoretical framework in the literature review chapter to 
discuss the importance of this research to move forward the theories and approaches in the VoC 
and neo-Gramscian studies. First of all, from the empirical findings, it can be concluded that 
China‟s politico-economic regime has transformed itself from state capitalism to a combination 
of multiple models of VoC, which enrich the relatively abstract typology divisions in the VoC 
studies with China‟s unique institutional diversity. Secondly, based on the politico-economic 
diversity in China, the research, with a neo-Gramscian perspective, concluded that the genres of 
the discourses of China‟s varieties of governance have been transformed from highly 
prescriptive planning to government supervision. The modern governance regime in China still 
maintain a „big-government‟ overtone, under which the state plays a significant role in political 
contestations and negotiations, and civil society, mainly exemplified and embodied as NGOs, 
has been greatly impeded by government restrictions, incompetence, and lack of trust. The 
empirical findings on China‟s varieties of governance, analysed by merging a neo-Gramscian 
perspective with China‟s VoC, provide a collective perspective on the dynamics of contemporary 
political contests engaging a variety of actors in China, which enrich the relatively „lean‟ societal 
theories in the VoC approach, and extend the Western-centric neo-Gramscian framework to 
China‟s distinctive state-dominated governance system with a completely different discourse of 
civil society from that in Levy‟s environmental governance research. Thirdly, based on the 
explanations of the changing hegemonic struggles in the history of environmental governance of 
China‟s rare earth industry, the research provided a more plural and dynamic understanding of 
the exercise of state power to regulate and coordinate the hegemonic coalitions between the state, 
business and civil society in the Chinese varieties of governance, which enriches the neo-
Gramscian governance studies with emphasis on the re-empowerment and re-regulation of the 
state and the unique discourse of civil society in the contemporary alliance building of China‟s 
environmental governance. Therefore, the empirical studies in this research, through combining 
a macro-level analysis of politico-economic diversity with a micro-level understanding of 
hegemonic struggles among multiple actors at an organisational level in the environmental 
governance of China‟s rare earth industry, are meaningful for further VoC studies on the 
dynamics of institutional diversity and further neo-Gramscian studies on varieties of governance 
regimes. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Summary of Research 
 
Moving into a new era of low-carbon economy and green growth, the global demand for rare 
earths has been greatly driven up by a series of high-tech and new-energy industries. Although 
rare earths have been widely utilised in „clean‟ technology to alleviate the environmental crisis, 
the processes of mining, smelting and separating rare earth ores cause heavy pollution, disposing 
considerable waste gas and water with a high concentration of toxic and radioactive residues. 
China supplies more than ninety percent of global rare earth materials, and over-exploitation of 
rare earth ores over the years has seriously polluted and poisoned the ecological environment in 
China‟s rare earth mining areas. In recent years, with ever more  stringent environmental 
requirements from the central state, environmental pollution in the upstream supply chains of 
many „clean‟ industries has become the most ironic and thorny issue in China‟s current 
environmental governance. This research investigated the development of the environmental 
governance of China‟s rare earth industry based on the two timeline stages , from the centralised 
planned economy (between the 1950s and the 1990s) to the current market-oriented economy 
(after the 1990s). 
 
To investigate the hegemonic struggles among government agencies, corporations and NGOs 
within the distinctive empirical setting of Chinese political economies, this research has argued 
for a neo-Gramscian perspective on the changing hegemonic struggles in the varieties of 
environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry. First of all, the researcher employed 
the VoC approach to model the changing typologies of China‟s complex politico-economic 
systems. From the perspective of VoC, the regime in China has completed a transition from state 
capitalism to the current combination of multiple models of VoC. China‟s institutional diversity 
is completely different from the discourses of Western countries, owing to its particular 
historical, political and economic trajectories; thus, the hegemonic coalitions and bargaining 
processes among the state, business, and civil society over China‟s environmental regime also 
manifest in many unique features. Then towards the critique of the VoC approach as less 
considerate of the politico-economic and societal themes, historical trajectories and dynamic 
power relations involved, the researcher introduced the Gramscian hegemony with a broader 
conception of power and politics to China‟s VoC, which incorporates multiple actors  in the 
particular assembly of economic, political and discursive relations in political contestations and 
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negotiations over the environmental domain in China. However, although the neo-Gramscian 
approach implies that all three pillar actors in governance have similar access to power in 
environmental governance, most current Gramscian studies on environmental governance are 
conducted within the context of neo-liberalism with an overemphasis on non-state power in the 
collective action of environmental governance. It is Anglo-Saxon centred to neglect or de-
empower the role of the state in contemporary alliance building. Even in the most neo-liberal 
countries, the state still matters in securing the functioning of markets, maintaining the cohesion 
of social organisations, and resolving the crisis of neoliberalism. Especially in non-market areas, 
such as environmental governance and climate control, state action is significant in constructing 
and securing the functioning of organisational structures. In VoC research, the re-configuration 
of state power in variations of institutional setups of post-World War II capitalism along 
different lines is particularly emphasised to develop the debate on capitalist diversity. Therefore, 
the researcher merged the neo-Gramscian approach with the VoC approach to provide a more 
plural and dynamic view on the institutional variations of the state and the power relations 
involved therein, as well as the hegemonic struggles among government agencies, corporations 
and NGOs. Based on a neo-Gramscian perspective on China‟s varieties of environmental 
governance, this research, through combining a macro-level analysis of institutional diversity 
with a micro-level understanding of organisational struggles, dynamically investiga ted the 
exercise of state power in regulating and coordinating the hegemonic coalitions in the 
development of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry. 
 
Based on an in-depth case study on BSRE, which monopolises the northern rare earth industry in 
China, the research collected primary data from the semi-structured interviews with the Baotou 
local government, BSRE and environmental NGOs as well as secondary data from documentary 
collection. By means of the three-dimensional analysis of CDA, this research carried out a 
timeline analysis to illustrate the different discourses of environmental governance in the 
different periods of New China: a textual analysis to discuss the changing genres, discourses and 
styles of environmental governance, particularly the changing hegemonic positions of the state, 
business and civil society in the development of environmental governance of China‟s rare earth 
industry; then a process analysis to illustrate how different textual elements hang together to 
produce integrated discourses of China‟s environmental governance in two timeline stages; and 
finally a social analysis, from the wider perspective of political discourse, to analyse the 
hegemonic struggles among the three pillar actors in governance. 
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In accordance with the changes in China‟s varieties of governance, the researcher identified the 
changing genres of the hegemonic discourses as shifting from highly prescriptive planning in the 
planned economy to government supervision in the market economy, and investigated how 
different actors in the development of China‟s environmental governance are created, adapt and 
coordinate over time. 
 
During the planned economy, the state achieved its intellectual and moral hegemony by way of 
highly prescriptive commands. Under the authoritarian governance of the CPC, the central state 
determined the logics of political rule and economic activities, and SOEs dominated the entire 
economic structure. However, under state capitalism, all SOEs functioned as „processing plants‟ 
to fulfil government orders. Thus, without sufficient environmental concerns and requirements 
from the central state, both the local governments and SOEs performed poorly in environmental 
governance. Especially for the heavy industries, for example the rare earth industry, with the 
central guideline of maximising outputs and realising rapid industrialisation, SOEs were fully 
engaged in immoderate mining and processing activities to increase outputs and profits, 
promoting economic growth at huge environmental cost. Therefore, without the environmental 
awareness of the central state, environmental governance gave way to economic growth under an 
extensive growth model. 
 
Moving to the current market-oriented economy, with the gradual establishment of the market 
mechanism and modern enterprise system, different levels of government have changed the role 
from „manager‟ to „supervisor‟ by decentralising their management power to the corporate level. 
With an increasingly open market, Western ideas of civil society and sustainability have deeply 
influenced the decision-makers‟ thoughts in China. The state has realised the importance of 
sustainable development and begun to play a leading role in promoting China‟s environmental 
governance practices. At the same time, with a gradual relaxation of government control over the 
economic structure and ultimately over public discourse, civil society, mainly exemplified and 
embodied as the development of NGOs, has gradually acted as a visible player in China‟s 
environmental governance. Under government supervision, the potential of non-state actors in 
securing sustainable development has gradually been unlocked: corporations have begun to place 
more focus on their environmental performance, so as to satisfy the government requirements, 
meet the national standards and increase green competitiveness in the global market; and green 
NGOs have increasingly played the role of environmental monitor and conflict mediator, rather 
than taking direct actions to fight against corporate pollution activities. In the initial stage of 
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China‟s sustainable development, the state still matters significantly in dealing with all kinds of 
environmental issues in business, for example, in BSRE‟s case, making payoffs, governing 
polluted sites, supporting corporate green upgrade; although there still exists disagreement 
regarding green growth plans within internal government departments.  
 
In short, under the current regime of soft authoritarian governance in China, it can be concluded 
that the state acts in a supreme role in developing environmental policies and regulations, 
exploring green strategies and techniques, monitoring and supervising industrial green 
performance; corporations, directly involved in environmental pollution, also play a significant 
role in improving their environmental performance and green competitiveness in a global market; 
and green NGOs, whose potential in the hegemonic struggle has largely been restricted by the 
government‟s „dual administrative system‟, have made limited but inspiring progress in 
facilitating collective action in China‟s environmental governance. The unique historical and 
politico-economic trajectories of one-party dominance over 5,000 years are still reflected in the 
„big-government‟ overtone in today‟s institutional diversity of China. According to Harvey 
(2005, p. 151), China is moving towards „neoliberalisation and the reconstitution of class power, 
albeit with distinctly Chinese characteristics‟. With the deepening of the democratisa tion process 
in China, Gramscian hegemony may manifest a different meaning in the further development of 
China‟s varieties of environmental governance. 
 
7.2 Contribution of Research 
 
The theoretical framework and empirical findings offered in this research made a number of 
contributions to the VoC approach to institutional diversity and the neo-Gramscian studies on 
environmental governance. First of all, based on the major divisions of VoC, this research 
identified China‟s unique politico-economic regimes shifting from state capitalism to the current 
combination of multiple models of VoC. With considerable divergences and great uniqueness in 
its politics, China‟s current politico-economic regime contains multiple tactics and models. 
Based on the specific politico-economic heritages and particular historical trajectories in China, 
the empowerment of the state after the foundation of New China and the re-configuration of the 
state power after the start of the market-oriented reform have been identified as the unique 
characteristics of China‟s changing governance regimes, which enriched the conventional 
divisions of VoC in the „comparative capitalisms‟ literature with „a form of state-manipulated 
market economy‟ (Harvey, 2005, p. 122). 
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Secondly, the research summarised the major critiques on the abstract and macro-level divisions 
of VoC, as lacking of consideration of societal themes of power relations and political 
contestations within varying regime typologies. Reacting to these critiques, the researcher 
merged the neo-Gramscian approach with the VoC approach to provide a dynamic and micro-
level understanding of the hegemonic struggles in China‟s varieties of governance. On the one 
hand, the VoC approach helps the neo-Gramscian framework to identify the unique political and 
economic characteristics of China‟s institutional formations; on the other hand, the neo-
Gramscian approach, with consideration of hegemonic struggles among multiple actors, provides 
a dynamic understanding of the ideological, political and social dimensions of institutional 
diversity in China‟s unique governance regime.  With a neo-Gramscian perspective on China‟s 
VoC, the changing genres of varieties of governance in China were identified as evolving from 
highly prescriptive planning to government supervision in the context of China‟s soft 
authoritarian regime. 
 
Finally, as environmental issues are a new crisis to hegemony, although the neo-Gramscian 
approach provides a valuable theoretical framework with which to analyse the cha nging 
hegemonic struggles among the state, business and civil society in China‟s environmental 
governance, most existing Gramscian governance studies, for example, by David Levy and 
others, are set within neo-liberal countries, and focus overly on a pluralistic interpretation of 
Gramsci from a neoliberal perspective. In other words, with overemphasis of corporate political 
power and NGO‟s counter-hegemonic power, most neo-Gramscian studies on environmental 
governance are Anglo-Saxon centred with less attention to clarifying the re-regulation and re-
configuration of state power in contemporary alliance building, although essentially implying 
that all three main actors have similar access to power in environmental governance. This 
research has been more critical of that by the illustrations of the institutional variations of the 
state in China‟s political negotiations and contestations and the explanations of the exercise of 
state power to regulate and coordinate the hegemonic coalitions in the environmental governance 
of China‟s rare earth industry. 
 
Thus, to extend the neo-Gramscian framework to China‟s unique soft authoritarian governance 
regime and investigate the changing discourses of environmental governance of China‟s rare 
earth industry, this research proposed a neo-Gramscian perspective on varieties of environmental 
governance, through combining macro-level analysis of institutional diversity with micro-level 
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understanding of hegemonic struggles. Following Fairclough‟s CDA approach, the research 
carried out a textual analysis to describe the different roles of the state, business and civil society 
in contestations over the environmental domain in China‟s rare earth industry; then a process 
analysis to interpret the changing discourses of the development of environmental governance of 
China‟s rare earth industry; and finally a social analysis to explain the changing hegemonic 
struggles among government agencies, corporations and green NGOs over a series of 
environmental issues in China‟s rare earth industry.  Based on the CDA approach, the research 
identified the varieties of governance in China at the macro level, discussed the changing 
hegemonic struggles in the environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry at the micro 
level, and particularly illustrated the unique discourse of civil society in China‟s state-dominated 
governance regime, which bridged the empirical gap for the Gramscian governance research in 
China‟s unique environmental governance regime and displayed a series of distinctive images of 
the environmental struggles in China‟s rare earth industry.  
 
7.3 Limitations of Research and Suggested Areas for Further Research 
 
Although a number of theoretical and empirical contributions are made by this research, the 
researcher must acknowledge that there are some limitations of the research. First of all, there is 
only one case study on BSRE to analyse the development of environmental governance o f the 
rare earth industry in China, although it is the most typical case to represent the development of 
the Chinese rare earth industry after the foundation of New China, and its green performance has 
attracted global attention from government authorities, firms, scholars and the global media to 
Baotou‟s rare earth industry. The empirical evidence obtained from the researcher‟s fieldwork is 
also appropriate for illustrating the changing roles of the different levels of government, 
corporations and green NGOs and their hegemonic struggles in the development of 
environmental governance of China‟s rare earth industry.  
 
At the initial stage of the development of NGOs in China, there is a relative lack of empirical 
evidence for grassroots green NGOs playing an active role in environmental governance. In this 
research, the only empirical evidence is that the local green NGOs played the role of 
environmental monitor to disclose the corporate polluting activities, and then played the role of 
mediator to deal with the payoff disputes between the local residents and BSRE. The influence 
of IPE‟s pollution maps, as another small example, is briefly illustrated in Section 5.3.3.2, to 
display the biggest progress that grassroots green NGOs have achieved at the current stage in 
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China. This can particularly be investigated as another case in future, to discuss the influence of 
NGO activism in environmental governance with the deepening of the democratisation process 
in China. 
 
As mentioned before, at the current stage, cooperation requests with grassroots NGOs from local 
governments and local businesses usually have certain ulterior motives. In most cases, they need 
an organisation with public trust to deal with public discontent or improve public recognition. 
Within the soft authoritarian governance system in China, the concern of how to prevent green 
NGOs being captured as greening tools by local governments or large SOEs has challenged the 
efficiency of the development of China‟s environmental governance in the foreseeable future as 
well as the hegemonic relations in China‟s further democratisation process. The opportunities to 
„cooperate‟ with local governments and large SOEs may challenge NGOs‟ neutral positions, 
original principles and bottom lines. Although there is no empirical evidence for NGOs‟ self-lost 
cooperation with the state and capital in pursuit of higher social status, greater social impact and 
increase social funds, the researcher still has a certain degree of concern that with the vibrant 
development of civil society in China, certain self-serving NGOs with unresponsive and 
underskilled staff may act only for their own private interests, which necessitates further in-depth 
investigations and on-site observations of the activism of NGOs in the future development of 
China‟s environmental governance. With the deepening of democratisation process in China, 
Gramscian hegemony may manifest a different meaning in the further development of China‟s 
varieties of environmental governance. 
 
7.4 Concluding Remarks: Environmental Concerns of the Global Rare Earth Industry 
 
As the world moves into a new era of low-carbon economy, global demand of rare earths has 
been driven up greatly due to the huge consumption in high-tech and new-energy industries, 
which has led to the shortage of rare earths in the global market. Moreover, the global geological 
distribution of rare earth ores has led the supplies to be concentrated in a few countries. China, 
with more than 36% of the world‟s reserves of rare earths, provides more than ninety percent of 
global consumption. The application market of rare earth materials, covering a wide range from 
precision missiles to smart phones, is mainly concentrated in China, Japan, the US, and some 
European countries such as Germany and France. The US and Japan are the two largest 
consumers of rare earth materials, and account for nearly 60% of world total consumption of rare 
earths. Although Japan does not have rare earth deposits, it achieves the highest value-added of 
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rare earths in the world: for example, in Japan, the total import amount of rare earth metals is 
about 38,000 tons annually and only two automotive manufactures, Honda and Toyota, could 
consume all of this quota (Melfi et al., 2008; Spiegel, 2010; Zhang and Qiu, 1999). 
 
In the new era of green growth, according to Mason (2009), for green capitalism, there are 
mainly two core technologies, including manufacturing permanent magnets used in almost all 
gadgets guided by computers, and manufacturing battery powered cars to replace the traditional 
petrol or diesel engines. Both of these two technologies rely heavily on rare earths. Motor 
vehicles are widely regarded as one of the most significant contributors to global warmin g 
(Decicco and Fung, 2006). In order to reduce carbon emissions and greenhouse gas when 
engines burn fuel, hybrid cars running on a combination of liquid fuel and electricity and pure-
electric cars have been widely developed to meet the requirements of sustainability. Marketed as 
being environment-friendly, pure-electric and hybrid cars have been racking up big sales in 
recent years, especially stimulated by higher prices of petrol and diesel. 
 
However, although rare earths have been widely regarded as an energy-efficient resource for 
many new-energy and high-tech industries to alleviate the environmental crisis, the mining, 
smelting and separating activities of rare earth ores in the upstream supply chains produce heavy 
pollution. As the largest rare earth supplier in the world, China‟s rare earth industry has 
generated a huge amount of toxic and hazardous gases and waste water with a high concentration 
of radioactive residues, which has heavily polluted and poisoned the Chinese ecological 
environment system. In an article in the Daily Mail, as mentioned in Section 5.3.2.2, the true cost 
of Britain's clean, green wind power experiment is attributed to the heavy environmental 
pollution on a disastrous scale in China, and the authors of the article appealed for  wider focus 
on the incredible environmental cost caused by the expansion of the global rare earth industry 
(Parry and Douglas, 2011). 
 
Since the 1990s, the central state in China has gradually realised that the rare earth industry, as a 
typically high-energy-consuming sector in the steel and iron industry, and also with the obvious 
nature of a heavily-polluting chemical industry, has caused a large number of „very tricky‟ 
environmental problems. Since 2005, the MIIT and the MC have begun to implement control 
over the total mining amount of rare earth ores and the total output amount of rare earth materials. 
The highly prescriptive plans emerged in the rare earth industry again to cut the export quota of 
rare earth metals by 0.5% in 2005, 7% in 2006, 3% in 2007, and 6% in 2008 (Treadgold and 
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Kelly, 2008). The export restriction plans sent the prices of rare earths skyrocketing in the global 
market, and they increased by more than 13 times from 2008 to 2011 (Bernstein Group, 2011). 
According to Bourzac (2011), even without the export restrictions in China, the worldwide 
supply of rare earth metals will soon fall short of demand. Due to the severe supply shortage of 
rare earths, recent market surveys show that the production processes of wind turbines and 
electric vehicles have slowed down (Pool, 2012; Nesbit, 2013; Hammond and Mitchell, 2014). 
 
Facing export restrictions in China, a few countries have begun to develop strategies to secure 
the supplies of rare earth materials, such as exploring new mines and re-mining old mines. For 
example, in 2011, Japan launched a $200 million programme to secure the supplies of rare earths 
for domestic manufacturing through developing new suppliers in Mongolia, Australia and 
Vietnam (Bourzac, 2011). The largest rare earth mine in the US, in Mountain Pass, California, 
was also re-mined in 2012 to serve the increasing domestic needs. This mine in California had 
provided 100% of the rare earth consumption in the US market in the mid -1980s, but dwindled 
with China‟s increasing supply (Venton, 2012). Backing Levy and Newell‟s edited book, ‘The 
Business of Global Environmental Governance’, with the new round of the vibrant boost of rare 
earth mining and processing activities worldwide, increased attention should be paid to the 
environmental performance of the global rare earth industry. The state agencies, multinational 
corporations, international NGOs and intergovernmental actors should be more actively involved 
in contestations over structures and the process of global environmental governance, with 
particular emphasis on the environmental performance and green competitiveness of the global 
rare earth industry. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I – Guided Questions of Interviews 
 
The interview guide provides the major questions in the semi-structured interviews with the 
government officers from the Baotou government, corporate managers from BSRE and 
environmental officers from the different green NGOs. 
 
A. Introduction 
 
a) Explanation of purpose of research, relevance and importance of the interview 
b) Explanation of anonymity and confidentiality of interview 
c) Explanation of rights of interviewee 
 
B. Background Information 
 
a) Name of interviewee (optional) 
b) Institution of interviewee 
 
C. Interview Questions for government officers 
 
a) General questions: 
1. Could you briefly introduce your department? What is the main role of your department? 
2. What do you think about environmental governance? 
3. What does environmental governance mean to your department? 
4. In your opinion, what are the most distinctive features of the Chinese rare earth industry?  
 
b) Questions on the planned economy: 
5. What were the roles of the central and local governments in BSRE‟s management in the 
planned economy? 
6. In your opinion, how did BSRE perform in corporate governance during the planned 
economy period? Why? 
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7. What roles did the central state/the local governments/BSRE play in the environmental 
governance of the rare earth industry in that period? Could you give an example? 
8. What do you think about the low efficiency of China‟s environmental governance during 
the planned economy? What was the most significant reason for this low efficiency in 
your opinion? 
9. As we all know, in the 1990s, Baotou‟s rare earth industry encountered serious minin g 
chaos. Why did this happen in your point of view? Could you offer me more details? 
 
c) Questions on the market economy: 
10. After the 1990s, do you think the roles of the central and local governments in BSRE‟s 
management changed? What are the differences between the past and the present 
situations? 
11. Does BSRE behave differently in corporate governance? What are the differences 
between the past and the present situations? 
12. Regarding the environmental governance of the rare earth industry, after the 1990s, what 
are the changing roles of the central state/the local governments/BSRE in your point of 
view? 
13. In your opinion, do green NGOs play an important role in the current environmental 
governance system? Why? 
14. How did the local governments support BSRE‟s industrial integration? What are the 
main challenges to the consolidation of the rare earth industry? 
15. Which do you think is more important in the current government decision-makings: 
economic growth or sustainable development? Is there any conflict between the different 
governmental institutions in drafting strategies? 
 
D. Interview Questions for corporate managers 
 
a) General questions: 
1. Could you briefly introduce BSRE? What are the advantages of BSRE in China‟s rare 
earth industry? 
2. What do you think about environmental governance? 
3. What does environmental governance mean to your company? 
 
b) Questions on the planned economy: 
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4. What were the roles of the central and local governments in BSRE‟s management in the 
planned economy? 
5. In your opinion, how did BSRE perform in corporate governance during the planned 
economy period? Why? 
6. As we all know, in the 1990s, Baotou‟s rare earth industry encountered serious mining 
chaos. Why did this happen in your point of view? Could you offer me more details? 
7. What roles did the central state/the local governments/BSRE play in the environmental 
governance of rare earth industry in that period? Could you give an example? 
8. What do you think about the low efficiency of China‟s environmental governance during 
the planned economy? What was the most significant reason for this low efficiency in 
your opinion? 
 
c) Questions on the market economy: 
9. After the 1990s, do you think the roles of the central and local governments in BSRE‟s 
management changed? What are the differences between the past and the present 
situations? 
10. Does BSRE behave differently in corporate governance? What are the differences 
between the past and the present situations? 
11. Regarding the environmental governance of the rare earth industry, after the 1990s, what 
are the changing roles of the central state/the local governments/BSRE in your point of 
view? 
12. In your opinion, what are the main drivers for the state to focus on the sustainable 
development of the rare earth industry? 
13. Why did your company start to pay attention to your green performance? 
14. Have you taken actions to improve your green performance? How did you do that? Could 
you provide more details? 
15. How did the local governments support your industrial integration? In your opinion, is 
there any challenge to the consolidation of the rare earth industry? If so, how did you deal 
with this challenge?  
16. After the industrial consolidation, is there any new governmental requirement for your 
green performance? Have you taken any action to respond? 
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E. Interview Questions for NGO officers 
 
a) General questions: 
1. Could you briefly introduce the aim and scope of your institution?  
2. What do you think about environmental governance? 
3. Have you carried out any activity to participate in China‟s environmental governance? 
How did you do that? 
4. Do you think the mass media matters in China‟s environmental governance? Why? What 
do they mean to your activities in China? 
 
b) Questions on the planned economy: 
5. What roles did the central state/the local governments/BSRE play in the environmental 
governance of rare earth industry in that period? Could you give an example? 
6. What do you think about the low efficiency of China‟s environmental governance during 
the planned economy? What was the most significant reason for this low efficiency in 
your opinion? 
7. As we all know, in the 1990s, Baotou‟s rare earth industry encountered serious mining 
chaos. Could you offer me more details? 
8. In your opinion, what were the most important reasons for the ineffectiveness of civil 
society in China‟s environmental governance? 
 
c) Questions on the market economy: 
9. Regarding the environmental governance of the rare earth industry, after the 1990s, what 
are the changing roles of the central state/the local governments/BSRE in your point of 
view? How did these changes happen? 
10. Do green NGOs play an active role in the current environmental governance system? 
How do they perform?  
11. Is there any obstacle or restriction preventing green NGOs carrying out green activities 
and participating in the public environmental programmes? How do you survive under 
the Chinese state-dominated governance regime? 
12. In your point of view, what are the differences between NGO activism in China and in 
Western countries? 
13. What are your major strategies to fight against corporate polluting activities? 
186 
 
14. Have you ever been engaged in any campaign regarding the environmental governance 
of China‟s rare earth industry? If so, what roles did you play? And how about the results?  
 
Further open questions will be asked based on participants‟ replies. 
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Appendix II – Lists of Interviewees 
 
Interviewee from Corporation 
Code Institution Interview Date 
COM1 Department of Marketing March 28, 2013 
COM2 Department of Production Technology August 26, 2013 
COM3 General Office August 29, 2013 
COM4 Board of Directors September 9, 2013 
COM5 Board of Directors September 9, 2013  
 
Interviewee from Government 
Code Institution Interview Date 
GOV1 
Baotou Economic and Information Technology 
Commission 
August 23, 2013 
GOV2 Baotou Business Bureau August 30, 2013 
GOV3 Baotou Environmental Protection Bureau September 16, 2013 
 
Interviewee from NGO 
Code Institution Interview Date 
NGO1 Baotou Environmental Science Institution August 22, 2013 
NGO2 
Baotou Environmental Protection Industry 
Association 
August 23, 2013 
NGO3 
Baotou Environmental Protection Volunteers 
Association  
September 12, 2013 
NGO4 Baotou Environment Federation  September 12, 2013 
NGO5 Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs March 12, 2013 
NGO6 Green Beagle Environmental Institution  March 15, 2013 
NGO7 
Enviro-Friends Science and Technology 
Research Center 
March 19, 2013 
NGO8 Institute of Green Earth Volunteers  March 21, 2013 
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